Following talks between Indian defence minister Rajnath Singh and his Chinese counterpart Admiral Dong Jun in Laos recently (on the sidelines of an ASEAN conference), the Chinese Defence Ministry spokesperson Sr. Col. Wu Qian came out with an interesting comment: “We look forward to harmonious dance between the Chinese dragon and Indian elephant with concerted steps.” (re: THE HINDU, November 29, 2024).
Soon after, Indian foreign minister S. Jaishankar told the Lok Sabha that Sino-Indian ties were moving in the direction of “some improvement,” while referring to disengagement with China in eastern Ladakh. (re: THE TIMES OF INDIA, December 4, 2024).
The announced rapprochement and proposed partnership between a dragon (an imaginary animal which is the Chinese symbol) and an elephant (a real-life animal which is the Indian symbol) presages uneasy prospects that stem from an unequal relationship between the two states. How can the Indian elephant rhyme its ponderous steps with the quick fast moving steps of its Chinese partner in a tango on the dancing floor of global politics ? Besides, Sino-Indian relationship continues to remain `an elephant in the room’ of Delhi’s South Block – a problem that is too unwieldy to be tackled.
To be frank and coming back to brass tacks, however uncomfortable and disconcerting it might be for both the Indian ruling BJP and the Opposition, the fact is that India cannot compete with China, either in the field of economy or in the sphere of military might. To take just one instance, China had been developing its human resources by educating and training its youth to man its economy and face challenges in the competitive global arena. In 2023, it spent $906 billion on education for a population of 1.409 billion (while India spent just $ 13.67 billion for our population of 1.429 billion). As a result, it is this technology-savvy generation of Chinese youth who are exporting chips to India that sustain our software infrastructure. There are other areas where India has to depend on imports from China, as a result of which India had lost more than $1 trillion owing to the deficit in bilateral trade. China enjoys nearly $ 85 billion trade surplus over India. Further, Chinese export of manufactured goods like electric locomotives, signaling rakes and other engineering apparatus, and even the entry of Chinese techies, are helping the Indian Railways to modernize its system. This was brought about by a pact signed by India and China in November 2012 to develop the railways through mutual cooperation in high-tech, high-speed rail, heavy haulage and station development. Some critics however are now blaming this introduction of Chinese technology for the spurt of fatal rail accidents. But given our usual Indian habit of bungling such technology (as revealed by investigations which exposed the failure of the railway staff), instead of accusing the Chinese of sabotaging our railway system (as some hot-heads among the political circles do), we should engage in some honest self-introspection to find out what went wrong.
In contrast with China’s emphasis on educating the youth in modern sciences, India had neglected such training (and cut down the budget allocation on education) which has resulted in the growth of masses of unemployable youth, who cannot find jobs.
Military imbalance
If we turn to the defence sector, we find again an imbalance between the military prowess of India and China. The Chinese mythological dragon has cast a spell on the modern Indian army, reducing it to an inferior rival. Although the Hindu god Ganesha wears an elephant head, and is worshipped by our brave jawans, the elephant has not been able to save them from the Chinese dragon’s deadly assaults on our borders at Galwan and other spots along the Sino-Indian boundary. By all yardsticks, acknowledged even by Indian army generals, the Chinese PLA (People’s Liberation Army) is head and shoulders superior to the Indian army, in terms of manpower and possession of sophisticated armaments. A recent survey carried out by Lt. Gen. Deependra Singh Hooda (retired) draws our attention to (i) the disparity between the budget allocation for defence, with China spending more than India; (ii) China’s nearly self-sufficient production capabilities in contrast with India’s continuing dependence on imports; and (iii) the Chinese PLA’s advancements in space, cyber and information warfare compared with India’s slow growth of domestic projects. (Re: Delhi Policy Group’s report – Competitive Forces: Evaluating the Military Capabilities of India and China. July 2, 2024).
De–jure to de-facto – making a virtue of necessity
Given this stark reality, let us look at the boundary dispute in a dispassionate way and search for a pragmatic way out. As it is, historically the McMahon Line and other similar official markings of borders in other sectors, had been causes of disputes between neighbouring states on either side of the borders, whose present rulers allege that such demarcation had been made in an arbitrary way by the colonial rulers without consulting the native authorities and inhabitants of these areas.
But now, how can we cope with these lines of border demarcation carved out by past rulers, which are regarded as inconvenient and branded as illegal by the present rulers ? There are two options. One – China and India can engage in wars to reverse the old lines of demarcation in order to occupy and integrate some areas which they claim to be their own, into their respective territories. This has been the history of Sino-Indian relations for the last seven decades. It has not led to any permanent solution, and has instead dragged the two nations into a futile and military confrontation with China having an upper edge. It has made India prioritize budgetary expenditure on defence over that on health care and other social benefits that our citizens are entitled to. The other option is a give-and-take settlement of sorts that adheres to the status quo ante. The recent disengagement agreements in areas like the Depsang Plains and Charding La near Demchok are signs of such a settlement.
As predictable, politicians from the Opposition parties have found an opportunity to take a snipe at the Modi government for making concessions to Chinese claims through these agreements, and are accusing it of cowardice. But both they and Modi know deep down in their hearts that India (ruled by whichever political party) has no option but to retreat from its posture of braggadocio, since it does not have the guts to translate that rhetoric of sabre-rattling into an act of military confrontation with China in the battlefield. It is precisely because of this incapacity, that despite Chinese occupation of parts of Ladakh in 2020, Narendra Modi had to brush it off with his false press statement saying “no outsider was inside Indian territory” on June 19, 2020.
Under these circumstances, where China enjoys a superior position vis-a-vis India in both economic and military terms, is it not pragmatic for India to concede and accept its position as a junior partner when negotiating with China on commercial and trade issues, as well as border disputes ? One agrees that it is humiliating for India. But at certain moments in history, real life needs become more important than political rhetoric. India today stands at that moment.
China’s domestic problems
At the same time, let us also look at the other side of the picture. Behind its aggressive posture in foreign policies, back home in China, its dictator Xi is facing an economic crisis. The massive capitalist expansion under his regime has led to enormous concentration of wealth in the hands of a few billionaires (second highest number after the US), who are being accused of corruption. This has also coincided with the collapse of the real estate market which is making consumers cautious and business houses wary of investing. The bloated and uncompetitive state-owned enterprises are suffering from pressures of ballooning debt. High levels of unemployment among the youth are compelling them to come out on the streets in demonstrations of protest, as witnessed recently in Hong Kong.
When journalists report these events, they are immediately hounded by the police, some of them being put behind bars. The latest case is the sentencing of the veteran journalist Dong Yyu (62) to seven years of imprisonment for espionage, just because he was having lunch with a Japanese diplomat, in the course of his usual reporting assignment for news gathering.
In its defence sector, the Xi regime has to cope with cases of wide spread corruption among the top brass of its armed forces. Recently, Xi had to suspend a top military official, Admiral Miao Hua, who was also a member of the powerful Central Military Commission, on charges of corruption. Earlier, even ministers like the Defence Minister Li Shangfu and his predecessor Wei Feng Hei were ousted after being accused of corruption. It is evident that the Chinese administrative machinery and its military apparatus are thoroughly rotten to the core, being eaten up by worms of corruption.
It is in order to surmount these domestic problems which he cannot solve, and to sideline popular grievances, Xi is trying to divert the attention of his people from their diurnal anxieties to the wider sphere of global politics. He is arousing a spirit of aggressive nationalism among them by raising the false bogey of foreign attacks (over the controversial issue of Taiwan’s status) and thus hoping to rally the disgruntled, unemployed Chinese people behind him by appealing to their nationalist instincts.
Having scored a point over India by retaining its influence over the territories it occupied by agreeing to their being `buffer zones’, Beijing is now turning its aggressive designs against Taiwan (an independent Chinese state with a democratically elected government) by claiming it to be a part of its territory. In a similar aggressive gesture it claims Arunachal of India as its part. But are the Chinese citizens of Taiwan and the Indians residing in Arunachal willing to be a part of the present People’s Republic of China, exchanging their present democratic rights for their inevitable suppression under an authoritarian regime ? Instead of threatening Taiwan and Arunachal with military occupation, why doesn’t Xi agree to a plebiscite under independent UN auspices to ascertain the preferences of these residents of Taiwan and Arunachal ?
Uncertain future
The future of Sino-Indian relations depends to a large extent on how Xi Jing Ping manages to tackle the increasing problems in his domestic sphere and the big tariff battle with the US in his economic policy. It is these twin issues that preoccupy him now which have probably led him to deescalate tensions on the Sino-Indian border – so that he can turn his attention and concentrate on those immediate priorities. A crafty and cunning politician as he is, he is stretching out his hands covered in friendly gloves towards Modi to freeze the stalemate in the form of `disengagement’ and creation of `buffer zones.’ But these may be temporary compromises. Once Xi sorts out these problems in his home and abroad, he in all probability may return to the old anti-Indian policies that he has inherited from his predecessors.
We should also remember that the Sino-Indian dispute is a part of the wider inter-imperial conflict between two rival gangs of rogue states – the US-Israel axis on the one hand and the Sino-Russian axis on the other. Indian prime minister Narendra Modi is playing a duplicitous role by placating both the rivals. On the one hand, it is supplying Israel with military armaments to fight in Gaza, and sending Indian labourers to man its economy, and on the other hand, it is coming to the rescue of Russian economy by buying its oil.
We are yet to see how far the Modi government can walk this tightrope, once this inter-imperial rivalry intensifies on a global scale, moving beyond the borders of Gaza in the Middle East and Ukraine in Europe.
Sumanta Banerjee is a political commentator and writer, is the author of In The Wake of Naxalbari’ (1980 and 2008); The Parlour and the Streets: Elite and Popular Culture in Nineteenth Century Calcutta (1989) and ‘Memoirs of Roads: Calcutta from Colonial Urbanization to Global Modernization.’ (2016).
