The Fallout of Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Dangers of Nuclear Energy

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The dangers of nuclear energy were understood when the WW2 Allied Forces feared that Hitler’s Germany would produce and use a nuclear bomb, to conclude WW2 in his favour. It led to the Manhattan Project in the Hanford National Park in Washington State, USA. The Hanford reactors produced Plutonium, with which to build atomic weapons.

The first-ever test of a nuclear weapon at Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA, on July 16, 1945, revealed the monstrous power of nuclear energy as a weapon, with Robert Oppenheimer famously quoting a Hindu scripture: “Now I am become Death, the Destroyer of Worlds.”

The weaponisation of nuclear energy was made abundantly clear to the world on August 6, 1945, when the “atomic bomb” was dropped on Hiroshima, and again two days later at Nagasaki. However, what was clear, were only the unprecedented enormous explosive energy equivalent to 15,000-tonnes of TNT released at one go, immediately followed by firestorms and radioactive fallout from the sky.

An important fallout of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki events themselves, is the so-called peaceful uses of nuclear energy, of which many issues remain unclear to this day, 79-years later.

What is unclear?

What remains unclear are the long-term effects, risks and dangers, to all forms of life, due to radioactivity fallout from the use of nuclear weapons, or from nuclear weapons testing. Starting with the Los Alamos test explosion to validate the first-ever nuclear bombs, more than 2,000 nuclear tests have been conducted at more than 60 sites worldwide, all involving radioactive fallout.

Also unclear, are the long-term effects on public health, due to radioactivity emanating from radioactive materials, called ‘radionuclides’. Today, radionuclides are generated by operation of 440 civilian electric power generation nuclear reactors in 32 countries, at their nuclear power plants (NPPs). Military nuclear reactors reserved for generation of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, are not included in this count. At present, 60 new reactors are under construction, and 110 new reactors are being planned, worldwide.

A new technology of small modular reactors (SMRs, reportedly maximum 300 MW) is being introduced to enable construction of large numbers of smaller electric power generators, enabling decentralisation. India’s 2024 union budget includes fund allocation for research in SMR technology.

Radionuclides are produced at every nuclear installation in the nuclear fuel cycle, such as uranium mining and refining, uranium enrichment for weapons or nuclear fuel, nuclear fuel reprocessing plants, and manufacture of heavy water, to support NPPs. Waste from these installations, including spent (used) nuclear fuel of NPPs, and other handling equipment and materials, are radioactive to various degrees. These pose varying levels of risk and danger, depending upon low-level, medium-level or high-level radioactivity, for periods of time varying from days and months, to hundreds of thousands of years. The handling, storage and disposal of radioactive wastes, pose long-term risks.

The operation of every nuclear installation, results in unavoidable – that is, planned – routine releases of radionuclides, which contaminate the environment. However, unplanned or accidental releases of radionuclides also can and do occur, especially in NPPs. These are categorised according to the International Nuclear Events Scale (INES), with zero for “deviation”, 1 (anomaly), 2 (incident), 3 (serious incident), 4 (accident, local consequences), 5 (accident, wider  consequences). 6 (serious accident) and 7 (major accident). The INES is a ‘fuzzy’ scale, and reporting and publicly promulgating the category of unplanned radionuclides release, is political rather than technical.

Also unclear, are the totality of public health and public safety issues, and the costs associated with various kinds of malfunctions possible in nuclear power installations, that cause unplanned releases or leakages of radionuclides into the environment.

Nuclear accidents 

Accidents at NPPs resulting in enormous uncontrolled/uncontrollable releases/leakages of radioactive materials into the environment, are cross-boundary international disasters. Notable INES-7 nuclear disasters are UK’s Windscale (1957), USA’s Three Mile Island (1979), USSR’s (now Russia) Chernobyl (1986), or Japan’s Fukushima (2011).

The Fukushima NPP accident on 11 March 2011, resulted in three of six nuclear reactors melting down, with large releases of radioactive contaminants that forced the evacuation of 164,000 people. Even to-date, the situation has not stabilised, even after spending over $200-billion and counting (far more than the initial cost of about $25-billion for the 4,700-MW NPP), and radioactive wastes being discharged into the Pacific Ocean, with the radioactive plume reaching USA’s west coast. Decommissioning the NPP is expected to take 30-40 years and cost about $100-billion more.

Radioactivity – sensing and measurement

Apart from background radioactivity due to radionuclides occuring naturally in Earth’s crust, all man-made radioactivity arising from solid, liquid or gaseous emissions, is pollution or contamination. Unlike other kinds of pollution, human senses cannot detect radioactivity – it can only be detected and measured using scientific instruments.

Detecting the presence and type of radioactivity in the soil, water or air near nuclear installations, and measuring its levels, is restricted to nuclear science authorities, according to law.

Safety and health standards

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the world’s foremost intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA safety standards are the global reference for protecting people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation.

IAEA sets out the requirements that must be met to ensure the “protection of people and the environment, both now and in the future”. The safety standards are primarily addressed to national regulatory bodies, to protect health”, and to minimise danger to life and property”.  [Emphases supplied] [Ref.1] The words emphasised in the foregoing paragraph, indicate international acceptance of definite threats and risks to public health and environment, and the danger to life and property. These arise from all fuel cycle, electric power production, and industrial and research installations, releasing radionuclides as part of their function.

IAEA also states that [there is]no threshold dose below which there is no effect”. [Emphasis supplied]. Put simply, the double negative means that every dose has effect, and there is no safe dose of nuclear radiation, for biological tissue.

Based upon scientific studies by experts in the field of “health physics”, IAEA prescribes the permissible dose, averaged as 1 mSv in 1-year for members of the public who live “near” nuclear installations, and twenty times higher 100 mSv in 5-years for persons working in the nuclear industry. [“mSv” is “millisievert”, a unit in the International System of Units (SI), representing the probability of causing radiation-induced cancer and genetic damage in biological tissue]. [Ref.1] Thus, the permissible radiation dose, is reduced to an arbitrary figure indicating the probability of cancer occurrence, or damage to DNA, affecting future generations.

Health and safety regulation of nuclear installations

The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) is a national nuclear regulatory body, functioning under India’s Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), along with government’s Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), which operates nuclear installations.

AERB’s mission is “to ensure [that] use of ionising radiation and nuclear energy does not cause undue risk to the health of people and environment”. [Emphasis supplied] [Ref.2] AERB’s mandate is to conduct regulatory checks for NPPs and nuclear fuel cycle installations operated by DAE, and in DAE‘s industrial and research facilities. The checks are in line with IAEA safety standards and the limits set by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) from time to time.

Based on the above limits, AERB issues ‘authorization’ specifying the limits in terms of quantity and activity content of the radioactive waste that can be disposed, to protect public health and safety. Thus, AERB oversees DAE functions, which concern public health and safety. 

Accountability and transparency in the nuclear industry

Secrecy surrounds activities concerned with nuclear installations. The only information/data available to the public, concerning the dangers and risks to public health and safety, and to the environment, is what DAE is pleased to release. The public is constrained to unquestioningly accept the veracity of this released data. There is little or no transparency or accountability, which may reassure the public, which seeks information/data. The information released by AERB concerning safety in DAE installations, is coloured by the fact that AERB is not independent of AEC/DAE. It needs to be emphasised that information concerning nuclear weapons, and national security and defence, are never sought by the public.

Dr.A.Gopalakrishnan was AERB Chairman from 17.06.1993 to 16.06.1996. He had commented adversely upon the DAE’s functioning, in a 1995 report on the safety status of DAE installations, and exposed more than 120 serious safety deficiencies. [Ref.3] Naturally, service rules precluded release of such information/data, but reportedly, Dr.Gopalakrishnan’s comments displeased the authorities, and resulted in his prematurely leaving the AERB in 1996.

However, in 2010, in the context of radioactive material found in scrap shops in New Delhi, Dr.Gopalakrishnan stated: “I can personally vouch from my earlier experience as Chairman AERB, that the DAE and the AERB often use the Official Secrets Act much more to cover up the serious lapses and inactions in their operations, than to protect the safety or security of the public”, and “The Atomic Energy Commission and its subordinate organisations have the mandate to put in place a comprehensive plan to ensure nuclear safety in the country, but that does not seem to have been done”. [Ref.3] This speaks for Dr.Gopalakrishnan’s courage and independence in carrying out his public duties, and as importantly, of the secrecy in the DAE which can impinge on public health and safety.

The foregoing indicates that AERB – being part of AEC – is not an independent and effective regulator, because it is not empowered to independently frame rules, enforce compliance and enforce appropriate penalties. This is borne out in Para 6 of Chapter I of the Public Accounts Committee Report [Ref.4], concerning “Grant of independent status to AERB”. [Details in Note 1]

Legislating a Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority (NSRA), which is legally and operationally independent of the government of the day, is essential in the interest of public health and public safety.

Discussing safety and security   

The nuclear lobby argues that, given the strict control and technical vigilance enforced in nuclear installations, the probability of a nuclear disaster (INES-7) is extremely small,.

In this writer’s experience, one proponent of nuclear power sought to underplay the risk of an INES-7 event, by arguing that nuclear accident risk is comparable with the risk of a person being hit by a speeding vehicle while crossing a road, and hence should not form the basis for opposition to NPPs. He also argued that there have been more deaths due to smoking than due to nuclear accidents.

However, these arguments neglect the following issues:

# The numbers of casualties resulting from nuclear accident, far exceeds the immediate “body count”. Further, the risk to health and safety is not only from INES-7 disasters. Noting that there is no safe dose of radiation [[there is]no threshold dose below which there is no effect”], every event on INES from zero through 6, also has public health and safety consequences, including for future generations.

# Voluntary avoidance of, or escape from, most situations of risks is possible, but it is not possible to avoid nuclear radiation, because it neither detectable nor assessable by human cognitive senses.

# The reporting of an event (say, according to INES-4 to INES-7) would depend upon the Operator of a NPP, and the vigilance, honesty and independence of the Regulator. The post-event public promulgation, and safety, relief and mitigation measures to be adopted, are entirely political.

# Howsoever small the calculated probability of a nuclear disaster (INES-7) may be, no probability calculation can predict whether it will occur after hundred years or tomorrow. The four nuclear disasters mentioned above, are evidence of this.

Assaying fissile materials, and maintaining and protecting inventory of fissile materials against pilferage, are difficult. Inaccurate assaying and possible pilferage of fissile materials for malafide purposes, are combined safety and security risks.

Costing of nuclear energy

The costs of nuclear disaster in financial terms, are apart from the (uncosted) social effects of forced re-settlement following evacuation, and long term health effects of man-made radionuclides on biological beings. As mentioned earlier, the costs connected with the Fukushima nuclear disaster, far exceed the initial cost of the NPP itself.

The operating costs and the cost of electrical energy generated by NPPs, are intimately linked with operational safety requirements, which include down-time for inspection, maintenance and repair, etc. A portion of the energy generated by a NPP is always used for keeping the reactor core cool. Even an idling nuclear reactor has to be kept cooled for safety reasons, and needs electricity either from the grid or from captive diesel generators, for the purpose. Thus, there is an obvious trade-off between keeping a NPP operating to supply energy to the power grid, and lowering the operating power level (for safety, maintenance procedures, etc) which requires drawing power from the grid or use its stand-by generators.

Indeed, for the early years of the life of a NPP, the energy that it draws from the grid exceeds the energy that it supplies to the grid. This ‘break-even’ point may be as much as five to seven years, depending upon several factors.

Proponents of the nuclear industry naturally calculate the capital cost and operating cost of a NPP, and the cost of electrical energy it produces, to show it as favourable, compared with other forms of power generation. On the other hand, calculations by several qualified and credible agencies on available data, show that nuclear energy is more expensive. This divergence will continue since the basic data used by the nuclear industry to calculate costs, is not available to the public, due to the nuclear industry’s in-built, closed-door intransparency.


The bottom line  

Admittedly, the totality of the financial, economic, social, environmental, land-requirement costs, and operational-safety costs of nuclear energy, can only be arrived at by a comprehensive (and expensive) audit, and even that may not be accurate. Also, the arguments of the nuclear lobby in favour of nuclear energy must not be dismissed.

Therefore, from the foregoing discussions, we may list ten realities of operational NPPs and their supporting nuclear fuel cycle installations, as follows:

# The IAEA and the nuclear industry recognise that people and the environment need to be protected from the danger and risk of man-made radiation, now and in the future. They must not be exposed to “undue risk”, and danger needs to be minimised, and their health protected. 

# Nuclear radiation cannot be detected or assessed by human cognitive senses.

# There is no safe dose of radiation. 

# Prescribing the permissible dose of radiation is a commercial and political decision based on technical/scientific advice – the difference between 100 mSv in 5-years for workers, and 1 mSv in 1-year for the proximate public, speaks for itself.

# Biological tissue is affected by radiation.

# The effect of radiation on biological systems is cumulative.

# Radioactive particles are not usually excreted by biological systems.

# Irradiated material that enters the food chain due to fallout, etc., can result in radiation to the consumer.

# Effective implementation of nuclear safety regulations by an independent regulator, can only reduce risks or mitigate severity of events on the INES scale.

# Careless or inadvertent disposal of fissile material by medical, research or other users, or its pilferage for malafide purposes (e.g., a “dirty bomb”), is an ever-present safety and security issue.

The reader may consider and assess the dangers of nuclear energy.

NOTES

Note 1. The Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority Bill, 2011 (NSRA Bill) was introduced in the Lok Sabha on 07.9.2011. The NSRA Bill was intended to provide for a statutorily independent NSRA to replace AERB, which is subordinate to government’s DAE. This was needed so as to be in keeping with IAEA’s norms for ensuring the “protection of people and the environment, both now and in the future”, and to “protect health”, and  “minimise danger to life and property”. However, PAC recommended that Clauses 14, 42 and 48 of the NSRA Bill, [Ref.4] should be deleted or drastically amended, so that NSRA would have meaningful autonomy, to avert nuclear accidents, earn public trust within India, and gain credibility at par with nuclear regulators in the global community. The PAC noted with concern, that Government had failed to re-introduce the NSRA Bill in Parliament, with suggested deletions/amendments.

S.G.Vombatkere retired in 1996 from service in the Indian Army, in the rank of Major General.

References (hyperlinked in the text)

1. IAEA Safety Standards: Protecting People and the Environment; <https://www.iaea.org/resources/safety-standards>; International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna. [Accessed on 24.7.2024].

2. “About AERB”; <https://aerb.gov.in/english/about-us>; Government of India, AERB; Last updated 15.12.2017 at 3:14:24 PM; [Accessed on 24.7.2024].

3. Dr.A.Gopalakrishnan; “Delhi radiation case: AEC, AERB also culpable“; <https://www.rediff.com/news/column/delhi-radiation-case-aec-aerb-also-culpable/20100422.htm>; Rediff.com; 22.4.2010. [Accessed on 24.7.2024].

4. Public Accounts Committee (2019-20); “Activities of Atomic Energy Regulatory Board”; <https://loksabhadocs.nic.in/lsscommittee/Public%20Accounts/17_Public_Accounts_7.pdf>; Seventh Report to the 17th Lok Sabha; PAC No.2188; [Accessed on 24.7.2024].

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