Trump has won the Presidential election of USA and will be the 47th President on 5th January 2025. The reason for his success are multiple: 1) Electorate doesn’t like inflation, 2) The obduracy of Biden-Kamala administration in supporting Isreal’s genocidal behavior in Gaza, West Bank and in Lebanon, which eroded its support amongst Arab-Americans, youth and the left, 3) Erosion of support amongst Black, and Hispanic communities, 4) Persistent misogyny amongst US electorate.
Be that as it may, for those of us living in, what is known as, the global south what does Trump 2.0 portent. For the sake of narrative exigency I will attempt to speculate the potential impact of Trump 2.0 on four geostrategic nodes: i) West Asia, ii) Ukraine, iii) China and iv) India.
West Asia:
Trump 1.0 was premised on two strategic gambits. First was to consolidate USA’s hold over West Asia by cobbling a coalition of Arab states with Isreal, under the patronage of USA. A strategic goal that resulted in the signing of Abraham Accords between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and between Israel and Bahrain on September 15, 2020.
Second, the Accord paved the way for marginalizing the Palestinian issue. When USA, on December 6, 2017, officially recognized Jerusalem as the capital city of the State of Israel; any hope for a two state solution became even more remote. The pot was sweetened further for the Abraham Accords signatories by tightening the screws on Iran, the nemesis of the Arab states and Isreal. The United States withdrew from the “Iran nuclear deal” or the “Iran deal”, on May 8, 2018. And a couple of years later, in 3 January 2020, Qasem Soleimani, an Iranian major general, was killed by an American drone strike near Baghdad International Airport, Iraq.
Much water has flown in the Karun river since Trump 1.0. The Palestinian question is raging in West Asia. Isreal disproportionate military response, resulting in the deaths of civilians majority of them women and children, has inflamed the public opinion across sectarian, ethnic and regional divide in West Asia. Thus, generating considerable pressure on Arab ruling dynasties.
It is in this backdrop that Iran, by standing up to Isreal and their backers, has staked claim to the leadership of the Ummah, that was hitherto the preserve of the ruling house of Saud. The strategic option available for Trump 2 .0 is fairly limited. He could attempt to release the pressure being generated on Isreal by attempting to disengage Hezbollah, Iran and Ansar Allah from the tragedy unfolding in Gaza, by encouraging separate negotiations between them and Isreal. He could also attempt at offering a new nuclear deal to Iran. Or he could attempt to weaken Iran and it’s proxies by targeting Iranian nuclear program. Whether he will succeed in either of the two options, however, depends on the emerging alliance between Iran, Russia and China.
Ukraine:
The Ukrainian question is an outcome of the US policy of eastward expansion of NATO. USA did not abide by the treaty between Gorbachev led USSR and Reagan led USA where USSR relinquished it’s claim over East Germany on the guarantee that NATO will not expand eastward.
However, Bill Clinton’s Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was a trailblazer as the first woman Secretary of State enabled eastward expansion of NATO in the 1990s. The proposal to include Ukraine in NATO was a part of this eastward push of NATO. Unwilling to give up its control over the Black Sea Russia, on 24 February 2022, opted for a military resolution of it’s economic and security concerns.
It follows that the Ukraine crisis is a result of the politics of retaining a balance of power between Eastern and Western Europe that was at the core of cold war hostilities. Trump’s antipathy NATO and politics of cold war era politics is well known. Notwithstanding the promulgation in late 2023, a statutory provision by the Congress —located at Section 1250A of the most recent National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)—that expressly prohibits the president from withdrawing from NATO or using any appropriated funds for that purpose without permission from Congress; Trump could refuse any new funds and weapons to Ukraine.
However, whether this will suffice in ending hostilities in Ukraine is moot? West has significant financial interests in Ukraine. A report from the Oakland Institute, War and Theft: The Takeover of Ukraine’s Agricultural Land, exposes the financial interests and the dynamics at play leading to further concentration of land and finance.
The total amount of land controlled by oligarchs, corrupt individuals, and large agribusinesses is over nine million hectares — exceeding 28 percent of Ukraine’s arable land. The largest landholders are a mix of Ukrainian oligarchs and foreign interests — mostly European and North American as well as the sovereign fund of Saudi Arabia. Prominent US pension funds, foundations, and university endowments are invested through NCH Capital, a US-based private equity fund.
Most of the large landholders are substantially indebted to Western funds and institutions, notably the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank. Western financing to Ukraine in recent years has been tied to a drastic structural adjustment program that has required austerity and privatization measures, including the creation of a land market for the sale of agricultural land.
Such entrenched corporate interests in Ukraine will make it impossible for Trump to accede to Russian claim over the Russian speaking port city of Odessa and to demilitarization of Ukraine. Will Russia concede its claim over Odessa? Will it come to terms with Ukraine having a military armed with western weapons? The fate of peace in Ukraine will remain a hostage to such concers.
China:
There is very little differentiate between Biden’s and Trump’s China policy. Both followed a combination of trade and political rivalry. Both resorted a tarrif war with China. Both entered in military military alliances to restrain Chinese sphere of influence in the Pacific and the Indian ocean region.
However, while Trump viewed Indian and Pacific ocean region as a unified strategic site, thus he established quad– a four nation alliance between US, Australia, Japan and India, to block the spreading Chinese sphere of influence. Biden delinked the two oceans and preferred alliances based in the Pacific region to stymie China. For instance the US security alliance with .Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand. As well as the three nation alliance between Australia, UK and USA (AUKUS).
Under Trump 2.0 trade war and military alliances aimed at China will continue. We can expect a tarrfic war and increased US presence in the Indo-Pacific region. However, with the rise of China as an economic power and the expansion of BRICS, the material conditions for a rebalancing of Sino-US relationship is already in place. Will the isolationist policy of Trump be able to sustain it technological and economic rivalry with China, which has cultivated ties with the global south?
India:
Trump 2.0 may pose serious challenge before India’s post-Trump 1.0 diplomacy of strategic nuterality– a sort of India first policy. Trump had attempted to encircle India in a bear hug, by increasing Indian dependence on US technology and military hardware, as was evidenced in the initiatives spearheaded by Mike Pompeo. Trump had also forced open Indian market for American products and fuel under threat of retaliatory tarrifs. Trump 2.0 may witness more of the same. However, whether this would succeed will depend on how well India leverages it’s ties with Russia and the Brics Nations.
Kumar Sanjay Singh, Associate Professor, Department of History, Swami Shraddhanand College, Delhi University.
