Democrats
Must Offer A
New Blueprint For Iraq
By Scott Ritter
17 November, 2006
AlterNet
With
the dramatic victory of the Democratic Party in the recent mid-term
elections, winning as it did a majority in the House of Representatives
and the United States Senate, there appear to be heightened expectations
in many corners of the United States that this new Congress will be
able to somehow act on the expectations of the American people and help
President Bush chart a new policy course in Iraq. The resignation of
Donald Rumsfeld, together with the appointment of the former CIA Director
Bob Gates, represents a transition from ideology to pragmatism in a
Defense Department torn apart by the ongoing debacle in Iraq. Mr. Gates
not only represents a break from the Rumsfeldian past, but also brings
with him his recent participation in the Iraq Study Group, a bipartisan
committee tasked with exploring new policy directions for the United
States in Iraq.
The political astuteness of the decision by President Bush to replace
Rumsfeld with Gates has escaped notice by many Democrats, who seem inclined
simply to gloat over the demise of their archenemy. However, removing
Rumsfeld not only eliminated an all-too convenient lightening rod for
democratic angst over Bush's Iraq policies, but also, by putting Gates
up in his stead, bought the Bush administration much needed political
breathing room, as Gate's cannot be held accountable for policy failures
he had nothing to do with either formulating or implementing. Indeed,
given the fact that the Democrats have as of yet failed to articulate
anything that remotely resembles a sound policy option regarding Iraq,
instead falling back on the age-old tradition of criticizing without
offering a solution of their own, a Gates controlled Defense Department
will be almost untouchable from an oversight perspective, especially
if Gates chooses to act on any of the policy options the Baker-led Iraq
Study Group may recommend to the President.
It is imperative that the
Democratic Party stake out a position on Iraq before the Iraq Study
Group publicly announces its findings and recommendations.
This would enable the Democrats
to enter into their mandated tasks of policy oversight from a position
of strength, and not the exceptionally weak position they currently
occupy. The American people, in voting in the Democrats, let their frustration
over the current policy direction in Iraq manifest itself in real change.
Lacking any policy option of their own, the Democratic Party could very
well find itself in a position where it will have to accept any policy
formulation put forward by the Iraq Study Group simply because it has
nothing in its stead to offer. Any opposition to a change in policy
direction put forward by the Iraq Study Group, regardless of justification,
without a sound alternative to be articulated, will look more like political
grandstanding than constitutionally mandated oversight, and will be
frowned upon by an American electorate with such high hopes and demands.
What could a Democratic Iraq
Strategy look like? Perhaps we should start from a position of what
it should not look like. There is much talk about the wisdom of recognizing
the inevitable, and accept that post-Saddam Iraq, as had been the case
with the former Yugoslavia, is incapable of surviving as a unified nation
state, and should be broken down into three basic sub-states, one for
the Shi'a Arab majority, one for the Sunni Arab minority, and one for
the Kurds. While this simplistic vision has its attractions (indeed,
there are a number of esteemed American statesmen, Peter Galbraith,
the former US Ambassador to Croatia, among them, who embrace such a
concept, especially for the Kurds), it is in fact a plan totally devoid
of reality. If the goal of breaking Iraq into three separate components
is to reduce the likelihood of civil conflict, the fact is that in doing
so the end result will be an environment even more conducive to internal
strife that manifests itself violently.
The fact of the matter is
that in Iraq today there is no homogeneous Shi'a, Sunni or Kurd community
to draw upon in forming these theoretical ethnic/religious sub-states.
The only one of the three which comes close to having a singular unifying
national vision are the Kurds, and they are fatally split between competing
political entities, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Peoples
Union of Kurdistan (PUK). As recently as 1997 these two parties were
engaged in an all-out civil war of their own, and the truce they have
been pressured to consummate in the aftermath of the fall of Saddam
is tenuous at best. The growing presence of a third Kurdish entity,
the Turkish Kurdish Worker's Party, or PKK, in northern Iraq, brings
with it the reality that America's NATO ally, Turkey, will never permit
an independent Kurdish state to be carved out of Iraq (something the
Turkish military has made quite clear to all parties involved). The
fractures between Iraq's Kurds are so great, and their hold on unified
governance so fragile, that any pressure brought to bear on the tenuous
union between the KDP and PUK would result in its immediate dissolution
and return to internecine violence, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani's
protestations to the contrary notwithstanding.
The Sunni represent a growing
quandary for the United States and the region. Once the bedrock foundation
of secular stability in Iraq under Saddam Hussein, the Sunni of Iraq
today represent the single greatest threat to Iraqi peace and security,
and regional stability, due in part to their near-total disenfranchisement
since the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq in March 2003. Where
once the Ba'ath Party reigned supreme, the Sunni's of Iraq today find
their minority status even further reinforced by the reality that their
community has been fractured into numerous entities which increasingly
are as much at odds with themselves as they are with the Kurds and Shi'a
of Iraq. From this internal discord has grown a vigorous Al-Qaeda-based
terror organization.
Initially fostered by secular
Sunni seeking to exploit the instability in Iraq brought on by terrorism
to undermine the American occupation of Iraq (a tactic which has worked
extremely well), the instability fueled by terror also weakened the
ability of the secular Sunni to contain the vehemently anti-western
Al-Qaeda, who have benefited from their close proximity to Saudi Arabia
and the birth place of both Wahabism and Osama Bin Laden. Universal
opposition to the American occupation of Iraq, fueled by examples of
torture, rape and murder that have emerged as a direct result of this
occupation, have provided the Al-Qaeda organization inside Iraq with
no shortage of recruits, both foreign and indigenous.
The cornerstone of any American
policy in Iraq must be the defeat of this Iraqi Al-Qaeda terror organization.
The key to achieving this result is to manufacture a split between any
Iraqi Al-Qaeda and their Sunni hosts. As a Sunni-based religious fundamentalist
movement, Iraqi Al-Qaeda will never be able to establish itself within
the Shi'a majority. The Sunni host is the only chance such an organization
has to survive. Therefore, it is essential that the Sunni community
of Iraq be brought into any political solution in a manner that addresses
their legitimate concerns as well as rewards them for their decision
to be a responsible part of a unified post-Saddam Iraq. The Sunni, in
exchange for helping bring down Al-Qaeda in Iraq and agreeing to peacefully
coexist with their Shi'a and Kurdish neighbors, should be given assurances
that they will have a viable place in any future government of Iraq,
one inclusive of a share of Iraq's oil wealth.
There are two keys to making
this happen. The first requires the United States to help orchestrate
a coalition of Iraq's Sunni-dominated neighbors in Jordan, Syria and
Saudi Arabia. These three nations would agree to work with any new Iraqi
Government to strangle the financial and personnel support being received
from abroad by the Iraqi Al-Qaeda. Saudi Arabia would play a particularly
vital role, since it provides host to the very Wahabist influences that
serve as the religious and ideological motivators of Al-Qaeda in Iraq.
The role of Syria also cannot
be understated. Syria has provided host to the very secular Iraqi Sunnis
the United States needs to turn to if a viable solution to the question
of peace and stability in Iraq is to be found. Many of these secular
Iraqi Sunni's are today engaged in helping foment and support the anti-American
insurgency. By seeking Syrian assistance in reaching an accommodation
with these forces, the United States can initiate the process of separating
Iraqi Al-Qaeda from their Sunni hosts. The secular Sunni can provide
an effective bridge into the ranks of the Sunni tribes, where the reign
of the local Sheik more than often outweighs the influence of the local
Mullah.
Identifying, isolating and
eliminating those Sunni religious elements which refuse to work within
the framework of a unified Iraqi government operating in a post-US occupation
Iraq, and instead choose to side with the forces of Al-Qaeda terror,
is a job that only the Sunni themselves can accomplish. The goal of
the United States should be to facilitate this as rapidly as possible.
That this will require a new policy direction vis-à-vis Syria
goes without saying, and needs to be recognized and embraced by those
in the Democratic Party seeking an end to the current Iraqi quagmire.
The next key is for a political
alliance to be struck between a Sunni alliance of tribal, religious
and secular (i.e., former Ba'athist) officials and organizations and
the most influential indigenous Shi'a group in Iraq today, the Mahdi
Army of the Mokhtar al-Sadr. If the United States wants the future government
of Iraq to reflect genuine internal dynamics of that country free from
outside influence, then it must seek to empower those elements that
are truly reflective of the will of the Iraqi people. Recognition (and
active support) of a union that brings together the nationalistic Sunni
insurgency (versus Al-Qaeda terrorism) and the nationalistic Mahdi Army
is the best way to empower the internal voice of Iraq. A Sunni-Shi'a
union of this nature would also enable a strong central government in
Baghdad to realistically exist, and exert its influence and control
over the Kurds in the north, the pro-Iranian militias of the south,
and the anarchy that exists in the Sunni Anbar province of western Iraq.
It also means that the United
States must turn its back on the government in helped create. The United
States must, in the end, break with its failed policy of attempted imposed
democracy, and declare the illegitimate by-product of the union of American
neo-conservative militaristic adventure and post-Saddam Iraqi chaos,
also known as the Government headed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki,
null and void. This government has no legitimacy, no power, and no chance
of success. To continue to hold the future of Iraq hostage to its ineffective
and corrupt governance only makes an eventual solution to the quagmire
that engulfs Iraq that much more uncertain and difficult to achieve.
The elections of January
2005 which spawned the Maliki government were paid for with the blood
and sacrifice of hundreds of American service members, not to mention
thousands of Iraqis, and there will be those who will seek to hold on
to this vestige of a failed dream if for no other reason than to honor
those who gave the ultimate sacrifice in attempting to bring the dream
to fruition.
But to grasp at the memory
of a noble mission, whether it was in Falluja, Najaf, Samara, Baghdad
or anywhere else in Iraq, while the overarching policy position in Iraq
has fragmented into a thousand disparate pieces, does nothing to sustain
the sacrifice of the fallen. In fact, by maintaining a policy direction
that fails to recognize the reality of Iraq for the sole purpose of
respecting those who have fallen only ensures that their sacrifice will
be stained with the blood of others who will die in support of a dream
long since mutated into a nightmare.
The Iraqi experiment in American-imposed
democracy has failed. The new mission is, simply put, stability operations.
The government of Nouri al-Maliki
represents the antithesis of stability, and therefore must be dissolved
so that a new government can rule in its place.
The removal of Nouri al-Maliki
can be achieved with little or no problems, if handled properly. First
and foremost there must be recognition on the part of Washington, DC
that the United States will not have any veto or final say over what
form the system of governance that emerges in the post-Maliki period
takes. In order to have any legitimacy, the future government of Iraq
must be a product of Iraqi politicians, representative of Iraqi goals
and objectives. The United States has a critical role to play in facilitating
the circumstances under which these interested parties can come together,
and later in nurturing and sustaining whatever agreement on governance
is reached, but the day of the US pro-Consul is over.
The Sunni-Shi'a alliance
would not, and could not, be expected to govern in isolation. The two
remaining key political players outside of such an alliance, the pro-Iranian
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, or SCIRI, and the
Kurds of northern Iraq, would have to be brought in as well. But any
effort to incorporate these two elements into a future government of
Iraqi unity must be made in concert with a substantive diplomatic effort
on the part of the United States to rein in the outside influence of
Iran in the affairs of Iraq on the one hand, and any notions of independence
on the part of the Kurds on the other. Both of these objectives can
be reached, but will require a major shift in policy direction on the
part of the United States.
The most dramatic shift would
involve a complete strategic rethinking of America's posture vis-à-vis
Iran. As currently structured, the US policy toward Iran is one of increasing
confrontation leading to the inevitability of conflict that will, from
the standpoint of the United States, result in regime change in Iran.
This policy stance is more reflective of an overarching ideologically
motivated position that embraces the notion of regional transformation
in the Middle East, as opposed to a genuine reaction to any legitimate
national security concerns emanating from within Iran. If we are considering
a radical restructuring of our failed Iraq policy, then we must recognize
the failure of the ideologically motivated policy of regional transformation,
inclusive of the notion of regime change, which produced this failure.
Iran is not the problem;
America's policy is.
Iran represents the best
hope the United States has of creating a viable unified Iraqi government
that is capable of instilling peace and stability. And it is in Iran's
own interest to promote such a government. The current Iranian support
of SCIRI and other pro-Iranian elements inside Iraq is borne from a
desire on the part of Iran to ensure that whatever government emerges
in Iraq does not embrace policies which create conditions that would
put Iraq on course for a repeat of the tensions which led to the bloody
Iran-Iraq War of the 1980's. Iran views the American occupation of Iraq
as a horrific force of destabilization that threatens Iran and the region,
and has reacted accordingly.
If the United States were
willing to sit down with the Iranians and enter into negotiations about
the future of Iraq, especially if this future was one which included
a dramatically reduced presence of the United States in Iraq coupled
with a reversal of the US policy of regional transformation in the Middle
East inclusive of regime change in Tehran, there is good reason to believe
that the Iranians would assist not only in the removal of the Maliki
Government in Baghdad, but also in the creation of a new unified Iraqi
government where the influence of the pro-Iranian SCIRI was moderated
to reflect its actual representative influence inside Iraq.
Iran would also prove to
be a very influential player in resolving the Kurdish problem in northern
Iraq. There can be no doubt that any hope of a viable unified Iraqi
government must incorporate some form of genuine Kurdish autonomy in
northern Iraq, one that recognizes the unique Kurdish language and culture,
but which does not promote the concept of Kurdish independence. Iran,
with a large and troublesome Kurdish minority of its own, would be a
logical ally in support of any such policy. Any shift in policy by the
United States which facilitates the inclusion of Iran as a partner in
creating a post-occupation Iraqi government would also enable Iran to
work more closely with Turkey in creating a unified front in the face
of any notions of Kurdish independence on the part of Iraq's Kurds.
Autonomy, not independence, should become the buzz phrase with which
all parties address the Kurdish problem in the Middle East.
Both Iran and Turkey should
be pressed by the United States not only to support an autonomous Kurdish
region in Iraq, but also to permit greater autonomy of their own respective
Kurdish populations. This is an important element of any US diplomatic
effort in support of a post-occupation Iraq, because there can be no
talk of a viable unified Iraq so long as northern Iraq serves as a base
of operations for the Turkish PKK Kurdish rebels. A unified Iraq must
work with the Turks and the Iranians to eradicate the PKK in northern
Iraq. But any effort to liquidate the PKK which is not inclusive of
a plan to address the root problems in Turkey (and in Iran) which serve
to give legitimacy to movements like the PKK will only serve to prolong
the violence in the region, and with it the suffering of the Kurdish
people. This is one area in which a full-court diplomatic press by the
United States, inclusive of a new policy direction regarding Iran, could
pay long-term benefits for all.
Once serious negotiations
have been entered into with Iran, Syria, Turkey, Jordan, Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia, as well as the various Iraqi factions of concerns (with
an emphasis on creating a viable alliance between Sunni insurgents and
the Shi'a Mahdi Army), the United States needs to get down to the brass
tacks of leaving Iraq. The first order of business is to establish goal-based
decision points that are tied to the withdrawal of forces.
The first of these should
be the establishment of a cease-fire agreement between the American
occupiers and the Sunni and Shi'a insurgents. Once this cease-fire has
been agreed to, the United States would fall back to clearly defined
bases within Iraq. These would include a major base in Anbar province
(possibly the massive H-2 airbase complex), the Balad Base north of
Baghdad, and Baghdad Airport. Lesser presence would be maintained in
the so-called "Green Zone" in Baghdad, and in the Kurdish
north. American forces would be withdrawn from Mosul, Tikrit, Al-Qaim,
and other operating areas, as well as the streets of Baghdad. Operations
would be limited to force protection.
The immediate impact of such
a posture change would be to dramatically cut the number of troops required
to serve in Iraq. The first order of business should be to take advantage
of these force reductions by removing from Iraq most if not all of the
reserve and National Guard units, eliminating some of the greatest sources
of strain on the American public. The return of American reserve and
National Guard forces from their deployments in Iraq would result in
immediate political dividends for the Democrats, shutting down the highly
unpopular 'back door draft' instituted by the Rumsfeld-led Defense Department.
As the new Iraqi government
takes shape (through protracted negotiations monitored, but not dominated
or directed, by the United States), the United States could then trade
US military presence for Iraqi security presence. For instance, as the
new government assumes responsibility for security in Baghdad, the United
States could start phasing out its presence at Baghdad Airport. As central
authority is expanded, American draw down would be increased.
It is important to note that
this equation does not include the notion of perfect security as a precondition
for American response. The assumption of security responsibility by
the Iraqi government is all that is required. It is assumed that there
will be residual violence that will possibly increase upon the departure
of American forces. This must be viewed as a natural and expected result
that will diminish over time. In order for any withdrawal strategy to
work, the United States cannot allow its actions to be dictated by those
who are strengthened by the friction and instability brought on by the
continued presence of American troops in Iraq, namely Al-Qaeda. These
elements will seek to bog the American forces down in Iraq by increasing
the level of violence.
In the end, the only solution
to violence in Iraq that is viable is a solution borne from internal
Iraqi forces. Removing American forces from Iraq represents the best
means of empowering these internal forces while at the same time weakening
the forces of terror, especially Al-Qaeda.
In place of the large American
force concentrations inside Iraq, Special Forces forward operating bases
would be established in the border areas of Iraq to assume the residual
military mission of the United States, namely anti-terrorist operations
against Al-Qaeda and security training operations inside Iraq as requested
by the new Iraqi government. Each of these new bases would comprise
approximately one reinforced Brigade's worth of troops, who would be
responsible for force protection (securing the base itself), rapid reaction
responsibilities (protecting deployed forces if they get in trouble),
air support (fixed-wing and helicopter) and anti-terrorist and training
support forces (to hunt down Al-Qaeda operatives inside Iraq, as well
as help train indigenous Iraqi forces in border security operations)
that would need to be established in Jordan and Kuwait (and in Saudi
Arabia, if possible, taking advantage of America's long history of operating
out of the Saudi provincial town of Ar' Ar'). A similar force could
be temporarily established in northern Iraq, in the Kurdish zone, to
help suppress the PKK, with the goal of withdrawing this force once
unified control of all Iraqi territory by central authorities has been
achieved). Special Forces liaison activities could be established with
the Syrians and Iranians to coordinate border security along these nations
respective borders with Iraq.
Once these Special Forces
bases are established and operating, the United States would begin the
rapid drawdown of forces inside Iraq, turning all installations over
to Iraqi forces as US attention turned away from internal security operations
in Iraq to border security operations in cooperation with Iraqi forces
and those of Iraq's neighbors. Border security operations would be focused
on isolating anti-government and Al-Qaeda elements remaining inside
Iraq, so that they could either be compelled to submit to central authority,
or else be destroyed. Active US military operations in Iraq would be
limited to anti-terrorist efforts and security training missions, as
requested by the Iraqi government. Military presence in Baghdad would
be limited to force protection requirements for the "Green Zone,"
requirements which should be reduced dramatically as stability in Baghdad
increases in light of the reduction of friction brought on by increased
Shi'a-Sunni cooperation and the reduction of American presence. Eventually,
as the situation in Iraq is brought back to a degree of normalcy and
the Al-Qaeda presence is eliminated, the American military presence
in Jordan and Kuwait could in turn be drawn down, bringing to closure
the military phase of America's involvement in a post-occupation Iraq.
Diplomatic and economic involvement would continue as dictated by the
requirements of US foreign and national security policy.
A policy such as the one
outlined here is neither "cut and run," nor is it "stay
the course." It is reflective of the legitimate national security
concerns of the United States, as well as the reality of the situation
we face in the post-Saddam Iraq (and Middle East) of today. Two final
thoughts on any plan which seeks to address the current predicament
in Iraq. First, the matter of Saddam Hussein. To allow the former dictator
of Iraq to be executed by the Maliki Government would be the worst move
imaginable if the United States seeks a return to peace and stability
in this war-torn nation. Justice has not been served with the trial
of Saddam. His execution would only increase the stature of the pro-Iranian
Dawa faction that Nouri al-Maliki represents. As the Maliki Government
is stood down, so should the period of Kangaroo Courts in Iraq.
The United States, in determining
the illegitimacy of the Maliki Government, should take custody of Saddam
and turn him over to an international tribunal at the Hague. In doing
so, the United States should be willing to accept whatever verdict the
Hague lays down, even if it is not one we would desire. Whatever short
term discomfort such a move might bring inside Iraq would be off-set
by its long-term benefits, especially if, in preparing the new forces
in Iraq who will be called upon to govern following the dismissal of
the Maliki government are made aware, and can be compelled to concur,
with such an action.
For all those who wish to
see Saddam hang, I can say only this: explain your blood lust to the
parents of the scores of American service members who will die as a
direct result of the violence engendered by such an action. Far too
many Americans have died because of our decision to invade Iraq and
depose Saddam. There is no need to heap additional tragedy on top of
this policy failure. The United States, in all fairness, must recuse
itself from the process of judging Saddam. Let the international courts
determine Saddam's fate.
Lastly, we must recognize
the role Israel, and America's support of Israel, plays in any policy
decision involving the Middle East. As outlined here, the key to any
successful American withdrawal from Iraq rests in America's willingness
to initiate a new policy direction regarding Iran and Syria. Such a
policy move would be strongly opposed by the current Israeli government,
and those forces inside the United States supportive of this Israeli
government. America must engage in an internal debate and discussion
about the proper policy position we as a nation should take regarding
the state of Israel. That Israel is a close friend and ally there can
be no doubt. That America should be available to protect the legitimate
national security interests of Israel, as compatible with international
law, again goes without question. But to allow a situation to exist,
as it currently does, where Israel can influence, or in some cases,
using lobbyist proxies, dictate a given course of policy direction when
such policies are not in the national interest of the United States,
is unacceptable.
There is a need today for
an American policy shift regarding Iraq that seeks not only to bring
peace and stability to Iraq, but also normalize America's relations
with the entire Middle East. This policy direction should not, and cannot,
involve the abandonment of Israel. However, it must be recognized that
such a bold new policy regarding Iraq will not be to the liking of those
who currently govern in Israel, and their American friends and allies.
There is room for debate and discussion on this issue. Indeed, sound
policy cannot be achieved without such a debate taking place. But this
debate must be held free of the rancor of past debates of this sort,
where irresponsible charges of anti-Semitism were thrown about by those
unwilling to permit the discussion of any policy position deemed unacceptable
to the political right in Israel, or their American allies in the pro-Israeli
lobby.
We must accept as a basic
premise to any discussion about American-Israeli relations the notion
that there are circumstances involving the Middle East in which American
interests and Israeli interests diverge, and that America is right in
pursuing policies which are best for the national security of the United
States, even if Israel disagrees. Any new course of policy direction
in Iraq that embraces a rapprochement with Iran and Syria represents
a situation in which the possibility of a break with Israel exists.
America must have the moral and intellectual courage to accept such
a break, because at the end of the day it is what is in the best interests
of this country that matters most. Peace in Iraq, and stability in the
Middle East is a cause worth embracing, and fighting for, regardless
of who might oppose it.
This is a tall order for
a new Congress to consider. But anything less than total commitment
to all facets of a new Iraq policy, inclusive of those elements that
might be uncomfortable for Israel, will represent a betrayal of the
hopes of the American people when they voted for a Democratic Congress.
The new Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, together with the new Senate
Majority Leader, Harry Reid, as well as the rest of the Democratic Party
leadership and establishment, should proceed with extreme caution in
failing to heed these hopes. The "Big Election," the race
for national leadership in November 2008, is just around the corner,
and if the November 2006 elections prove anything, a slighted electorate
has no patience for those politicians who had slighted them.
Scott Ritter served as chief
U.N. weapons inspector in Iraq from 1991 until his resignation in 1998.
He is the author of, most recently, Target Iran (Nation Books, 2006)
and "Iraq Confidential: The Untold Story of the Intelligence Conspiracy
to Undermine the U.N. and Overthrow Saddam Hussein" (Nation Books,
2005).
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