In recent decades the serious risks of genetically engineered crops, foods, animals and mosquitoes have been widely discussed and thanks to the rich contribution by several senior scientists and groups of scientists also to this debate these hazards are now recognized quite widely. It is time now to give equal attention to the very high risks of genetically engineered viruses as well as these hazards can also be extremely serious.
It is not adequately realized that for several decades now virologists in dozens of labs located in several countries have been rather routinely creating viruses which are more dangerous than those that exist in nature. More recently a proliferation of highest bio-safety category labs has been reported in some countries and it is likely that this is at least partially an indicator also of such high-risk research being conducted in more labs than before.
As in the case of viruses the line between civilian research and biological warfare research is rather thin, an additional concern is that despite the ban on biological weapons, some aspects of such research may also increasing. What is already well known in any case is that there have been several exposures from time to time of biological warfare research being performed in the guise of civilian research.
In particular high level of concern has persisted among several senior scientists regarding unacceptably high risks relating to research which involves the creation of novel potential pandemic pathogens. These concerns were strong enough for the US government to impose a two to three year moratorium on some aspects of this research. This and some other related research is sometimes referred to as gains-of-function research. The US Government moratorium order defines such research as research that improves the ability of a pathogen to cause disease.
This order of the US government issued in October 2015 is titled ‘US Government Gain-of-Function Deliberative Process and Research Funding Pause on Selective Gain-of-Function Research Involving Influenza, MERS and SARS Viruses’. This order mentioned that such research has some benefits but also entails bio-safety and bio-security safety risks; hence the risks and benefits of gain-of-function research should be evaluated. Till a robust scientific review of this can be completed, a moratorium on US government funding of more risky aspects of such research will be imposed. More specifically this much-discussed order stated, “ New US funding will not be released for gain-of-function research projects that may be reasonably anticipated to confer attributes to influenza, MERS or SARS viruses such that the virus would have enhanced pathogenicity and/or transmissibility in mammals via the respiratory route.”
However several senior scientists were disappointed when the moratorium was lifted all too soon in December 2017 after the stated completion of the review process.
Dr Mark Lipsitch, a senior epidemiologist, was among those scientists who had welcomed the moratorium. He teamed up with Dr. Thomas V. Inglesby to write an important paper in mBio—Journal of American Society of Microbiology dated Nov-Dec. 2014 titled ‘ Moratarium on Research Intended to Create Novel Potential Pandemic Pathogens (PPPs)’. This paper while welcoming the moratorium stated that as some gain-of-function research can also be useful, it may be more relevant to talk of reducing the risk of novel PPPs. This paper stated that experiments which create the possibility of initiating a pandemic should be subjected to rigorous quantitative risk assessment and there should be search for safer alternatives. This paper regretted that despite the serious risks involved a rigorous and transparent risk assessment for this work has not yet been established.
Further this paper argued that during the moratorium , progress should also be made in calculating the risks associated with potential deliberate misuse of PPP strains and with potential deliberate misuse of the information that is created and published following PPP experimental work. This calculation should take into account the possibility of deliberate theft and dissemination by either persons working within a lab or theft by those outside the lab. The paper pointed out that this possibility may be rare, but there have been precedents already of scientists using pathogens from their own labs to cause harm. Further the paper said that this assessment should take into account the possibility that some scientists may deliberately misuse the knowledge gained and published following the experiments by recreating the novel PPP strains in another laboratory using methods from published papers and then purposefully disseminate it.
When the moratorium was lifted Dr. Lipsitch expressed concern at this decision. He was joined by some other senior scientists like Dr. Richard Ebright in this opposition.
Earlier a paper by Lynn C. Klotz Edward and J. Sylvester published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists had stated that SARS virus had already escaped from labs 3 times between 2003 and 2011 . Even the security of the highest category BSL4 labs was not adequate as there had been 3 escapes from such highest safety labs between 1990 and 2011—one in Taiwan, one in England and one in the Soviet Union. This paper argued that assuming a rather low probability of accident, the possibility of accidental leak from the nearly 42 labs engaged then in live PPP research relating to three of the more dangerous viruses, escape of a dangerous virus from lab amounted to 80 per cent in at least one lab in 12.8 years, a very high probability indeed. However this may well be higher now as the work is now likely to be taking place in a much higher number of labs compared to the estimate made then of 42 labs worldwide.
Clearly there is a very serious threat from novel PPPs and efforts should be continued to restrict such research and reduce its inherent dangers in various ways. A worldwide moratorium should be considered, followed by an international commission of scientists and bioethicists , selected carefully to exclude those who derive personal gain from such research, to examine comprehensively, in an entirely unbiased way and with the precautionary principle as guide, all aspects of this controversial issue and to make recommendations based on this.
The entire issue of genetically altered and engineered viruses should be discussed and debated among people also in well-informed conditions of transparency as very important issues of big risks to safety cannot be left to a few experts alone and should be the subject of well-informed public discussion as well.
Bharat Dogra is a journalist and author, is Honorary Coordinator of Campaign to Save Earth Now With Its SED Demand. His recent books include Planet in Peril and Protecting Earth for Children.
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