Lately, in Bangladesh, the stories of corrupt officials – high and low – and their acquisition of illicit wealth through corrupt means have been widely circulated in the media, revealing a widely known fact and something that Transparency International has repeatedly reported, that Bangladesh is one of the most corrupt countries in the world and that over the years corruption in Bangladesh has gone from bad to worse.
From ‘tolerated’ to ‘entitlement’
A recent study on Bangladesh’s 50-year history of governance and development[1] has reported that in Bangladesh, corruption has gone through several phases: initially, corruption was ‘tolerated’ (1972-1975); then it got ‘institutionalized’ (1976-1981); then, corruption ‘gained respectability’ (1982-1990); and then during 1990-2008, corruption persisted and compounded in all the above forms; and since 2009, corruption has become so open and audacious that it is no more a deal under the table – these days, corruption is an ‘entitlement’.
We all know that corruption does not happen overnight, nor does it happen without the knowledge of the government.
So, what has enabled corruption to reach this despicable level in Bangladesh, where the malaise has progressed from “tolerated” to “entitlement.”
The scourge of corruption could not have occurred and entrenched in the body politic of the society without the knowledge nor without the active participation of the governments that have ruled the country since its inception.
Furthermore, corruption also does not occur in a vacuum to become cancerous, as in Bangladesh where corruption has occurred and spread due to pre-meditated democracy backslides and governance missteps, which have undermined the rules of law, depleted checks, and balances, and promoted corruption with impunity.
Another key factor that has helped the growth and proliferation of corruption in Bangladesh especially recently, is the rise of the phenomenon of ‘consenting publics’, the politically aligned citizens, media, and civil society who instead of demanding accountability from the government for their corrupt and abusive behaviour, choose either to look the other way or acquiesce abusive acts that they are politically aligned with. Such brazen partisan behaviour has harmed the mission of corruption control badly.
Furthermore, another source of corrupt and autocratic governance, which has been the case in Suharto’s Indonesia, Pinochet’s Chile, Shah’s Iran, Rajapakse’s Sri Lanka, and many suspects that Bangladesh also falls into these categories of governments, is geopolitics where external forces install governments to serve mutually self-seeking purposes and, in the process, inspire such governments to engage most brazenly, in corruption and authoritarianism.
As far as Bangladesh is concerned geopolitical opportunism and the rising phenomenon of ‘consenting publics’ have worked together to destroy democracy, deplete checks and balances in public governance, and spread and embed corruption, such that by now corruption become so widespread and deep that it is now an ‘entitlement.’
Crooks in the government
Another key factor, which contributes to the spread of corruption in most countries including Bangladesh is the poor ethical moorings of leaders and public officials.
Studies have shown that if good systems are not run by good people and people with strong ethical moorings, cannot produce good outcomes – good systems require good people to keep the system good and produce good outcomes.
Indeed, you may have the world’s best system but if you have crooks running the system, the system will be crooked. For example, take the case of the United States of America – the same constitution, the same rules of business, and yet under Lincoln and Kennedy America behaved in one way and under Trump, entirely differently.
Bangladesh’s corruption is no different – over the years, crooks running the system have crooked the system. So, is there a way out?
Yes, there is provided that irrespective of their cast, colour, and political creed, the people of Bangladesh have to say enough is enough, and that the time is ripe for change which is now. They must unite and collectively demand reforms and subject governments, current and future, to accountability to journey to a corruption-free clean Bangladesh.
Second, reform must include measures that not only strengthen the checks and balances at institutional levels, but steps are also needed introduce mechanisms that help keeping the crooks out of the government and in this regard, South Korea’s Personnel Verification System (PVS) may come handy.
South Korea’s PVS model
Until the late 1980s, South Korea used to be an authoritarian corrupt country. The June peoples’ Democratic Struggle of 1987 ended the dictatorship in South Korea. However, the transition from dictatorship to democracy did not automatically reduce corruption which by then was rampant.
The real change came in 1997, through a student uprising that transformed South Korea’s governance from the “norms of particularism” (control through patronage distribution) to “ethical universalism” (a governing arrangement that treats all people equally and fairly).
The shift included sweeping reforms that included, inter alia, strengthening of accountability measures across the government and, most importantly, the introduction of a unique measure, the Personnel Verification System (PVS), designed to keep the system clean by “keeping the crooks out of the government.”
The PVS involves, by law, background checks of public officials at the time they get nominated/designated to take up positions especially at the upper echelons of the government and for politicians, the time they get nominated to contest elections. The ‘verifications’ include (i) professional capability (whether the person is adequately qualified to take up the position he or she has been nominated for); (ii) ethical credibility (whether the person possesses the required moral and ethical qualities, financial and otherwise); and (iii) whether there is a conflict of interest (whether the personal interests of the candidate conflict with the interest of the office he or she would occupy if appointed).
Bank accounts, assets, and checking of history of favouritism/nepotism (if any) are obligatory by law for those nominated to take up senior positions in the government, including ministers and politicians nominated to participate in elections.
Indeed, in South Korea, the PVS has since empowered the citizens to scrutinize the ethical standards of the politicians aspiring to participate in elections. Those who fail the PVS test, are disqualified. Similarly, if the ethical background of officials nominated/designated to assume the positions of heads of departments/ministries in the government fails the PVS test are barred from joining the posts.
The PVS, a system has since produced dramatic outcomes in corruption control in South Korea. For example, in 1993, when the elected ruling party made public the names of the leaders that were nominated as ministers, the PVS went into action and as the background checks of the nominated cabinet/senior public officials revealed that in the past, some of them had speculated in real estate, some used undue influence to get their children admitted to prestigious colleges with lower than recommended grades, and that some had manipulated documents to purchase land in development-restricted areas, their appointments were cancelled, and this included three ministers and the mayor of Seoul. In 2017, the PVS investigations into corruption and influence peddling allegations against the incumbent elected president, President Park Geun-hye which were proven in a court of law, led to her resignation.
Recently, seeing that many corrupt officials/politicians hide their illicit wealth and assets under the names of their children and immediate family members, the scope of the PVS has been expanded to include ethical checks on the children and immediate relatives of public officials.
In sum, South Korea which was ranked in 2023 by Transparency International as one of the 32 least corrupt countries in the world underscores the key role of the measures that are interlinking – strengthening checks and balances within the government and provision of a tool, the PVS, that keeps the system clean that keeps the crooks out of the government – that played in controlling corruption in this South East Asian nation that once was the most corrupt of nations.
Remedying Corruption in Bangladesh
In Bangladesh, corruption has reached a level where it is an “entitlement,” which is deeply unsettling. Urgent measures are needed to stem the tide of corruption. If not, Bangladesh risks becoming a failed state and disintegrating.
Therefore, to control corruption in Bangladesh, the South Korean model may come in handy – adopt an integrated approach, and introduce measures that on the one hand, strengthen accountability in the government and on the other, introduce provisions such as that of South Korea’s PVS, that have the potential to keep the government freed of crooks.
Corruption control in Bangladesh also requires yet another crucial step – the people of Bangladesh need a value shift; they must learn to act above politics and embrace the principle of “ethical universalism” in governance. In other words, the people of Bangladesh must transform themselves from ‘consenting’ to critiquing citizens and appreciate that “Be-cruel-to-be-kind” is progress!”
The next quest is how to go about the reform – who will bell the cat?
Who will bell the cat?
The answer is people of course and no one else. People must unite and demand change and pursue the proposed corruption control reforms through an institutional arrangement that is apolitical, technocratic, transformative, and transitional in tenure.
M. Adil Khan is a professor of Development Practice, at the School of Social Science, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia. He is also former Chief of Socio-Economic Governance and Management Branch of the Division of Public Administration and Development Management, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, UN Secretariat, New York, USA and an Editorial Board Member of the South Asian Journal.
Originally published in South Asia Journal