Changing relationships with the Maldives have come as India’s Independence Day gift in the face of perceived Chinese dominance in the island nation following a rupture on the eve of Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Lakshadweep in the beginning of this year. The irks in bilateral ties had placed Modi’s Neighborhood First Policy in jeopardy. However, India’s relations with the Maldives have moved through quick highs and lows in recent years. While small South Asian countries have continuously looked for capital, investment and a reliable security provider, the roles of India and China have been understood primarily from a strategic perspective given the smaller states’ prized strategic location in the Himalayas (where both share land frontiers) or in the Indian Ocean (where sea-routes for trade pass through and naval strategies could be developed) and where both competed for influence through aid, investment and coercive measures as well.
New Delhi shares a long Indian Ocean frontier and considers the water body its strategic backyard due to its vulnerability to external threats and its dependence on sea routes for trade. On the other hand, Chinese stakes in the ocean are driven by the need to safeguard its maritime trade as well as expanding its influence through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Beijing has been pursuing various infrastructure projects in Maldives as well as Sri Lanka and Pakistan, legitimizing them by bringing in employment opportunities and facilitating long-term socio-economic development, although it temporarily halted or withdrawn them in some cases. However, New Delhi perceives these projects as part of a strategy of “encirclement” because of their proximity to the Indian Ocean. China turned out to be the biggest investor in Maldives since the ex-president Abdulla Yameen’s preference to move into the Chinese economic sphere of influence contributing to Indian concerns during Modi’s first term in office undercutting Indian government’s and Modi’s penchant for a Neighborhood First Policy.
During the Yameen regime, Indian government appeared to be a bystander to the political drama within the Maldives and to its drifting toward Chinese influence and Modi visited the country only after the political dusts got settled in June 2019 during Modi’s second term. India’s neighborhood-first policy suffered a setback and appeared to meander without proper direction during much of Modi’s first term, India was cautious to the call of intervention from the Maldivian leaders in the opposition camp, which demanded the ouster of the Yameen regime and the release of democratic leaders from jail. India was aware that the regime and its actions were not the results of a coup like what happened in 1988 when India launched a successful military mission in Maldives, exemplifying a commendable effort by New Delhi to dislodge an authoritarian regime in the neighborhood.
However, political developments were projected to be favoring India when the archipelago state’s opposition leader Ibrahim Mohamed Solih won the presidential election and defeated Yameen.
Yameen had signed a free trade agreement with Beijing towards the end of 2017, leading to an increase in the country’s imports from China. President Solih preferred to call Yameen’s economic partnership agreement with China a “one-way treaty” that favors China and instead pushed for strong economic ties with India as a way to balance the ties.
With a change in leadership, India began to show an increasing interest in forging close ties with the island country, and the response from Maldives was equally warm.
Capitalising on the changing bilateral relations, India extended its support for the country’s decision to rejoin the Commonwealth as well as welcomed it into the Indian Ocean Rim Association as its newest member. The Indian government also sought to forge close defense ties with Maldives and strengthen its oceanic defense, with the Indian Coast Guard taking part in an exercise with its Maldivian and Sri Lankan counterparts.
However, the government led by Solih clarified that it would not play India and China against each other and is committed to maintaining healthy bilateral ties with the two countries.
Even while the change in leadership then was projected to be unfavorable to China by some analysts, there were wide-ranging speculations that it would not be easy to suspend or cancel the many Beijing-sponsored projects, which range from infrastructure development to upgrading and maintaining economically important airports and ports and housing estates, and the leasing of islands to Chinese companies for tourism use.
Maldives owed billions of rupees to China which it still owes. Meanwhile, China and the Maldives announced plans to build a Joint Ocean Observation Station in Makunudhoo, there were speculations that China would build a military port in Maldives, which concerned India. It could not be expected from the Solih government that it could roll back the Chinese projects.
Tensions between India and the island country flared up in January 2024 following Modi’s visit to Lakshadweep. Considering the Prime Minister’s visit to the Union Territory was intended to undermine the value of Maldives as tourist spot, three Deputy Ministers of Maldives publicly criticised Modi and President Mohamed Muizzu after returning from a five-day visit to China, said that no country had the right to “bully” the island nation.
However, both countries have again tried to reset their relations amid India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s three-day visit from August 9 to 11, 2024 to the island nation that was the first high-level trip from New Delhi after President Muizzu assumed office in November, 2023.
Amid this visit, foreign ministers of both countries inaugurated India’s Line of Credit (LoC) towards the project of water and sewerage network in 28 islands of Maldives. Meanwhile, President Muizzu appreciated India’s continued developmental assistance provided to Maldives and reaffirmed his commitment to deepen the India-Maldives relationship further.
Apart from discussions on supplies of rice and sugar, India and Maldives have decided to increase bilateral cooperation in the field of edible oil, especially the cultivation of oil palm, and the production and trade of palm oil.
Expecting the bilateral ties would further cement, the news that Maldivian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim will visit New Delhi soon and India and the island country would sign several agreements, including a key pact on the recruitment of Indian workers would go a long way meeting India’s security concerns from China.
India-China relations have been understood in the framework of a “zero-sum game” (each gain for one country is an equal loss for another and vice versa) in the island countries such as Maldives and Sri Lanka, primarily because of the trust deficit between the big powers. They can mold their relations into a win-win situation only by building trust.
Beijing must attempt to address New Delhi’s reservations concerning the BRI and other security-related issues, and New Delhi must reconsider its policies in light of the India-China economic partnership and its benefits. For instance, China has suggested the model of “two-plus-one” economic partnership, which can accommodate China and India plus another South Asian country.
Dr. Manoj Kumar Mishra, Lecturer in Political Science, SVM Autonomous College, Jagatsinghpur, Odisha, India
