Kashmir: Trapped in a Blind Alley?

[A Note from the Author:

The monograph appearing below was penned about six months back and has since been carried by a journal, New Approach, in its, just published, (undated) special issue: J&K: Faultlines and Way Ahead.

It is edited by SekharBasu Roy.

The other contributors, understandably including three from Pakistan and one of Syrian origin, are: Lt. Gen.(Rtd.)  Sanjay Kulkarni; WajahatHabibullah; Maj. Gen. (Rtd.) Harkirat Singh; Ram Puniyani; SanjivKrishanSood, ADG (Rtd.) BSF; TajHaider; Anil Khamboj, IG (Rtd.) BSF; K. Srinivasan, IG (Rtd.) BSF/CRPF; A K Pasha; Air Marshal (Rtd.) SumitMukerji; DhananjayTripathi; Babar Ayaz; Dr.WaielAwwad; F S Aijazuddin.

 

The virtually unaltered text, as had been sent to the editor of the said journal, is provided here with the addition of a very brief Epilogue, on account of the time lapsed in between.]

 

Kashmir: Trapped in a Blind Alley?

SuklaSen

Agar firdaus bar roo-e zameenast,
Hameenast-o hameenast-o hameen ast.¹
                       (If there is a paradise on earth,
It is this, it is this, it is this.)
Amir Khusro (1253 – 1325), a famous Sufi musician, poet and scholar from India.
This couplet serves as a popular epithet for Kashmir, for centuries.

Doodh mango ge to kheerdenge, Kashmir mango ge to chir denge!²
(If you ask for milk, will offer youpudding, ask for Kashmir and will just tear you apart!)
An oft-repeated RSS slogan, rather war cry, on Kashmir.

Intro
In South Asia, the two most powerful neighbours, armed with nuclear weapons along with all the three – land, air and subsea, launching platforms, are constantly bickering.
So much so that this region is considered one of the most threatening global nuclear flashpoints.³
One of the major, perhaps the most major, issues of dispute is Kashmir.⁴
And a war between India and Pakistan, if degenerates into a nuclear one – quite a possibility⁵, may, as a consequence, even wipe out human civilisation from the face of the globe.⁶
That itself is reason enough to make exploration of “peace” for Kashmir a worthwhile venture, in fact, an urgent existential imperative.

In the following, an attempt has been made, taking off from a brief description of Kashmir’s geography/topography/demography, recount of its past and, then, more recent developments – of which the “dispute” is the centrepiece, in some greater details.

Before proceeding further, it is, however, necessary to clarify that “Kashmir”, as used by an Indian, may denote either of the two: (i) the Kashmir Valley and (ii) the state of Jammu and Kashmir.
In order to locate it appropriately, it has to be read in the specific given context.

Geography,Topographyand Demography
Kashmir, a 222,236 sq km region in the northwestern Indian subcontinent, is surrounded by China in the northeast, the Indian states of Himachal Pradesh and Punjab in the south, by Pakistan in the west, and by Afghanistan in the northwest. The region has been dubbed “disputed territory” between India and Pakistan since the partition of India in 1947. The southern and southeastern parts of the region make up the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, while the northern and western parts are controlled by Pakistan. A border, called the Line of Control (agreed to in 1972) divides the two parts. The eastern area of Kashmir, comprising the northeastern part of the region (Aksai Chin) has been under the control of China since 1962. The predominant religion in the Jammu area is Hinduism in the east and Islam in the west. Islam is also the main religion in the Kashmir valley and in the Pakistan-controlled parts.⁷

The Kashmir region is predominantly mountainous, with deep, narrow valleys and high, barren plateaus. The relatively low-lying Jammu and Punch (Poonch) plains in the southwest are separated by the thickly forested Himalayan foothills and the PirPanjal Range of the Lesser Himalayas from the larger, more fertile, and more heavily populated Vale of Kashmir to the north. The vale, situated at an elevation of about 5,300 feet (1,600 metres), constitutes the basin of the upper Jhelum River and contains the city of Srinagar. Jammu and the vale lie in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, while the Punch lowlands are largely in Azad Kashmir.⁸

A princely state during the British colonial period, Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) was created by the British in 1846 with a Hindu Maharaja, Gulab Singh, ruling over a Muslim majority population. It consisted of three religiously and linguistically diverse regions: the Kashmir Valley with a largely Muslim population; the Jammu region with a Hindu majority; and the population of the Ladakh region which was half Buddhist, half Muslim.⁹

Past History in Brief
According to legend, an ascetic named Kashyapa reclaimed the land now comprising Kashmir from a vast lake. That land came to be known as Kashyapamar and, later, Kashmir. Buddhism was introduced by the Mauryan emperor Ashoka in the 3rd century BCE, and from the 9th to the 12th century CE the region appears to have achieved considerable prominence as a centre of Hindu culture. A succession of Hindu dynasties ruled Kashmir until 1346, when it came under Muslim rule. The Muslim period lasted nearly five centuries, ending when Kashmir was annexed to the Sikh kingdom of the Punjab in 1819 and then to the Dogra kingdom of Jammu in 1846.
Thus, the Kashmir region in its contemporary form dates from 1846, when, by the treaties of Lahore and Amritsar at the conclusion of the First Sikh War, Raja Gulab Singh, the Dogra ruler of Jammu, was created maharaja (ruling prince) of an extensive but somewhat ill-defined Himalayan kingdom “to the eastward of the River Indus and westward of the River Ravi.” The creation of this princely state helped the British safeguard their northern flank in their advance to the Indus and beyond during the latter part of the 19th century. The state thus formed part of a complex political buffer zone interposed by the British between their Indian empire and the empires of Russia and China to the north. For Gulab Singh, confirmation of title to these mountain territories marked the culmination of almost a quarter century of campaigning and diplomatic negotiation among the petty hill kingdoms along the northern borderlands of the Sikh empire of the Punjab.¹⁰

The“Dispute”: The Larger Background
It is commonly perceived that the “dispute” arose (between Pakistan and India) on account of the subcontinent gaining independence – on August 14-15 1947, throwing off the shackles of British colonial rule as the successful culmination of the long drawn out epic freedom struggle, with the Indian National Congress in the lead, combined with the changed scenario emerging post WW II – both globally and within Britain itself. Or more specifically, the traumatic “Partition” of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan – meant to be an exclusive homeland for the Muslims of the subcontinent as demanded by the Muslim League, which, by then, came to represent the voices of large sections of Muslims.¹¹
But the roots of the “dispute” are, actually, older than that andhave, rather expectedly, features unique to Kashmir.

Kashmir, as per the oldest, and subsequent, available historical accounts, used to be ruled by succession of dynastic rulers, following some form of Hinduism¹² – dominated by Brahmans.
Buddhism would appear on the scene during the reign of emperor Ashoka (304–232 BCE) and Kashmir became a part of the Maurya Empire. Buddhism, apparently, remained a major presence till early sixth century.¹³
Kashmir’s encounter with Islam, via invasions from the west, commenced in early eleventh century.¹⁴ The first Sultanate came into being with a Ladakhi Buddhist ascending the throne in 1320 and converting to Islam.¹⁵
In the 14th century, Islam gradually became the dominant religion in Kashmir. With the fall of Kashmir, a premier center of Sanskrit literary creativity, Sanskrit literature there disappeared.Islamic preacher Sheikh NooruddinNoorani, who is traditionally revered by Hindus as Nund Rishi, combined elements of Kashmir Shaivism with Sufi mysticism in his discourses.¹⁶
Direct Mughal rule, under emperor Akbar, came to be established in late sixteenth century.¹⁷
After four centuries of rule by successive Muslim rulers, Kashmir fell to the conquering armies of the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh of Punjab in the 1820s. The Sikh rule had a pronounced anti-Muslim edge.¹⁸
(T)he Kashmir region in its contemporary form dates from 1846, when, by the treaties of Lahore and Amritsar at the conclusion of the First Sikh War, Raja Gulab Singh, the Dogra ruler of Jammu [an erstwhile servitor of the Sikh empire], was [by the victorious British] created maharaja (ruling prince) [for a consideration of Rupees 7.5 million] of an extensive but somewhat ill-defined Himalayan kingdom “to the eastward of the River Indus and westward of the River Ravi.” The creation of this princely state helped the British safeguard their northern flank in their advance to the Indus and beyond during the latter part of the 19th century. The state thus formed part of a complex political buffer zone interposed by the British between their Indian empire and the empires of Russia and China to the north. For Gulab Singh, confirmation of title to these mountain territories marked the culmination of almost a quarter century of campaigning and diplomatic negotiation among the petty hill kingdoms along the northern borderlands of the Sikh empire of the Punjab.¹⁹
The Princely State of Kashmir and Jammu (as it was then called) was constituted between 1820 and 1858 and was “somewhat artificial in composition and it did not develop a fully coherent identity, partly as a result of its disparate origins and partly as a result of the autocratic rule which it experienced on the fringes of Empire.” It combined disparate regions, religions, and ethnicities: to the east, Ladakh was ethnically and culturally Tibetan and its inhabitants practised Buddhism; to the south, Jammu had a mixed population of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs; in the heavily populated central Kashmir valley, the population was overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim, however, there was also a small but influential Hindu minority, the Kashmiri brahmins or pandits; to the northeast, sparsely populated Baltistan had a population ethnically related to Ladakh, but which practised Shi’a Islam; to the north, also sparsely populated, Gilgit Agency, was an area of diverse, mostly Shi’a groups; and, to the west, Punch was Muslim, but of different ethnicity than the Kashmir valley.²⁰

Apart from the patchwork nature of the state thus created, no less significant was the fact that the Dogra kings, aided by their Kashmiri Pandit (i.e. Brahman), and Punjabi, administrative stuff, were very harsh with the vast impoverished Muslim masses of the Valley – mostly peasantry, artisansand workers.²¹
This would leave its marked imprint on the subsequent history of Kashmir.²²

One noteworthy aspect of the Dogra rule over Kashmir is that as distinct from Mughals, Afghans and  Sikhs, whose rules had preceded that of the Dogras, Kashmir was only peripheral to their empires, and, consequently, would rule the region through proxies while remaining primarily engaged with the concerns of their larger empires,for the Dogras, Kashmir itself was the empire – their primary concer.²³

The Immediate Backdrop
With dissentions and anger simmering against the repressive Dogra rule – subordinate to the British colonial rulers, there was a blanket ban on the publication of newspapers until 1932 and no overt political activities or organisations were permitted.²⁴

Regardless, the gatheringresentments exploded in public, in July 1931, in the form of first massive protest against the Dogra regime by the Muslims of the Valley, backed by the ulama.²⁵
On June 21 (or 25?), in a public meeting, first of its kind, before the gathered Muslim protestors, one Abdul Qadeer Khan delivered a rousing speech and gave a call to arms.He would soon be arrested and put on trial.²⁶
During one of the trial sessions, on July 13, thousands of protestors would gather and attack – presumably after some of them being arrested, the Central Jail, the trial venue. They would be fired upon.Some protestors got killed. Thereafter, violence broke out in the main city of Srinagar. Hindus would be attacked and some of their houses looted. Again the mob would be fired upon causing deaths. Perhaps a few (3?)Hindus also got killed in the violence directed against them. Total toll on the Muslim side was reportedly 22 (or 21?).
But, July 13, thereafter, came to be observed as the Martyrs’ Day (Youm-e-Shuhada-e-Kashmir) by Kashmiri Muslims.
Versions of the whole episode, however, widely vary, depending on the source.²⁷
At any rate, while July 13 1931 stands out as a watershed moment in the history of Kashmir “dispute”, it also, in a way, busts the myth of a harmonious past²⁸ of Kashmiri people.
At the most obvious level, July 13 stands for the first burst of open rebellion against Kashmir’s Hindu Dogra ruler by its alienated Muslim subjects and its suppression by the armed might of the state.
At another, the Hindu subjects of Kashmir got identified with their co-religionist ruler, in the eyes of both the overwhelming majority Muslim and minority Hindu subjects.²⁹
Thus while the Kashmiri Muslims, by and large, view July 13 1931 as the launching event of their (unfinished?) freedom struggle against the then oppressive Hindu Dogra rulers, the Hindus, or the Kashmiri Pandits, to be more specific, imagine it as the first occasion of large-scale atrocities by the (far more numerous) Muslims of the Valley directed against them.
That is pretty much significant in making sense ofthe subsequent developments.

At any rate, under the impact of July 31 and at the prodding of the British, Maharajah Hari Singh,the then ruler, would introduce limited democracy to the state, which would permit, for the first time, formation of political groups.³⁰
Taking advantage of the relative political freedom thus gained and spurred by continuing political turbulence the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference (AJKMC), an open political organisation of the Muslims of the Jammu and Kashmir state – the first of its kind,was brought into being in a convention held in Srinagar from 14 to 16 October, 1932.
Interestingly, a speaker at the flag hoisting ceremony observed: Today, the hoisting of the green flag with crescent [a very obvious and explicit symbol of Islam] opens a new chapter in the history of Kashmir. As such, it is the duty of the Kashmiris to see that it remains hoisted always. This flag of the conference is the harbinger of love, peace and brotherhood among all the communities living in the State and it is the guarantor of peace, progress and happiness for all subjects of the Maharaja.
That is clearly indicative of intertwining of two conflicting urges: (I) marching as the flag-bearer of Islam and (ii) to champion the cause of love, peace and brotherhood among all the communities living in the State[and, thereby, a composite Kashmiri nationhood].³¹
The implications of this self-contradiction would unfold in the coming days.
In any case, (i)n a special session in June 1939 the Muslim Conference was converted into the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference to represent all Kashmiris regardless of religion. This move brought the National Conference closer to the Indian National Congress which also favored a secular and non-communal approach to politics. This move towards secularizing the movement was apparently reinforced by the advice of Dr SaifuddinKitchlew, an eminent member of the Kashmiri diaspora in the Punjab, to Sheikh Abdullah.¹⁴
Despite the towering stature of Sheikh Abdullah, the National Conference would formally split in 1941 and the earlier buried AJKMC was revived on June 13 1941.³²
So, here, one would find a broadly three-way tensions/conflicts emerging among the subjects of the repressive Dogra rule with three major players making appearance on the stage: (i) Hindus, spearheaded by the small but influential Kashmiri Pandits of the Valley, (ii) Muslims standing for composite Kashmiri nationalism and (iii) Muslims for Islamic solidarity – a natural ally of the Muslim League.

Be that as it may, in 1944, the National Conference, the most influential popular political outfit, led by Sheikh Abdullah issued a manifesto,Naya Kashmir (A New Kashmir), notionally addressed, and also presented, to the Dogra ruler, charting out a new roadmap for Kashmir’s polity. It had two parts: political and economic. It envisaged a democratic polity for Kashmir with the Dogra ruler as the nominal head. It was radical and socialistic in terms of its contents. it was very pro-women,  called for universal franchise, freedom of expression, freedom of press, land to the tiller, state ownership of the industry, ending agrarian debt, ability of women to work in all trades and professions.³³
In its annual session in 1945, it passed a resolution espousing Indian unity, Indian independence and self-determination for India’s cultural nationalities.³⁴ This is all the more significant considering the fact that the All-India Muslim League, in 1940, in Lahore had adopted the “Pakistan resolution”³⁵ calling for separate homeland(s) for Indian Muslims(without, however, specifying any particular name) and Mohammad Ali Jinnah had articulated and put forward his “two-nation theory”³⁶, in justification of the demand.
Consequently, when Jinnah visited Kashmir during the summer of 1944, he, reportedly, indicated his support for the Muslim Conference, led by Muslim leaders from the districts of Muzaffarabad, Poonch and Mirpur who had supported the “Pakistan Resolution”, in preference over the National Conference.³⁷
In May 1946, Sheikh Abdullah launched the Quit Kashmir– an echo of the Quit India call issued by the Indian National Congress, directed at the British colonial rulers earlier in 1942³⁸, agitation directed against the Dogra rule and got arrested, being booked on sedition charge. Jawaharlal Nehru tried to go to Srinagar, to defend Sheikh in the court, but would be arrested and sent back.³⁹
The“three-way tensions/conflicts”, that had been referred to above, kept sharpening.
More so, under the impact of the evolving political scenario in India under direct British rule, particularly since the conclusion of the WW II and the transfer of baton in Britain itself from the diehard Conservative Winston Churchill to the Labour leader Clement Attlee, in July 1945⁴⁰ – in keen anticipation of the impending transfer of power and cessation of the British rule over the subcontinent.

The “Dispute” Arises
On February 20 1947, Attlee, the British Prime Minister, told the House of Commons that his government intended to hand India over to the Indians not later than June, 1948 and Lord Louis Mountbatten was named the new Viceroy to accomplish this task.⁴¹
Prior to that, the Muslim League leader Jinnah had called upon the Indian Muslims to observe August 16 1946 as the Direct Action Day in order to realise its demand for separate homeland for the Muslims. As a consequence, Calcutta, the capital of the Bengal province, with a Muslim League Chief Minister then, had witnessed the Great Calcutta Killings on that day. Violence would, in time, spread to various other corners of India.⁴²
Apparently, intimidated by the prospect of the bearing the responsibility for failing to contain spreading violence and bloodshed, the newly appointed Viceroy advanced the day of transfer of power to August 15 1947 and delayed the announcement of the award of Partition to two days later.⁴³
In the event, in the run-up to and, even more than that, aftermath of the Partition, the subcontinent would encounter perhaps the most horrific episode of violence during that century perpetrated, and suffered, by civilian populations – in this case, involving the followers of three major religions in the region: Hinduism, Sikhism and Islam.⁴⁴The state of Jammu and Kashmir was also not unaffected.⁴⁵
What, however, is more germane, in the current context, that the Partition left open the issue of the princely states, under British paramountcy – numbering over 560, of which the J&K was one of the two largest. The rulers had, at least hypothetically, three options: either merge with the Dominion of India or of Pakistan or remain independent.⁴⁶
That gave rise to the “dispute”, involving both India and Pakistan and also the J&K state – its ruler and the (medley⁴⁷ of) subjects.
The initial dilly-dallying⁴⁸ on the part of the then Dogra ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh, the geographical location of the state – bordering both the newly emergent Dominions, and the fact of Muslim majority population – with its own internal divisions, lorded over by a Hindu ruler – all these factors went to complicate things and contributed to the making of the “dispute”.

The “Dispute” Unfolds
It would be necessary to keep in mind that this point onward, “history” itself will be highly controversial. “Facts” would be hotly contested and divergent narratives would be dished out by the bitterly feuding parties.⁴⁹
An objective and conscientious student would have to willy-nilly take one’s own pick by applying one’s best judgement and carefully scanning those narratives.

The main trouble erupted on October 22 1947, in the form of waves of armed Pukhtoon intruders coming from Pakistan. However, things had already turned unsettled at least in the Poonch area, in Jammu. There were, as per one reading, three significant developments:
The first was a pro-Pakistan, anti-Maharaja uprising by Muslim Poonchis in western Jammu that ‘liberated’ large parts of this area from the Maharaja’s control. The second was major inter-religious violence in the province that caused upheaval and death, including a possible massacre of Muslims. The third was the creation of the Provisional Azad (Free) Government in areas liberated or ‘freed’ by the Poonch uprising. This region soon popularly became known as ‘Azad Kashmir’. These three actions all occurred during the ten-week interregnum between the creation of India and Pakistan on 15 August 1947.⁵⁰
To be sure, there are conflicting versions.
What, however, is undeniable that things came to a boil on October 22.

Before proceeding further ahead, it would be in fitness of things to recall, in passing, that till the very eve of Independence the princely states of Hyderabad and Junagadh – both Hindu majority states with Muslim rulers, and Jammu & Kashmir – a Muslim majority state with a Hindu ruler, remained undecided on their options on joining either of the two Dominions or stay independent.⁵¹
Maharaja Hari Singh, the ruler of Kashmir, on August 1947, would propose Standstill Agreements to both the Dominions. Pakistan would accept it on August 15; India would ask for further negotiations.⁵²

On September 18 1947, in violation of the Standstill Agreement, Pakistan cut off supply of essential items to the state.⁵³
On October 22, despite talks being in progress⁵⁴ between the state and Pakistan – regardless of steady infiltrations from across the border, huge number of tribesmen, equipped with modern weapons, invadedMuzaffarabad from the side of Abbottabad.There were, reportedly, large-scale atrocities against the locals and a large number of Kashmiris including Muslim, Hindus and Sikhs were killed by, apparently Pakistan sponsored, tribal invaders.⁵⁵

Instrument of Accession, Raging Battle, Military Stalemate and Eventual Ceasefire
On October 26, the exasperated ruler, MaharajaHari Singh, out of sheer desperation, finally decided to prostrate before the Dominion of India, confirming his readiness to surrender, albeit with important riders, only to make best of the miserable situation he was faced with.
He sent a letter recording his offer⁵⁶ to accede to India accompanied with the Instrument of Accession⁵⁷, which would duly be accepted by Lord Mountbatten as the Governor-General of the Indian Dominion, the next day – October 27. The same day, the first batch of the Indian armed forces, still under the overall command of British generals, as was very much the case with its Pakistani counterparts, landed in Srinagar, being airborne.⁵⁸
As would be expected, this climaxed thecrucial and intense negotiations between the concerned parties, not excluding Sheikh Abdullah – freed from Maharaja’s jail, quite possibly facilitated by the prodding ofthe Indian National Congress leaders, Nehru, and Gandhi, in particular, only on September 29⁵⁹, in the brief intervening period, in continuation with the chain of earlier rounds.
A very telling sign was a particular commitment by the Maharaja at the tail end of his “offer” letter:
I may also inform your Excellency’s Government that it is my intention at once to set up an interim Government and ask Shaikh Abdullah to carry the responsibilities in this emergency with my Prime Minister.

Now, the battle would rage on.
With the balance of forces significantly upended.⁶⁰Notwithstanding the fact that Muslim-majority Gilgit would also, like its predecessor Poonch, stage a successful uprising against the Dogra rule, and, eventually, in favour of Pakistan “on or around 3 November 1947”⁶¹.
The harsh winter, accompanied with heavy snowfalls, won’t, however, be too late to make its entry on the scene. This worked much more to the disadvantage of the Indian forces, drawn from the plains, than the raiders – mountain tribes.⁶²
Even then, a better trained and equipped army was able to push back the invading militias, reportedly indulging in severe large-scale atrocities against local civilians – not excluding Muslims⁶³, to a significant extent. However, the raiders could hold on to the territories on the west and the north, with considerable local support.
Pakistan, in response, gradually started increasing the presence of its regular forces. In the spring of 1948 regular army battalions, later entire brigades and artillery regiments participated in operations. The battle intensified.⁶⁴
Between May and December 1948, the Indian forces could, however, score some critical incremental gains.
There, however, arose, apparently, a situation of military stalemate on the ground.⁶⁵
On top of that, both the feuding states were still Dominions,with their armed forces under the commands of British generals.⁶⁶
In September 1948, India would initiate military operations to annex the princely state of Hyderabad.⁶⁷

As regards the state of Jammu and Kashmir, India, prodded by its Governor-General – Lord Mountbatten, had lodged a complaint with the United Nations Security Council on January 1 1948, in response to which Pakistan would lodge a countercomplaint, on the following January 15th, bringing in also the issue of India’s annexation of Junagadh, overriding its ruler’s move to accede to Pakistan, by signing the Instrument of Accession.⁶⁸
Eventually, through the interventions of the UN Security Council, a cease fire became operative on January 1 1949.⁶⁹
It would be useful to recall here that while India had based its case on its claimed legality, anchored in the “accession”, further buttressed by a pledge to honour popular choice – to be determined via a “plebiscite”; Pakistan challenged the authenticity of the “accession” and the ruler’s competence to do that, apart from highlighting the religious demography of the state in support of its claim over the territory.⁷⁰

Kashmir: Divided into two
At any rate, the erstwhilestate of Jammu and Kashmir now effectively split into two parts – along the Line of Control (LoC), regardless of the, hotly contested, “legal” positions
Pakistan got to retain a large chunk in the north – Northern Areas or Gilgit-Baltistan, and a rather thin slice in the west – Azad Kashmir.
In 1947, most of these areas had seen popular revolts against Maharaja Hari Singh and, eventually, in favour of Pakistan.
India got the rest.
In other words, Punjabi speaking areas of Poonch, Mirpur, and Muzaffarabad, along with Gilgit andBaltistan came to be under control by Pakistan, while the most part of Jammu regionand Ladakh and the entire Kashmir Valley came to India.⁷¹
One of the major (assessed) reasons why the Indian forces could clear the Valley of the invading Pukhtoons is the cooperation by the locals under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah.⁷²

While the developments, in this region, this point onwards would become a focus of international attention and a major, arguably the most major, source of violent – both low-level and highly intense, clashes between neighbouring India and Pakistan, the area under the control of Pakistan has, reportedly, no problem in terms of its relation with Pakistan, nor,for that matter, Jammu and Ladakh with India.
Undoubtedly, the Valley is the hotspot.
As a consequence, it is primarily this area which would be the focal point of the following discussions, in the process of exploring a resolution of the “problem” or “dispute”.

Since Accession (October 1947) till Rise of Insurgency (1989-90)
The limited war, accession, capped by the UN mediated ceasefire, however, led to no “solution” of the “dispute”.
While, in the eyes of the UN, India and Pakistan were the two disputants, the peoples of Kashmir – subjected to divergent pulls were/are no less so.

It would, however, be in the fitness of things to briefly review the various critical UNSC resolutions, as regards the “dispute” and its “resolution”, in the given context.
On January 20 1948, Resolution 39 was passed establishing a three-member Commission to investigate the complaints by both the disputants. This had been preceded by the Resolution 38, passed on January 17. The Commission, as envisaged in Resolution 39, did not come into fruition until May 1948. Meanwhile, the Security Council continued its deliberations and the war too continued.
On April 21 1948, the (three-part) Resolution 47 was adopted. It laid down the ground rules for holding the “plebiscite”. Pakistan was asked to use its “best endeavours” to secure the withdrawal of all tribesmen and Pakistani nationals, putting an end to the fighting in the state. India was asked to “progressively reduce” its forces to the minimum level required for keeping law and order and, subsequently, appoint a Plebiscite Administrator nominated by the United Nations, who would oversee a free and impartial plebiscite
The Resolution was recommendatory, not mandatory, in nature.⁷³
While a ceasefire would come into force on January 1 1949, neither Pakistan nor India made any move towards fulfilling the laid down conditions for holding the “plebiscite” and it would never be held.
The UNSC, however, would continue to pass resolutions, with progressively decreasing frequency, the last one being: Resolution 307, adopted on December 21, 1971.⁷⁴

The initial Indian pledge, to the UN, to hold a referendum was very much in tandem with the traditional position taken by the Indian National Congress, the ruling party, in respect of the future of the princely states in British India. Also its stand in alignment with its stand in case of Junagadh and Hyderabad.⁷⁵ But, far more importantly – as would become evident with the passage of time, its confidence that with Sheikh Abdullah, the tallest political leader from the Valley, by its side – having been appointed the Head of the Emergency Administration on 30 October 1947 and also leading a volunteer force locally raised to fight the invaders and, then, on March 17 1948⁷⁶, the Prime Minister of the state under Indian control, it will not be difficult to have a favourable opinion.⁷⁶
But, soon, the relations would start souring and, consequently, Sheikh would be dismissed from his office on August 8 1953and then thrown behind the bars suspecting his commitment to the “Accession”.⁷⁸
As a result, would evaporate the confidence.
Thus, India would finally rescind from the pledge in 1954, on the ostensible ground of Pakistan joining a military alliance with the USA and, thereby, altering the basic parameters as had hitherto existed.⁷⁹
Conversely, Pakistan, which was rather unenthusiastic about the plebiscite, initially, started demanding it more and more loudly.⁸⁰

The seeds of the growing tussle between India/Nehru and Nehru’s one-time close associate⁸¹ Sheikh Abdullah, who, virtually, was the very personification of the Valley, or at least Valley Muslims⁸², lay in their vastly different readings of the implications of Kashmir’s accession to India.⁸³
Though Sheikh played a pivotal role in the process of Kashmir’s accession to India – under extraordinary circumstances, it appears that for him it was the second best option – to be a part of “secular” India, enjoying a large degree of autonomy and with himself at the helm. The best, however, would have been an independent Kashmir (Valley)⁸⁴, neutral between India and Pakistan – both, however, keenly desirous of annexing Kashmir, the, most likely, prime consideration being its assessed geo-political salience.
Indian leaders, including Nehru – hard-nosed politicians as they were, could very well sense that Sheikh’s ambitions were in flagrant conflict with their own design, even while acknowledging his very considerable political utility.
Sheikh, cognizant of his weakness vis-à-vis the Indian state, started flirting with foreign powers.
That turned out to be the proverbial last straw on the camel’s back.⁸⁵
Consequently, Sheikh was just not dethroned but also thrown behind the bars.
That, in process, seriously ruptured the bond between the Indian state and the people of the Valley.
The Indian state was, of course, only too aware of that.
The three major elements in the armoury of the Indian state to tackle the Kashmir issue, henceforth would be political manoeuvring, combined with the selective use of carrot and stick –more stick than carrot.

Before being dismissed, the National Conference government led by Sheikh, unencumbered by the Indian legal system, had implemented a fairly comprehensive, despite some significant conceptual and implementational glitches, land reforms – evidently, the first and, perhaps, the most radical in India.⁸⁶
This will be further followed up in the late ‘70s, again under Sheikh.⁸⁷
This was in alignment with the spirit of the 1944 manifesto, Naya Kashmir⁸⁸ (New Kashmir) – its Article 26, in particular, adopted by the National Conference, under his leadership.

Sheikh, as the Prime Minister, was succeeded by BakshiGhulam Mohammad, another National Conference leader.
With Sheikh behind the bars, his followers, led by Mirza Mohammad Afzal Beg, would, in August 1955, found the All Jammu and Kashmir Plebiscite Front or Plebiscite Front to act as the main opposition force, without eliciting much tangible success.⁸⁹
However, by the end of 1963, the pent up frustrations of the people burst out in the open over the theft of holy relic from the Hazratbal Shrine. The relic would soon be recovered.⁹⁰
But, under its impact, Sheikh would soon be released from jail.⁹¹
In 1975, at the end of a period stretching over twenty one odd years with many ups and downs, there would be an accord⁹² between the then Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, and Sheikh, in February 1975, paving the path for his assuming the office of Chief Minister, soon thereafter⁹³.
The most salient point of the Accord was Sheikh giving up the demand for plebiscite.
Since January 64 till Sheikh taking up the reign again in February ’75, there were three Prime/Chief Ministers.
Sheikh, ‘Sher-e-Kashmir‘ (the ‘Lion of Kashmir’), would die in harness, on September 8 1982⁹⁴, re-inaugurating a phase of political uncertainties.
Along with Sheikh, the most robust ballast restraining the prospect of Kashmiri nationalism turning towards extremism also disappeared.

Amid political turbulence, in the ‘80s, extremism kept gathering momentum – the ongoing Jihad in neighbouring Afghanistan and the Islamic revolution in Iran also playing their roles.⁹⁵

In February 1984, the execution of Kashmir Liberation Front militant Maqbool Bhat⁹⁶ would spark off widespread public protests.⁹⁷
In July 1984, the dismissal of the popular Farooq Abdullah government by Governor Jagmohan, acting as Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s hatchet man, through thoroughly questionable machinations, added further fat to the slow fire.⁹⁸

The year 1987 would prove to be a major turning point.⁹⁹
An alliance of Islamic parties, the Muslim United Front (MUF), was formed to contest the 1987 state elections and emerged as a major player, the first time in the state – post-Accession, for an Islamic political outfit.
However, when the poll results came out, they were victorious in only 4 of the contested 43 seats.
This was, as is widely acknowledged, the outcome of a massive rigging by the rulingNational Conference in alliance with the Congress.^100.
Rigging of polls was nothing new – it is commonly held that only ’77 and ’83 polls were not rigged.¹⁰¹
But the scale of rigging this time provided a strong tailwind to the sprouting militancy in the state.¹⁰²

InsurgencyArrives
The new phase¹⁰³ would, sort of,be inaugurated with the assassination, on November 4 1989, of Justice Neelkanth Ganjoo¹⁰⁴, by the JKLF militants, who had delivered capital punishment to MaqboolBhat.It had been preceded by the murder of a BJP leader, TikkaLalTaploo, on September 14 1989.¹⁰⁵
The first political assassination had taken place with a National Conference block president, Md. Yusuf Halwai, having been shot dead in Srinagar on August 21 1989.¹⁰⁶
Its first eruptions had, however,started appearing in 1988¹⁰⁷ itself.
In the second half of 1989 the alleged assassinations of the Indian spies and political collaborators by JKLF (Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front) was intensified. Over six months more than a hundred officials were killed to paralyse government’s administrative and intelligence apparatus. The daughter of then interior affairs minister, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed was kidnapped in December and four terrorists had to be released for her release. This event led to mass celebrations all over the valley.¹⁰⁸

This would soon be followed by exodus of panic-stricken Kashmiri Pandits from the Valley, mainly Srinagar.
Rather intriguingly, a very large number fled on a single night of January 19 1990, the very day the newly appointed Governor Jagmohan, for the second time,had taken over the reins of the state, with the Chief Minister resigning, in protest.¹⁰⁹
The exodus, of course, would continue for a while, with the overwhelming bulk of the Panditsmigrating.¹¹⁰
The estimates of how many, however, widely vary.
Of the approximately 300,000 to 600,000 Hindus living in the Kashmir Valley in 1990 only 2,000–3,000 remain there in 2016.¹¹¹

The appointment of Jagmohan as the Governor, as a sort of a BJP nominee, with his earlier track record of dismissing Farooq Abdullah government at the behest of the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, by the V P Singh government was bound to be disastrous¹¹² and so it almost immediately turned out to be.
On January 21, a protest march, against atrocities by security forces on the previous day, was indiscriminately fired upon and 35, the highest till then, lives were reportedly extinguished.¹¹³
Things kept happening, at a rather feverish pitch, and 1990 proved to be the major turning point since 1987.
1990 was also the first year when the when the head of the state failed to hoist the national flag on Republic Day. It was a period when the Indian state exposed not only its ugliest face but also its most helpless form.¹¹⁴
What is worth noting here that a deliberate purely strong-arm policy just not only radically worsened the situation but also showed up the weakness of the Indian state.
Jagmohan would, eventually, be packed off¹¹⁵, following another round of atrocious mass killing by the security forces on May 21.¹¹⁶
But, the damage he could manage to inflict, during his rather short-lived tenure – just over four months, was simplyenormous.¹¹⁷

A Brief Recap
Between “Accession” of Kashmir to India on October 27 1947 and May 26 1990, the day Jagmohan demitted office, certain watershed events that took place need be specifically flagged here, before proceeding further.
First, Sheikh Abdullah’s appointment as the Head of the Emergency Administration on 30 October 1947, to be followed up with his assumption of the post of the Prime Minister of the state on March 17 1948. This had helped cement the emotional bond between the Valley and India.
This would suffer a serious jolt when Sheikh was unceremoniously dethroned and thrown behind the bars in early August 1953.
Things got partly repaired with his rehabilitation of sorts in 1975.
His death in 1982, while in office, is another momentous development.
The alleged large-scale rigging of the polls in 1987 triggered the rise of (budding) militancy, mainly led by the quasi-secular JKLF.
Under the impact of the rule of Jagmohan, during the first half of 1990, militancy assumed mass character, it also turned distinctly religious-sectarian and the atmosphere in the Valley became sharply communalised. Pakistan started shifting its support from the JKLF to pro-Pakistan Islamic militant groups.

Decades of Turbulence, Militancy and Repression: Till August 4 2019
The insurgency that made its appearance in the Valley in 1989-90 is since continuing, albeit with periodic ups and downs, in tandem with largely raised level of state repression, again, with fluctuating intensities.
The allegations of human rights violations are too ubiquitous.
So are the charges of Pakistan’s active promotion of armed militancy and terrorism.
The militancy itself, apparently further fuelled by repression, is getting deeper and deeper into the zone of radicalised Islam, rather contemptuous of any notion of “liberal democracy”.
In between, 2008 saw the emergence of stone pelting on the streets as a back-up form of mass resistance – to be met with more than matching state brutalities.
The global community is generally rather disinterested except on the ground of a potentially apocalyptic possible nuclear war between the two perpetually feuding neighbours, who went overtly nuclear in May 1998 and are relentlessly engaged in enhancing respective nuclear arsenals and developing the triad of delivery platforms since then.

While this period saw a radically spiked level of brutal violence, including sexual¹¹⁸– by the state and, also, by the militants – composed of both locals and outsiders, a few events merit special mention.
* Closely following the Pandit exodus and brutalities let loose by the administration under Jagmohan, in February 1991, there was one alleged event of mass gang rape by the Indian armed forces in the twin villages of Kunan and Poshpora, in the Kupwara district.¹¹⁹
* Alleged Shopian rape and murder followed by mas unrest in May-June 2009.¹²⁰
* Late 2010 saw triggering of prolonged unrest by an allegation of murder of three youths, via staged encounter, by the Indian Army.¹²¹
* On July 8 2016, a local militant, BurhanWani, in his very early twenties, was killed in an armed encounter with the Indian security forces. He was a commander of the theHizbulMujahideen and had gained considerable popularity among the local youth via social media. His death sparked off a new wave of militant recruitments.¹²²
* The last in this series is the Pulwama suicide blast, on February 14 2019, carried out by a local youth in which at least forty CRPF jawans in transit got killed.¹²³

Current Situation: Since August 5 2019
On August 5 and 6, just over last two days of the extended monsoon session of the Indian parliament, the incumbent regime brought about some seismic changes as regards the legal and constitutional status of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir via some highly questionable parliamentary jugglery.¹²⁴
In sum, the Article 370 of the Constitution – the recognition of the terms of the Instrument of Accession between the state and India by the latter in its Constitution, was made null and void, without actually amending it.
The Article 35A, which debars “outsiders” from purchasing property in the state – a protective measure not unique to the J&K alone, was scrapped.
The state was bifurcated – to come into force on October 31st, between Jammu and Kashmir on the one hand and Ladakh on the other.¹²⁵
The status of both the states stands degraded to that of Union Territories – something unprecedented since 1956.¹²⁶
Before doing all these, a large number of additional troops were deployed, in an already highly militarised zone, on the streets; round the clock curfew declared, all over the state, all forms of communications – including telephones, internet etc. were cut off. Kashmir, in a way, was completely sealed off from the outside world.¹²⁷
All known political leaders from the Valley have been put under arrest, including threeformer Chief Ministers. The total number of arrests, as per one report, is around 4,000¹²⁸, with a few hundreds shifted out of the state¹²⁹.
At the time of writing, with more than a month elapsed, things remain broadly the same¹³⁰, understandably, giving rise to a humanitarian crisis.¹³¹
Horror stories of custodial tortures have started leaking out.¹³²
The judicial system in Srinagar, reportedly, remains frozen, while the Supreme Court fails to take note.¹³³

Bouts of extended lock-down accompanied with state repressions are nothing new to Kashmir, though the scale and intensity, this time, is unprecedented.¹³⁴
Far more importantly, It appears to be part of a larger game plan, that was not there ever before.
An acknowledged “moderate” observer thus presciently noted:
In the context of the UAPA, NRC, communalisation, Ayodhya, it is one more node in a pattern hurtling the Indian state towards a denouement where all of us feel unsafe. Not just Kashmiris, not just minorities, but anyone standing up for constitutional liberty.¹³⁵
In this context, it is not easy to refrain from drawing the readers’ attention to what this writer had concluded in an analysis of the outcome of the 2019 parliamentary poll in India:
Modi 2.0 very much presents us with the looming threat of the dismantling of the “India” – embodying the values of “democracy”, “pluralism” and “egalitarianism”, that had been wrought out in the crucible of the epic freedom struggle and, in the process, finally emerged on the 15th August 1947 – in pursuance of a project to supplant it with a “Hindu Rashtra” (Hindu nation state) – by mobilising the Hindus of India as “Hindus”, drowning out all other identities linked to language, culture, gender, caste, class etc., constantly stoking hatred and violence against the constructed inimical “others”.¹³⁶
To connect the dots, while the previous Indian regimes – the Congress-led ones, in particular, had made, rather liberal, use of state repressions, intent upon retaining Kashmir as a part of the Indian territory – for a number of reasons, the subject move by the incumbent regime is primarily geared towards a very different objective altogether – actualising its long cherished project of transforming India into a “Hindu Rashtra” (Hindu nationstate).
Only if this is kept in mind, it would be possible to make sense of this momentous move cloaked in carefully planned deceptions and anchored in constitutional jugglery.

Engaged observers have quite emphatically underlined that a major outcome of this move is wiping out of that tribe of Kashmiri politicians – constantly shrinking, though, since the passing away of Sheikh Abdullah, who were seeking a “solution” of the Kashmir “problem” without asking for secession from India.
Given the salience of theissue, in determining the shape of things to come, it would quite be in the fitness of things to cite a few, verbatim:
I. By arresting mainstream leaders, activists, lumping them with separatists, and creating a binary in which “You are with us or against us”, the govt too has left virtually no political space for “collaborators”.¹³⁷
II. For now, the middle ground in Kashmir stands obliterated.¹³⁸
III. A recent tweet by a Kashmiri activist based in Europe, who is a harsh critic of Pakistan on J&K and intervenes in the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva to rebut any unfavourable report against India, sums up the situation. “Spoke to a friend in Srinagar after a two week hiatus and asked about the situation. His reply: There are only two Kashmiris left. One who feels betrayed &humiliated. The other, who tells the first one: ‘We told you so’. That was all we spoke. Both not knowing what else to say.”¹³⁹
IV.By these sweeping arrests, the government has blurred the lines between separatists, terrorists, stone-pelters and mainstream leaders who’ve kept the tricolour flying.¹⁴⁰
V. “For the past 70 years, mainstream leaders have been holding the Indian flag high in the Valley, sometimes at the cost of the lives. See what they (the Centre) have done to the mainstream,” said a PDP leader.
“I fear there will be no mainstream in Kashmir now. The entire Valley is now on the other side of the divide,” he said.¹⁴¹
Three of the five quotes above are from pretty well-known and well-respected journalists.

This quashing of the “middle ground” is, however, no unintended side-effect of an overzealous act by a regime having full faith in its own capacity to extinguish all opposition – armed and unarmed, through use of raw coercion.
It is very much designed to be that way.
Jitendra Singh, the Minister of State for the Prime Minister’s Office, thereby, supposedly, privy to the government’s mind, and an MP from Jammu, to boot, in a recent freewheeling chat with the Indian Express has made it as much explicit as possible:
No, no. Actually I don’t see any future for them (i.e. young politicians, such as Sajad Lone, Omar Abdullah, ShahFaesal). They are also realising that their political innings has come to an end. It is only some section of the media that wants to see some future, so that the story can carry on. The story has ended.¹⁴²
The same minister has rubbed this in further, again a month thereafter, by formally pronouncing that the arrested political leaders and activists, who, quite tellingly, include even BJP’s own allies and protégés¹⁴³, are not going to be freed in any near future.¹⁴⁴
This, apparent, deliberate self-infliction of a grievous wound would make sense only if one keeps in mind that for the current regime, Kashmir is just one of the more crucial pieces on the political chessboard, meant to be used, to checkmate “India”.
The regime cannot but be keenly aware of the fact that this approach of eliminating the “middle ground”, in all probability, would give a strong boost to armed militancy once attempts are made to restore, at least some degree of, “normalcy”.
The reason for which such a development would be considered welcome, and not dreaded – as would normally be expected, is that it– being held up as a mortal threat to mainland India, will help to communally polarise it and, thereby, smoothen the projected journey towards a “Hindu Rashtra”.
One can hardly dig out any other alternative plausible explanation.
Very much in tandem with this approach, the Union Home Minister has flatly refused to talk to any organised force in the Valley.¹⁴⁵
Not to be outdone, the Defence Minister has registered refusal to talk to Pakistan either.¹⁴⁶
The Home Minister, accordingly, met (apparently, in a choreographed move) a crowd of 22 village heads on September 3 in Delhi. As is expected, nothing of any consequence appears to have been discussed.¹⁴⁷

The earlier regimes, including the NDA led by Vajpayee, had, in between waves of armed repressions also used to make periodic overtures towards peace – with Kashmiris and also Pakistan, in separate moves.
Thus we had Lahore (1999)¹⁴⁸, Agra (2001)¹⁴⁹ and Sharm El Sheikh (2009)¹⁵⁰ between India and Pakistan.
With Kashmiris, the most significant official moves had been made in 2006 and then again in 2010.
All these, eventually, turned out to be stillborn though.¹⁵¹
But, this time round no such gesture appears to be in the offing.
A plausible explanation for that has already been offered above.

The Peace Prospects
In a situation of violent conflict no durable peace can be conceived of without the consent of the vital stakeholders to a negotiated settlementof the dispute(s) causing the conflict, however difficult the process may appear to be.
That, by its very definition, would call for “negotiations” between the disputants – all by themselves or aided by some external mediator(s), to make even a beginning.
No magic formula, howsoever sensible or even attractive it may look, is not going to “work” unless it emerges out of engagements between all the stakeholders.¹⁵²

As was attempted to map above, in the subject case, the (three) major feuding sides are (i) the Indian state – engaged in maintaining, and further tightening, of its ownership over the state of Jammu and Kashmir, under its control, and the Valley, in particular; (ii) the people of the Valley – many, or arguably most, of whom are asking for, somewhat nebulous, “Azadi”¹⁵³, either within “India” – with much greater autonomy, or (mostly) from India –through merger with the neighbouring ‘Islamic Republic of Pakistan’ or in the form of an independent state – staunchly Islamic or a more liberal version of it, and (iii) Pakistan, which considers annexation of the state under India as an “unfinished agenda of the Partition”¹⁵⁴in the region towards that goal.
Right now, the incumbent Indian regime is frankly bent upon going just the opposite way.

The only other way of achieving “peace” is the scoring of decisive military victory by one of the feuding parties over its opponent(s).
As regards the possibility of a decisive military victory, the history of the struggle of the Palestinians vis-à-vis Israel, armed with nuclear weapons, could be a good reference point.
On top of that, in the subject case, despite large asymmetry in terms of conventional weapons, India and Pakistan are both armed with nuclear weapons backed up by all the three delivery platforms¹⁵⁵ (In case of Pakistan the third leg of the triadic platform is – nuclear-tipped missiles from submarine, at least, close to completion.)
And, given the domestic popular mood, no Pakistani regime can afford to let militancy in Kashmir be just crushed by the Indian state.
Hence, it, too, does not look very much likely, in any foreseeable future.

Talks had, however, been held between India and Pakistan – in not-too-distant past, albeit, without involving “Kashmir” as an autonomous entity, on three occasions. At least the first two took place, quite plausibly, because of American prodding.
There was no such apparent external trigger for the efforts at internal dialogues.
But then, these, in any case, looked far less promising.
Arguably, the Agra conclave had raised maximum hopes, though, at the end, it failed even to produce a pro forma joint statement.¹⁵⁶
In any case, this time round, the Indian regime is in just no mood to engage any meaningful “talk”.
(In fact, given the current trend, once the current session (September 2019) of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is over, the possibility of a large-scale military crackdown in the Valley cannot just be ruled out.)

Moreover, the US, which, in the past – most visibly in the case of Kargil War¹⁵⁷, had played a vital role – even if, mostly, from behind the screen, under Donald Trump, has lost much of its diplomatic clout.
The repeated offers of Trump to mediate, in response to the urgings by Pakistan and even otherwise, have been summarily rejected by India.¹⁵⁸
Pakistan, under the circumstances, is trying its utmost to get the world leaders involved by scaring them with the talks of a possible nuclear war.¹⁵⁹As of now, it has failed to evoke the desired response.¹⁶⁰
Things may start changing only in case of a significant shift in the global scenario.

The Road Ahead
Right now, there is a radical shift in the stance of the Indian regime, away from even any overture in favour of peace, against the backdrop of armed militancy, infused with extremist Islamism¹⁶¹, gaining more and more grounds at the costs of “moderates”, with Pakistan, which itself has a dismal record as regards human rights of various minorities¹⁶² and now headed by a Prime Minister – widely believed to be a nominee of its military establishment¹⁶³, actively fanning the fire.
There is also a relative disinterest in “Kashmir”, on the global arena, partly caused by India’s enhanced economic and diplomatic clout, in the recent decades.
Even otherwise, in not-too-distant past, there was massive violation of human rights, in neighbouring puny Sri Lanka¹⁶⁴. In more immediate present, Myanmar¹⁶⁵ saw state directed genocide against one of its minority ethnic communities. In neither of the cases, the concerned regime faced any tangible consequence.

That, however, does, in no way, do away with the dire need of peace in Kashmir, more so, given its, all too obvious, nuclear dimensions.
Public opinion, in the region and globally, has got to be diligently mobilised, regardless of the roadblocks, in favour of initiating dialogues, to explore a “solution”, involving all the stakeholders, maybe with some credible mediator helping out in the process.
That appears tobe the only way out.

23 09 2019

Epilogue

 

Though the monograph had,finally, been wrapped up well after the momentous, or rather seismic, August 5, the reports from the ground zero were still fairly scant, given the extent and intensity of the lockdown imposed.
The lockdown, still in place, has, however,by now started gettingincrementally relaxed – though not unaccompanied by at least a few moves right in the opposite direction, in the wake of the much delayed (by more than five months) eventual response, from the Indian Supreme Court¹⁶⁶, in particular: social media sites are, right now, at least notionally, accessible¹⁶⁷; schools are reopened after seven months¹⁶⁸.

Quite a few factfinding reports¹⁶⁹, by various civil society groups, have, in the meanwhile, seen the light of the day – braving considerable hurdles. One is pretty recent¹⁷⁰ – came out just the last week.
Here,however, no attempt would be made to provide any synopsis of these or any analytical account of the subsequent developments.

It will, nevertheless, only be in the fitness of things to explicitly acknowledge that despite huge – understandably quite unprecedented even by the Kashmir standard, military mobilisation by the Indian state, no major military operation – as distinct from rather customary coercive measures, has yet been launched against the local people in general.

Nor there has been a noticeable spurt in armed militancy or even an outbreak of intifada – in response to August 5 and its aftermath.
These two, noteworthy, developments are, apparently, somehow interlinked – with the international opinion building and diplomacy forming crucial elements of the overall backdrop, and deserve to be closely interrogated.

 

Notes and References:

1. : <https://allpoetry.com/Couplet-7>.
2. RSS slogans like “Doodh mango ge to kheerdenge, Kashmir mango ge to chirdenge (If you ask for milk, we’ll give you kheer, but if you ask for Kashmir we shall kill you”).
   (Ref.: ‘A prayer for peace’, dtd. May 19 2002, at <https://www.thehindu.com/thehindu/mag/2002/05/19/stories/2002051900090100.htm>.)
3. It has been suggested that the Indian sub-continent is the most dangerous place in the world to-day and Kashmir is a nuclear flash-point.
   (Ref.: ‘Speech by ShriI K.R. Narayan, President of India, at the Banquet in Honour of Mr. William J. Clinton, President of The United States of Ameria, on March 21 2000 in New Delhi, at <http://www.krnarayanan.in/html/speeches/others/mar21000.htm>.)
   Also ref.: ‘South Asia is a nuclear flashpoint, expert tells Euronews’, dtd. March 2 2019, at <https://www.euronews.com/2019/03/02/south-asia-is-a-nuclear-flashpoint-expert-tells-euronews> and 5:39 to 7:27 mins. at<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RNUTQmSNfrE&feature=youtu.be>. [4]
4. Since 2016, Kashmir has been in an almost constant state of unrest, which while not caused by the Pakistanis – Indian ham-handedness and human rights abuses managed this all on their own – has been taken advantage of by them and their terrorist proxies. A settlement that all three parties—the Indians, Pakistanis, and, let’s not forget, the Kashmiris—will find acceptable is impossible to imagine.
   (Ref.: Revisiting “The Most Dangerous Place in the World” by Roberto Rivera, dtd. March 1 2019, at <http://www.breakpoint.org/2019/03/revisiting-the-most-dangerous-place-in-the-world/>.)
5. : ‘Military failure could push Pakistan to initiate nuclear attack against India’, dtd. July 14 2018, at <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/military-failure-could-push-pakistan-to-initiate-nuclear-attack-against-india/articleshow/54479254.cms?from=mdr>.
6. ‘The Global Cost Of India-Pak Nuclear War’ by Abheet Singh Sethi, dtd. Sept. 29 2016, at <https://archive.indiaspend.com/cover-story/the-global-cost-of-india-pak-nuclear-war-27563> and ‘India-Pakistan nuclear war could end human civilisation: Even limited nuclear exchange would devastate food production around the world, according to International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War’, dtd. Dec. 10 2013, at <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/10507342/India-Pakistan-nuclear-war-could-end-human-civilisation.html>.
7. : ‘Understanding the Kashmir Conflict’ by Subhamoy Das, dtd. March 6 2017. at<https://www.learnreligions.com/history-of-the-kashmir-conflict-1770394>.
8. : ‘Kashmir’ at <https://www.britannica.com/place/Kashmir-region-Indian-subcontinent>.
9. : ‘The New Wave of Mobilisation in Kashmir: Religious or Political?’ by Simple Mohanty at <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0049085717743838>.
10. : ‘Kashmir’ at <https://www.britannica.com/place/Kashmir-region-Indian-subcontinent>.
11. , e.g.: ‘A History of India’ by Hermann Kulke and DietmarRothermund, Third Edition, pp. 258 -293, at <http://111.68.99.107/libmax/Administrator/Library/DigitalResources/Digital/Books/A%20HISTORY%20OF%20INDIA.pdf>
12. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Kashmir>.
    Also: ‘Kashmir’ at <https://www.britannica.com/place/Kashmir-region-Indian-subcontinent>.
13. : ‘Kashmir’ at <https://www.britannica.com/place/Kashmir-region-Indian-subcontinent>.
14. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Kashmir>.
15. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rinchan>.
16. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Kashmir>.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. : ‘Kashmir’ at <https://www.britannica.com/place/Kashmir-region-Indian-subcontinent>.
20. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Kashmir>.
21. :’Demystifying Kashmir’ by NavnitaChadhaBehera, The Brookings Institution, 2006, pp. 14-15, at <https://lostkashmirihistory.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Behara-%E2%80%93-Demystifying-Kashmir.pdf>.
    Also <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Kashmir> and <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_movements_in_Jammu_and_Kashmir_(princely_state)#cite_note-6>.
22. He (my uncle) told me (a young Kashmiri Muslimvictim of alleged mass rape by Indian military) Kashmir’s story (of discrimination and “dispute”) not just starting from the Partition and the promises made by Pandit Nehru, but from the beginning of Dogra rule.
    : ‘That Night in KunanPoshpora: Do you remember KunanPoshopora? You should’ at <https://antiserious.com/that-night-in-kunan-poshpora-33b48db9a94e>.
    This implies that the narrative of oppression of Kashmiris by its erstwhile Dogra rulers is a part of popular memory, even now.
23. ‘The Economic Roots of the National. Awakening in Jammu and. Kashmir (1846-1947)’, by Ab Rashid Shiekh, chapter 5, at<https://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/23085/10/15_chapter6.pdf>.
24. Ibid.
25. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_movements_in_Jammu_and_Kashmir_(princely_state)#cite_note-6>.
26. ’13 July, 1931 : The Whole Truth …’, op cit.
27. : ’13 July 1931: A Chapter of Kashmir’ at <https://kashmirlife.net/13-july-1931-a-chapter-of-kashmir-61908/>.
    Also: ‘Kashmir Martyrs’ Day: Everything about Kashmir’s July 13 carnage’ at <https://www.freepressjournal.in/webspecial/kashmir-martyrs-day-everything-about-kashmirs-july-13-carnage> and ‘Martyrs’ Days: Memorializing 13 July 1931 in Kashmir: MriduRai’ at <https://kafila.online/2011/07/13/martyrs%E2%80%99-days-memorializing-13-july-1931-in-kashmir-mridu-rai/>.
28. Here is a significant comment on the narrative of “Kashmiriyat”:
    The composite and accommodating culture of Kashmir, often known as kashmiriyat, pre-dates the Valley’s role as an outpost of a succession of alien empires. At its core has been a gentle, mystical and humanist form of Islam influenced by Sufism. The term describes a Kashmiri identity which embraced both the Valley’s Muslim majority and its highcaste[sic] Hindu minority, the pandits. The concept is often overstated, as if to evoke a political paradise before a biblical fall and the embroiling of the Valley in the rival nationalisms of India and Pakistan. The religious and class divisions between Kashmiri-speaking Hindus and Muslims were always clear-cut. The Kashmiri nationalist current that has proclaimed kashmiriyat as its standard has often turned to Islam rather than a more inclusive regionalism as its defining identity. And it seems the term kashmiriyat was never used before 1947—it was in part invented as a political rallying cry. Yet its strength has come from a perception that Kashmir has been inclusive in its culture, and that both the Muslim majority and the vastly smaller and more privileged Hindu minority contributed to the language and the culture, respected and honoured the other community’s religious festivals and practices, and so shared a Kashmiri identity which created a bond stronger than the differences of faith and belief.
    (Ref.: ‘A Mission in Kashmir’ by Andrew Whitehead, Viking, 2007, Chapter 2, p. 14, at <https://www.andrewwhitehead.net/uploads/3/5/0/5/3505647/02_caught_in.pdf>.)
    It may be noted that in today’s context, there appears to be a very large degree of congruence between the proponents of Kashmiriyat, presupposing a harmonious past, and those of Kashmir’s continuance within India, albeit with a large degree of autonomy; also to some extent with those demanding “independence” (or “Azadi”). But, presumably none with those asking for unconditional integration with either India or Pakistan.
29. : ‘Emergence and Role of Muslim Conference in Kashmir (1932-1939)’ by Muhammad Yusuf Ganai, pp. 113 -125, at <http://ir.amu.ac.in/2266/1/T%205238.pdf>.
30. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_movements_in_Jammu_and_Kashmir_(princely_state)#cite_note-6>.
31. Muhammad Yusuf Ganai, op cit, pp. 157 – 158.
    Also: ‘Kashmir’s Flags: A Historical Overview’ by M J Aslam at <http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=83588>.
    It does, quite interestingly, describe the subsequent transformation of the party, in 1939, into the National Conference, in terms of their respective flags, in the following words:
    The green flag with white a crescent & a star in the middle was pulled down & replaced by a flag with red background & a plough in the middle which, thenceforth, became the party flag of the National Conference.
32. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_movements_in_Jammu_and_Kashmir_(princely_state)#cite_note-6>.
    Also: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/All_Jammu_and_Kashmir_Muslim_Conference>.
33. : ‘Towards New Kashmir’ at <http://www.jknc.in/UploadFiles/8a2ed918-f302-4831-89a0-d3d301635197__nayakashmir.pdf>.
    Also: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naya_Kashmir>, ‘Naya Kashmir and Human Development: Foundations for State Development Policy’ by SeharIqbal at <http://www.ijmdrr.com/admin/downloads/1509201716.pdf> and ”Sheikh Abdullah’s New Kashmir Manifesto Was A Cut And Paste Of Stalin’s Constitution For Soviet Union” by NaseerGanani at <https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/sheikh-abdullahs-new-kashmir-manifesto-was-a-cut-and-paste-of-stalins-constituti/298388>.
34. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_movements_in_Jammu_and_Kashmir_(princely_state)#cite_note-6>.
35. : The first paragraph, Section 3 of the ‘Resolution’, as cited in ‘Lahore Resolution 1940’ at <https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=603006017073091021123087088112123087031020067072039011023110016119127018120084103064002029052121121116050100025126018102090124053017086038086008087087019068090099069035069078113073103094097024107103115094025072087010123026019086029064089110018068119067&EXT=pdf>.
36. : In particular, para 23, ‘Presidential address by Muhammad Ali Jinnah to the Muslim League: Lahore, 1940’ at <http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00islamlinks/txt_jinnah_lahore_1940.html>.
37. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_movements_in_Jammu_and_Kashmir_(princely_state)#cite_note-6>.
    Also: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Kashmir_conflict#1846%E2%80%931945:_Princely_state>.
38. : <http://www.gandhi-manibhavan.org/activities/quit_india.htm>.
39. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Kashmir_conflict#1846%E2%80%931945:_Princely_state>.
40. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attlee_ministry#Post-war_consensus>.
41. : ‘British give date for Indian independence’, dtd. Feb. 20 1947, at <https://www.upi.com/Archives/1947/02/20/British-give-date-for-Indian-independence/3317410585124/>.
42. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_Action_Day>.
    Also: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partition_of_India#1946_Election,_Cabinet_Mission,_Direct_Action_Day,_Plan_for_Partition,_Independence:_1946%E2%80%931947>.
43. : ‘Five things you didn’t know about India’s Independence Day’ by ShoaibDaniyal at <https://scroll.in/article/674450/five-things-you-didnt-know-about-indias-independence-day>.
    Also: ‘Why was August 15 chosen as Independence Day?’ by Sushant Singh at <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/why-was-august-15-chosen-as-independence-day/>.
44. : ‘Remembering partition: ‘It was like a slaughterhouse” by Steve Chao at <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/08/remembering-partition-slaughter-house-170810050649347.html>.
45. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Kashmir_conflict#1846%E2%80%931945:_Princely_state>.
46. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_princely_states_of_British_India_(by_region)>.
    Also: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Princely_state>.
47. A highly pertinent observation, even if it pertains to the current, post-accession, scenario:
    With its extraordinary medley of races, tribal groups, languages, and religions, Jammu and Kashmir is one of the most diverse regions in the subcontinent. Even its majority community of Kashmiri Muslims is not a unified, homogeneous entity in terms of its political beliefs, its ideological leanings, or the political goals of the decade-long insurgent movement in the Kashmir Valley. There are sharp divisions between those demanding that Jammu and Kashmir become an independent state, those seeking to merge with Pakistan, and those wanting to reconcile their differences with India through constitutional mechanisms guaranteeing their political rights. Nor does the Kashmiri political leadership necessarily speak for the diverse minorities of the state, including Gujjars, Bakkarwals, Kashmiri Pandits, Dogras, and Ladakhi Buddhists. Across the Line of Control, the Northern Areas also presents a rich mosaic of languages, castes, Islamic sects, and cultures, which cannot be subsumed under the overarching category of “Muslim brotherhood” without distorting the diverse political aspirations of the region’s residents. It is essential to recognize the deeply plural character of Jammu and Kashmir’s society on both sides of the line of control and the political aspirations and choices of its minority communities. The irreducible and homogenizing parameters of ideology and nationalism usually applied in analyzing the Kashmir conflict are clearly at variance with the plural realities and diverse political demands of the region’s various communities, ranging from affirmative discrimination to more autonomy, separate constitutional status within India or Pakistan, and outright secession.
    (Ref.: Behera, op cit, p. 2.)
48. : ‘Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War’ by Victoria Schofield, I.B.Tauris, 2003, p. 25 and 30, at <https://lostkashmirihistory.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/book-kashmir-in-conflict-india-pakistan-and-unending-war.pdf>.
49. : ‘Kashmir 1947: Rival Versions of History’ by Prem Shankar Jha, OUP, 1996, p. vii, at <https://lostkashmirihistory.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/split_jha_kashmir-1947-rival-versions-of-history.pdf>.
50. ‘The forgotten Poonch uprising of 1947’ by Christopher Snedden, Seminar 643, March 2013, at <https://www.india-seminar.com/2013/643/643_christopher_snedden.htm#top>.
51. : <https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Political_integration_of_India>.
52. ‘APPENDIX – I’ at <https://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/6534/15/15_appendix.pdf>.
    Also: Ref.: ‘Victims of Massacre, 22nd October 1947’ by AshiqueHamdani Syed at <https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/victims-of-massacre-22nd-october-1947-black-day.137665/>.
    For a significantly divergent version: ‘Danger in Kashmir’ by Josef Korbel, Princeton University Press, 1954, pp. 75-78, at <https://lostkashmirihistory.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/1954-Danger-in-Kashmir-by-Korbel-s.pdf>.
    As regards the “sponsoring”: Korbel, op cit, pp. 93-95.
    ‘Jammu and Kashmir in Legal perspective’ by EFSAS at <https://www.efsas.org/EFSAS-Jammu%20and%20Kashmir%20in%20Legal%20Perspective.pdf>.
    ‘Alive and Kicking: The Kashmir Dispute Forty Years Later’ by James D. Howley, 1991, at <https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1132&context=psilr>.
53. AshiqueHamdani Syed, op cit.
54. : ‘Kashmir: Insurgency and After’ by BalrajPuri, Orient Longman Private Ltd, 2008, pp. 8-9, at <https://lostkashmirihistory.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/puri_kashmirinsurgencyandafter.pdf>.
55. AshiqueHamdani Syed, op cit.
56. : ‘Kashmir: Legal Documents’, Legal Document No 112, at <http://help.ikashmir.net/historicaldocuments/doc/historicaldocuments.pdf>.
57. : ‘Appendix – II’ at <https://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/6534/15/15_appendix.pdf>.
    Also: ‘The Backstory of Article 370: A True Copy of J&K’s Instrument of Accession’ by VenkateshNayak, August 5, 2019, at <https://thewire.in/history/public-first-time-jammu-kashmirs-instrument-accession-india/amp/>.
58. There are some bitter controversies as regards the precise sequence of events, and even some doubts about the very existence of the Instrument of Accession. Views and inferences diverge, to a very significant extent, on the basis of which side of the divide one is on.
    Nayak, ibid, deals with the “existence” aspect, apparently, rather conclusively.
    For the larger, rather acrimonious, debate, one may refer to (i) ‘Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir 1947’ by Alastair Lamb, Roxford Books, Hertingfordbury, 1994, pp. 82-103, at <https://lostkashmirihistory.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/1994-Birth-of-a-Tragedy-Kashmir-1947-by-Lamb-s.pdf> and (ii) Jha, op cit, pp. 59-73.
59. Puri, op cit, p. 12.
    Also: There is no evidence of any official intervention with the Maharaja, but the only possible guess which suggests itself is that Abdullah was released on the intervention of the government of India, whose Prime Minister, Pandit Nehru, had been for years associated with him.
    (Ref.: Korbel, op cit, p. 70.)
60. : ‘Partition 70 years on: When tribal warriors invaded Kashmir’ by M Ilyas Khan, October 22 2017, at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41662588>.
61. : ‘Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris’ by Christopher Snedden, C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., London, 2015, pp. 126-27/252, at <https://lostkashmirihistory.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Understanding-Kashmir-and-Kashmiris.pdf>.
62. As winter set in, the intensity of operations decreased. For the Indian forces the weather was a serious problem: many soldiers saw snow for the first time in their life, they were not accustomed to the cold weather at all, and there was not enough winter clothing and footwear available (shortages were gradually eased by local purchases). The locally recruited Azad militias and the Pathan fighters – who were generally used to the weather of high mountains – were far less affected by winter conditions. (Ref.: ‘The First Indo-Pakistani War, 1947-48’ by Peter A. Kiss, March 2013, at <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235932742_THE_FIRST_INDO-PAKISTANI_WAR_1947-48>.)
63. : ‘A Mission in Kashmir’ by Andrew Whitehead, Chapter 1: ‘An Italian in Kashmir’, at <https://www.andrewwhitehead.net/uploads/3/5/0/5/3505647/01_an_italian.pdf>.
    Also: AshiqueHamdani Syed, op cit.
64. The first Pakistan Army formation to go into Kashmir was the 101 Brigade. The 101 Pakistani Brigade was the first regular army formation to enter Kashmir.This act of singular decisiveness took place in May 1948. One battalion each from this brigade went to Uri and Muzaffarabad-Kohala-Bagharea,while one company (later replaced by a battalion) went to Tithwal.
    (Ref.: ‘The 1947-48 Kashmir War’ by Major Agha Humayun Amin at <https://www.brownpundits.com/2018/02/18/1947-48-kashmir-war/>.)
65. : ‘History of Operations in Jammu & Kashmir (1947-48)’ by S.N. Prasad, 1987, pp. pp.373-5, as cited in: ‘From Kashmir and 370 to Partition, BJP’s Hatred of Nehru is Fuelled by Falsehoods’ by A. G. Noorani, August 9 2019, at <https://thewire.in/history/from-kashmir-and-370-to-partition-bjps-hatred-of-nehru-is-fuelled-by-falsehoods>.
66. Because of Pakistan and India’s dependence on British officers in their respective armies, both countries believed that they had been disadvantaged during the Kashmir war: Pakistan, because General Gracey had refused to send in troops when Jinnah requested him to do so; India because, rather than encouraging the Indians to counterattack and recapture the area around Mirpur and Muzaffarabad, while they were militarily in the ascendancy, General Bucher pressed for a ceasefire. But, from the British perspective, Bucher’s objective, mirrored by that of Gracey, was preventing an inter-dominion war, which would have required men, who had so recently been comrades-in-arms, to fight each other.
    (Ref.: Schofield, op cit, p. 72.)
67. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_annexation_of_Hyderabad>.
68. : ‘Resolutions and Statements of the United Nations Security Council (1946–1989): A Thematic Guide’ edited by Karel C. Wellens, MartinusNijhoff Publishers, Netherlands, 1990, p. 322, at <https://books.google.co.in/books?id=lsyOVH6E-PEC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false>.
    It appears that well before India actually taking the dispute to the UN, Pak Prime Minster, on November 16 1947, had proposed such a course of action, via a press statement.
    (Ref.: Korbel, op cit, pp. 90-91.)
    That makes the proposition quite plausible that India would eventually go to the UN, on January 1 1948, to forestall such a move on the part of Pakistan and lodge the complaint under chapter VII, instead of chapter VI (which Puri found rather “intriguing”: Puri, op cit, p. 17), to keep the level of UN intervention, all at the same time, to the most minimum and its opinion only recommendatory. At that point of time, quite possibly, it was pretty much an astute diplomatic move, on the part of India in the tussle with rival Pakistan.
    Also: Ref.: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UN_mediation_of_the_Kashmir_dispute>.
69. Puri, op cit, pp. 16-17. Also: Korbel, op cit, p. viii.
70. Schofield, op cit, pp. 70-71. Also Puri, op cit, pp. 16-17. Also: <https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_47>.
71. Lamb, op cit, maps 1-3. Also: Behera, op cit. p. 29.
72. Puri, op cit, pp. 17-18.
73. : ‘’Resolutions and Statements …’, op cit, p. 322, and <https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_47>.
74. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_307>.
75. Puri, op cit, pp. 15-17.
76. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sheikh_Abdullah#Head_of_emergency_administration>.
77. Puri, op cit, pp. 15-16.
78. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sheikh_Abdullah#Head_of_emergency_administration>.
    Also: Schofield, op cit, pp. 92-93.
79. Ref: Snedden, op cit, pp. 155-6/252. Also: Puri, op cit, pp. 20-21.
80. Puri, ibid.
    Also: ‘How Pakistan avoided a plebiscite -Excerpts from the book “The Kashmir Story” by B. L. Sharma’ at <https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18970/How+Pakistan+avoided+a+plebiscite+Excerpts+from+the+book+quotThe+Kashmir+Storyquot+by+B+L+Sharma>.
    For a strikingly different version: Korbel, op cit, pp. 88-91.
81. For a rather amusing and, yet, telling testimony: ‘My Years with Sheikh Abdullah: Kashmir 1971 – 1987’ by Gulam Ahmad, Gulshan Books, Srinagar, 2008, pp. 24-25, at <https://lostkashmirihistory.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Ahmad-Years-with-Abdullah.pdf>. Also subsequent pages.
    Also: Special Report: Sheikh Abdullah and the Kashmir Issue, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence, April 22 1964, Approved for Release on December 1999, pp. 1-2, at <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000283431.pdf>.
82. Ahmad, ibid, pp. 29-31.
    Puri, op cit, pp. 46-47.
    ‘Radical Land Reforms Were Key to Sheikh Abdullah’s Towering Influence on Kashmir: Within the Valley, the reforms caused a social transformation that has few parallels.’ by SudhirDevdas, December 8 2017, at <https://thewire.in/government/radical-land-reforms-key-sheikh-abdullahs-towering-influence-kashmir>.
    Schofield, op cit, pp. 128-129.
83. Puri, op cit, pp. 25-26. Also: Ahmad, ibid, pp. 33-36.
84. Ahmad, ibid, pp. 35-36.
85. Central Intelligence Agency, op cit, p.2. Ahmad, op cit, pp. 34-35.
86. Jagirs and similar special grants had been abolished. Debt conciliation boards had been set up and were operating so vigorously, I was informed, that they amounted to debt cancellation boards. Rents had been lowered. Security of tenure had been provided for the tillers. A ceiling- on all landholdings had been set at 22¾ acres. All arable land above that figure had been taken away from the owners and redistributed.
    (Ref.: ‘The Kashmir Land Reforms” Some Personal Impressions’ by Daniel Thorner, The Economic Weekly, September 12 1953, p. 999, at <https://www.epw.in/system/files/pdf/1953_5/37/the_kashmir_land_reforms.pdf>.)
    Also: Devdas, op cit.
87. : ‘Land Reforms and Politics in Jammu and Kashmir’, pp. 74-79 at <https://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/14486/7/07_chapter%203.pdf>.
88. : ‘Towards New Kashmir’ at <http://www.jknc.in/UploadFiles/8a2ed918-f302-4831-89a0-d3d301635197__nayakashmir.pdf>.
    Eminent Indian economist, Jean Dreze, has argued that under the influence of this manifesto and with the protective shield of the Article 370, now scrapped, Kashmir could make significantly greater progress in terms of the Human Development Index (HDI) as compared to Gujarat, in particular, the home state of the incumbent Indian Prime Minister and also the Home Minister.
    (Ref.: ‘Jean Dreze contests Amit Shah with Gujarat data: Dreze showed how Jammu and Kashmir outscored Gujarat on the basis of a raft of development indices’ by Pheroze L. Vincent, August 9 2019, at <https://www.telegraphindia.com/india/jean-dreze-contests-amit-shah-with-gujarat-data/cid/1696457>.)
89. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/All_Jammu_and_Kashmir_Plebiscite_Front>.
90. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theft_of_the_Holy_Relic_from_the_Hazratbal_Shrine>.
91. Central Intelligence Agency, op cit, pp. 3-4.
92. : ‘Kashmir: Sheikh Abdullah’s Reinstatement’ by David E. Lockwood at <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40394860?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents>.
93. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_chief_ministers_of_Jammu_and_Kashmir>.
94. Ibid.
95. : Schofield, op cit, pp. 125-126.
96. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maqbool_Bhat>.
97. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashmir_conflict#Period_of_integration_and_rise_of_Kashmiri_nationalism_(1954%E2%80%931974)>.
98. Schofield, op cit, pp. 133-135.
99. Schofield, op cit, p. 138.
100. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashmir_conflict#Period_of_integration_and_rise_of_Kashmiri_nationalism_(1954%E2%80%931974)>.
101. Ibid.
102. : ‘Kashmir’s flawed elections’ by AltafHussain, September 14 2002, at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2223364.stm>.
103. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insurgency_in_Jammu_and_Kashmir#Rigging_of_1987_Assembly_elections> and <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashmir_conflict#Period_of_integration_and_rise_of_Kashmiri_nationalism_(1954%E2%80%931974)>.
     Schofield, op cit, p. 143.
104. : ‘Media on a Fai ride’ by Jagmohan, August 06 2011, at <http://archive.asianage.com/columnists/media-fai-ride-933>.
105. Schofield, op cit, p. 144.
106. Puri, op cit, p. 63.
107. : ‘How Maqbool Butt Passed on the Baton of Militancy in Kashmir: An excerpt from the book ‘The Story of Kashmir’ by David Devadas.’ by David Devadas, February 11 2019, at <https://thewire.in/books/how-maqbool-butt-passed-on-the-baton-of-militancy-in-kashmir>.
     Schofield, op cit, pp. 139-140.
108. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insurgency_in_Jammu_and_Kashmir#1987%E2%80%932004>.
109. : ‘Kashmiri Pandits offered three choices by Radical Islamists’ by Col (Dr) Tej Kumar Tikoo (Retd.), January 19 2015, at <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/kashmiri-pandits-offered-three-choices-by-radical-islamists/>.
     This provides quite a graphic account of the alleged atrocities and violence that triggered the “exodus”.
     For a very different version: ‘Exposing the Exodus’ by LKH Desk, Augist 18 2017, at <https://lostkashmirihistory.com/exposing-the-kp-exodus/>. Also: Puri, op cit, pp. 70-73.
     The claim, by some, that the “exodus” had been engineered by Jagmohan in order to have a clear field to launch brutal state terror against the local (ref.: ‘Governor Jagmohan Was Responsible for Pandit Exodus, Says SaifuddinSoz in New Book on Kashmir’, June 23 2018, at <https://www.news18.com/news/india/governor-jagmohan-was-responsible-for-pandit-exodus-says-saifuddin-soz-in-new-book-on-kashmir-1787973.html>) does not appear too credible when one takes note of the fact that the bulk had fled the very day Jagmohan had taken over, allowing him no time to do all this.
110. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashmiri_Pandit#Exodus_from_Kashmir_(1985–1995)>.
111. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exodus_of_Kashmiri_Hindus>.
112. Schofield, op cit, p. 147.
     Puri, op cit, p. 65.
113. Puri, op cit, p. 66.
     Also: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gawkadal_massacre>.
114. Puri, op cit, p. 67.
115. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jagmohan#Governor_of_Jammu_and_Kashmir>.
     Also: ‘Mirwaiz fiasco sparks off a change of guard in Kashmir.’ by PankajPachuri, June 15 1990, at <https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/indiascope/story/19900615-mirwaiz-fiasco-sparks-off-a-change-of-guard-in-kashmir-812692-1990-06-15>.
116. : ‘Muslim Leader of Kashmir Slain; 30 Die as Police Fire on Mourners’ by Barbara Crossette, May 22 1990, at <https://www.nytimes.com/1990/05/22/world/muslim-leader-of-kashmir-slain-30-die-as-police-fire-on-mourners.html>.
     ‘Desecrating the dead’ by Shams Irfan, July 18 2010, at <https://kashmirlife.net/desecrating-the-dead-650/>.
     Puri, op cit, p. 68.
117. It was the logical outcome of such a reckless and ruthless one-track policy that led to the cross-over of an officially estimated 10,000 desperate Kashmiri youth to Pakistan for training and procurement of arms.
     (Ref.: Puri, op cit, 69.)
     Also: Schofield, op cit, p. 154.
118. ‘Rape in Kasmir: A Crime of War’ by Asia Watch, a Division of Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, 1993, at <https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/INDIA935.PDF>
119. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kunan_Poshpora_incident> and ‘KunanPoshpora – The Other Story’ by ShrimoyeeNandiniGhosh, January 20 2014, at<https://kafila.online/2014/01/20/kunan-poshpora-the-other-story-shrimoyee-nandini-ghosh/>.
120. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009_Shopian_rape_and_murder_case>.
121. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Kashmir_unrest#Stone_pelting>.
122. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burhan_Wani> and ‘Kashmir: 2 Years AfterBurhanWani: BurhanWani’s killing sparked an uprising that never really ended.’ by Fahad Shah, July 10 2018, at <https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/kashmir-2-years-after-burhan-wani/>.
123. : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_Pulwama_attack> and ‘Kashmir attack: Tracing the path that led to Pulwama’, May 1 2019, at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-47302467>.
124. : ‘The Article 370 Amendments: Key Legal Issues’ by Gautam Bhatia, August 5 2019, at <https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2019/08/05/the-article-370-amendments-key-legal-issues/?fbclid=IwAR2h12Puu6pOx9MRjZnkz2OvPd342VJAI6uYOmg_onX22htwVfmXzQpgyqU>.
     Also: ‘Article 370 scrapped: What will change in Jammu & Kashmir’, August 5 2019, at <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/article-370-to-be-scrapped-what-impact-will-it-have-on-jk/articleshow/70534157.cms>.
125. : ‘With President’s nod to J&K bifurcation, two UTs to come into existence on October 31: The Act was passed to bifurcate the state into two Union Territories — Jammu and Kashmir with an Assembly and Ladakh without one.’, August 9 2019, at <http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2019/aug/09/with-presidents-not-to-jk-bifurcation-two-uts-to-come-into-existence-on-october-31-2016603.html>.
126. : ‘J&K: The first state to become a Union Territory’ by TNN, August 6 2019, at <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/jk-the-first-state-to-become-a-ut/articleshow/70548872.cms>.
127. : ‘Kashmir: Why Centre is sending additional 38000 troops to J&K: NarendraModigovt has decided to send 38,000 more troops to the Kashmir Valley even though terror incidents have come down.’ by Prabhash K Dutta, August 2 2019, at <https://www.indiatoday.in/news-analysis/story/-if-situation-has-improved-then-why-send-38-000-troops-to-j-k-1576436-2019-08-02>, ‘Article 370: India strips disputed Kashmir of special status’, August 5 2019, at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-49231619> and ‘‘Anxiety Fills the Air.’ What It’s Like Inside Kashmir When All Communication With the Outside World Is Cut Off’ by Fahad Shah, August 7 2019 at <https://time.com/5646005/inside-kashmir-communication-shutdown/>.
128. : ‘About 4,000 people arrested in Kashmir since August 5: govt sources to AFP’, by AFP, August 18 2019, at <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/about-4000-people-arrested-in-kashmir-since-august-5-govt-sources-to-afp/article29126566.ece>. For a slightly different version: ‘Thousands Detained in Indian Kashmir Crackdown, Official Data Reveals’ by Reuters, September 12 2019, at <https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2019/09/12/world/asia/12reuters-india-kashmir-detentions.html>.
129. : ‘Nearly 300 from Valley detained in UP jails: Separate barracks, families wait’ by Anil Bhatnagar, September 12 2019, at <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/nearly-300-from-valley-detained-in-up-jails-separate-barracks-families-wait-5987405/>.
130. : ‘Kashmir under lockdown: All the latest updates: Latest updates as India abrogates Kashmir’s special status and imposes a security lockdown which is in its second month.’, September 19 2019, at <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/india-revokes-kashmir-special-status-latest-updates-190806134011673.html>.
131. : ‘Doctors write to Amit Shah for permission to assess healthcare situation in Jammu and Kashmir’ by Scroll Staff, September 11 2019, at <https://scroll.in/latest/937000/doctors-write-to-amit-shah-for-permission-to-assess-healthcare-situation-in-jammu-and-kashmir?fbclid=IwAR2m0EWUOovJd7lVUnOkuoYojupHv7g4LWadgHLJGNkZoCQ-Xc9HrBe51Js>.
132. : ‘Kashmir lockdown: Stories of torture and arbitrary arrests: Thousands have been detained and many of them tortured since India revoked Kashmir’s autonomy a month ago.’ by AkashBisht, September 4 2019, at <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/09/kashmir-lockdown-stories-torture-arbitrary-arrests-190904122016072.html> and <https://twitter.com/BabaUmarr/status/1174038807634763778>.
133. : ‘Even as thousands are detained in Kashmir, courts and legal system remain frozen: Habeas corpus petition are piling up but hearings are being postponed and court orders have dwindled.’ by AnumehaYadav and MenakaRao, September 20 2019, at <https://scroll.in/article/937856/even-as-thousands-are-detained-in-kashmir-courts-and-legal-system-remain-frozen?fbclid=IwAR1I67aRzVEoQS7zD5LxpGrAwmctTsrrI7lbFRoontgBpmSyiYjo6WrxWkw>.
     Also: ‘Under wraps so far: 252 habeas corpus pleas in J&K High Court since August 5: Little urgency has been shown by the High Court — each case is either in the stage of admission or has been listed for orders’ by Kaunain Sheriff M, September 20 2019, at <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/under-wraps-so-far-252-habeas-corpus-pleas-in-jk-hc-since-august-5-6011628/?fbclid=IwAR0L0-DyA4aTa04dRkORdvw3dod5QtK4JF8YwcPy_ogq9FUXT0Y1cNWImiA>.
134. : ‘Kashmir Valley has seen many a lockdown but why this time it is so different: The Kashmir Valley’s connection with the inside and the outside world has been cut — all internet connectivity, cellular, landline, and cable TV services have been snapped.’ by MuzamilJaleel, BashaaratMasood, AdilAkhzer, August 7 2019, at <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/valley-has-seen-many-a-lockdown-but-why-this-time-it-is-so-different-article-370-kashmir-amit-shah-5884129/>.
135. : ‘The story of Indian democracy written in blood and betrayal: BJP thinks it is going to Indianise Kashmir. Instead, we will see, potentially, the Kashmirisation of India.’ by PratapBhanu Mehta, August 7 2019, at <https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/jammu-kashmir-article-370-scrapped-special-status-amit-shah-narendra-modi-bjp-5880797/>.
136. :’2019 Parliamentary Poll: Outcome: Drivers: Consequences: An Exploration’ by SuklaSen, June 15 2019, at<https://docs.google.com/document/d/e/2PACX-1vSX4J7wt12TDUlBKNQ_x1AiIPFvYKiNay001ceKe6qrZD9kAy_8sdtYNE25Jbwk0A/pub>.
137. : NirupamaSubramanian@tallstories, September 3 2019, at <https://twitter.com/tallstories/status/1168936922682712067?s=17&fbclid=IwAR02ZDf4czEEZOCayzkTazvNy8770W4eAKWqVc6eSgvijK122QQBdnBlXeI>.
138. : ‘Kashmir will not react and erupt in anger, Kashmir will respond’ by GowharGeelani, September 9 2019, at <https://www.asianage.com/opinion/oped/090919/kashmir-will-not-react-and-erupt-in-anger-kashmir-will-respond.html>.
139. : ‘Abrogation of J&K’s special status is being seen through one prism: The fear of demographic change: If, indeed, New Delhi believes the decision is for the good of the people, then what explains the siege around every household, an unprecedented communication blockade, a record troop build-up and the detention of almost everyone who has a political or social standing in Kashmir?’ by MuzamilJaleel, Sptember 9 2019, at <https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/kashmir-lockdown-article-370-communication-modi-govt-5978122/>.
140. : ‘Kashmiris have lost the sense of fear’, Interview of AnuradhaBhasin by JyotiPunwani, August 30 2019, at <https://www.rediff.com/news/interview/kashmiris-have-lost-the-sense-of-fear/20190830.htm>.
141. : ‘Kashmir’s Political Leaders Remain in Detention, Government Mum on Charges: The massive crackdown on mainstream politicians has left the Valley leaders, workers and supporters in both anger and shock.’ by Mudasir Ahmad, August 13 2019, at <https://thewire.in/politics/kashmir-political-leaders-arrest-government-silence>.
142. : ‘‘I see no future (for Omar, Sajad, Mufti)… Story has ended for those thriving in vacuum, 8% turnouts’: Jitendra Singh: MoS, PMO, Jitendra Singh says curbs in J&K are nothing new and should not be seen through the prism of Art 370.’ by Express News Service, August 18 2019, at <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/idea-exchange-jitendra-singh-mos-pmo-jammu-and-kashmir-bifurcation-article-370-jk-reorganisation-bill-5913457/>.
143. : ‘Detained in Jammu and Kashmir: Three former CMs, ex ministers, MLAs, Mayor’ by BashaaratMasood, August 19 2019, at <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/detained-in-jk-ex-top-ministers-mlas-mayor-5915920/>.
144. : ‘J&K leaders will be freed in less than 18 months: MoSJitendra Singh: Singh’s statement is the first one by a senior functionary in the Union government about the maximum time for which mainstream political leaders in Jammu and Kashmir may remain under detention.’ by Arun Sharma, September 18 2019, at <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/jk-leaders-will-be-freed-in-less-than-18-months-mos-jitendra-singh-6004598/>.
145. : ‘No talks with Hurriyat, only with people of J&K…will continue to claim PoK: Amit Shah’ by Liz Mathew and PradeepKaushal, August 7 2019, at <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/jammu-kashmir-reorganisation-bill-passed-lok-sabha-no-talks-with-hurriyat-amit-shah-5884095/>.
146. : ‘Talks with Pakistan now will only be about PoK, says Rajnath Singh’ by Archis Mohan and PTI, August 18 2019, at <https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/talks-with-pakistan-now-will-only-be-about-pok-says-rajnath-singh-119081800832_1.html>.
147. : ‘Kashmiri delegation meets Amit Shah in Delhi’ by IANS, September 3 2019, at <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/kashmiri-delegation-meets-amit-shah-delhi-1594839-2019-09-03>.
     Given that the report uses both past and future tenseswhile referring to the “meeting”, one cannot be really too sure whether any such meeting had actually taken place.
148. : ‘Lahore Declaration February, 1999’, February 02 1999, at <https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18997/Lahore+Declaration+February+1999>.
149. : ‘When Vajpayee and Musharraf ‘Almost Resolved’ the Kashmir Dispute: History remembers the Agra Summit as one of the greatest missed opportunities of India-Pakistan relations. Former Pakistan Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri in his book ‘Neither a Hawk nor a Dove’ wrote that the “solution to Kashmir was in the grasp of both governments”.’ by Uday Singh Rana, February 13 2018, at <https://www.news18.com/news/politics/when-vajpayee-and-musharraf-almost-resolved-the-kashmir-dispute-1659481.html>.
150. : ‘Joint Statement Prime Minister of India Dr.Manmohan Singh and the Prime Minister of Pakistan Syed Yusuf RazaGilani’, July 16 2009, at <https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/4855/Joint+Statement+Prime+Minister+of+India+Dr+Manmohan+Singh+and+the+Prime+Minister+of+Pakistan+Syed+Yusuf+Raza+Gilani>.
151. Rivera, op cit.
152. It was the acknowledgement that Kashmiris need to be counted in, plus the realism that neither diplomacy nor war would change the map, that propelled the backchannel talks on the four-point solution for Kashmir in the first decade of the century. It was a truly exciting period in this history of South Asia, because for the first time, here was a historic opportunity to end the hostility. It had four elements — borders will not change, but Kashmiris will be allowed to move freely across it; a phased withdrawal of the military on both sides; more autonomy from Islamabad to PoK, and from Delhi to J&K; and a joint mechanism for the “supervision” of J&K. This formula remains the best way out of the mess that India and Pakistan have created in Kashmir.
     (Ref.: ‘India’s actions over the status of J&K provide an opportunity to revisit four-point plan for Kashmir’ by Nirupama Subramanian, September 19 2019, at <https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/jammu-kashmir-restrictions-article-370-pakistan-6007817/?fbclid=IwAR3GwwTdGOa95VhUGeuBADjJp7NPHXAeA-_O1mJc_q5OixRd65riFSD4Uuo>.
     The very same proposal, albeit in greater details, had been laid out here as well: Uday Singh Rana, op cit.
153. : ‘First Person – Shades of Azadi: Address the rage and frustration of the youth and everything else will follow’ by GhazalaWahab at <http://forceindia.net/firstperson/shades-of-azadi/> and ‘What does azadi mean to Kashmiris? The answer may be surprising: On the issue of joining Pakistan, the answer is 50-50.’ by Harsh Kakar, June 10 2017, at <https://www.dailyo.in/politics/kashmir-azadi-india-pakistan/story/1/17742.html>.
154. : ‘Press Release from the President’s Secretariat’ (PR No. 193/2018), Islamabad, December 18 2018, at <http://president.gov.pk/imgs/121418/121418e.pdf>] and keep fanning insurgency[Ref.: ‘Kashmir in Comparative Perspective: Democracy and Violent Separatism in India’ by StenWidmalm, p.88, at <https://lostkashmirihistory.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Kashmir-in-Comparative-Perspective-OCR.pdf>.
155. : ‘Factbox: India and Pakistan – nuclear arsenals and strategies’ by ZebaSiddiqui, March 1 2019, at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-kashmir-pakistan-nuclear-factbo/factbox-india-and-pakistan-nuclear-arsenals-and-strategies-idUSKCN1QI4O5>.
     Also: ‘India and Pakistan are quietly making nuclear war more likely: Both countries are arming their submarines with nukes.’ by Tom Hundley, April 4 2018, at <https://www.vox.com/2018/4/2/17096566/pakistan-india-nuclear-war-submarine-enemies>.
156. : ‘The Summit’, July 14 2001, at <https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?20047/The+Summit>.
157. : ‘The story of how Nawaz Sharif pulled back from nuclear war’ by EliasGroll, May 14 2013, at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/14/the-story-of-how-nawaz-sharif-pulled-back-from-nuclear-war/> and ‘Joint Statement (of US President Clinton) With Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan’, July 4 1999, at <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/WCPD-1999-07-12/pdf/WCPD-1999-07-12-Pg1278.pdf>.
158. : ‘Imran welcomes Trump’s offer of mediation on Kashmir, says it won’t be resolved bilaterally’ by PTI, July 23 2019, at <http://www.ptinews.com/news/10726606_Imran-welcomes-Trump-s-offer-of-mediation-on-Kashmir–says-it-won-t-be-resolved-bilaterally.html>.
     Also: ‘PM Modi rejects mediation on J-K, Donald Trump agrees: The two leaders met for the first time since India scrapped the special status to Jammu and Kashmir.’ by HT Correspondent, August 26 2019, at <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/pm-modi-rejects-mediation-on-j-k-donald-trump-agrees/story-4z1mdXYD6RKSCrbdfai71I.html>.
     ‘Trump once again offers to help India-Pakistan, says Kashmir mediation offer still out there: Donald Trump has offered to help resolve the tensions between India and Pakistan. He said that the offer to mediate over the Kashmir issue is still there.’ by India Today Web Desk, September 10 2019, at <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/donald-trump-again-offers-to-help-india-pakistan-kashmir-1597424-2019-09-10?utm_source=JioXpressNews&utm_medium=JioXpressNews&utm_campaign=JioXpressNews>.
159. : ‘Imran Khan rakes up prospect of nuclear war with India’ by IANS, September 15 2019, at <https://www.khaleejtimes.com/international/pakistan/imran-khan-rakes-up-prospect-of-nuclear-war-with-india>.
     Also: If the world does nothing to stop the Indian assault on Kashmir and its people, there will be consequences for the whole world as two nuclear-armed states get ever closer to a direct military confrontation. India’s defense minister has issued a not-so-veiled nuclear threat to Pakistan by saying that the future of India’s “no first use” policy on nuclear weapons will “depend on circumstances.” Similar statements have been made by Indian leaders periodically. Pakistan has long viewed India’s “no first use” claims with skepticism.
     (Ref.: ‘Imran Khan: The World Can’t Ignore Kashmir. We Are All in Danger.: If the world does nothing to stop the Indian assault on Kashmir and its people, two nuclear-armed states will get ever closer to a direct military confrontation.’ by Imran Khan, August 30 2019, at <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/30/opinion/imran-khan-kashmir-pakistan.html>.)
160. The UNSC, Secretary General has, however, expressed his concern.
     Look, I think, on Kashmir, the Secretary‑General… as the Secretary‑General said and has said previously, he remains engaged. I think he will also use the opportunity of discussions during the General Assembly to raise it. He’s also underscored the need for dialogue as the only way to resolve the issue and, as part of the solution for the current crisis in Kashmir, to make sure that human rights aspects are very much dealt with, as well.
     (Ref.: ‘Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General’, September 19 2019, at <https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/db190919.doc.htm?fbclid=IwAR3NGLocaVK-CoTw615WFsqKQMrrmxEz9dLCw3phJ_0XjBYXOaOMPlg2NsU>.)
161. Here is a list of key militant groups, as in 2006: Behera, op cit, pp. 160-1.
     Subsequently, the Al Qaeda and ISIS have also been reported to try to gain footholds.
     (Ref.: ‘Al Qaeda chief threatens India over Kashmir, unveils Pak’s role in fueling cross-border terrorism’ by IANS, July 10 2019, at <https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ani/al-qaeda-chief-threatens-india-over-kashmir-unveils-pak-s-role-in-fueling-cross-border-terrorism-119071000389_1.html> and ‘Isis claims to have established Kashmir ‘province’’, May 12 2019, at <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/isis-claims-to-have-established-kashmir-province-bz92ls7jk>.)
162. : ‘Pakistan’s secret dirty war’ by Declan Walsh, March 29 2011, at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/29/balochistan-pakistans-secret-dirty-war> and ‘Pakistan: Hazara Shia Muslims end protest in Quetta over killings’ by AsadHashim, May 3 2018, at <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/pakistan-hazara-shia-muslims-protest-quetta-killings-180502131145156.html>.
163. : ‘Pakistan’s Sham Election: How the Army Chose Imran Khan’ by C. Christine Fair, July 27 2018, at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/pakistan/2018-07-27/pakistans-sham-election>.
164. : ‘Sri Lanka Massacred Tens of Thousands of Tamils While the World Looked Away’ by CallumMacrae, August 5 2015, at <https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/kwxz4m/death-of-a-tiger-0000710-v22n8>.
165. : ‘Myanmar: Events of 2018’ at <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/burma>.
166. : ‘The value of the SC’s Kashmir order’ by Gautam Bhatia, Jan. 12 2020, at <https://www.hindustantimes.com/columns/the-value-of-the-sc-s-kashmir-order-opinion/story-AQBLRCMYZ2mkAhVWWiMnIL.html>.
167. : ‘Jammu and Kashmir administration lifts ban on social media sites’ by PrashastiAwasthi, March 4 2020, at <https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/jammu-and-kashmir-administration-lifts-ban-on-social-media-sites/article30981290.ece>.
168. : ‘Kashmir schools reopen after 7 months’ by Yusuf Jameel, Feb. 25 2020, at <https://www.deccanchronicle.com/nation/current-affairs/250220/kashmir-schools-reopen-after-7-months.html>.
169. At least two of these deserve special mention: (i) ‘Imprisoned Resistance – 5th August And Its Aftermath’, November 12 2019, at <http://pucl.org/reports/imprisoned-resistance-5th-august-and-its-aftermath> and (ii) ‘#KashmirCivilDisobedience’, October 12 2019, by Anirudh Kala, Brinelle D’Souza, RevatiLaul and ShabnamHashmi at <https://cdn.dnd.com.pk/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/report-titled-Kashmir-Civil-Disobedience.pdf>.
170. ‘Interrogating the “Normal” in Kashmir: Report of a Visit to the Valley, January 31 to February 5, 2020’, March 4 2020, by KalpanaKannabiran, SarojiniNadimpally, Navsharan Singh, RoshmiGoswami and Pamela Philipose at <https://indianculturalforum.in/2020/03/04/interrogating-the-normal-in-kashmir/?fbclid=IwAR1fsd2aHAn4QsGlaP-gpxcE5O8JkWXFDk1dQvzk6u13fvIGu2ZWWGHMAng>.
     

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