by Hemshikha Mishra and Ankit Kumar
Introduction
Is the conflict in Middle East likely to expand? Iran’s quest for a security assurance seems to suggest so. Since his surprising election as the president of the Islamic Republic of Iran in July 2024, Masoud Pezeshkian has visited the important partners of Tehran – Iraq, Tajikistan and Russia – to restrengthen ties with them. On January 17, 2025, during his visit to Moscow, Pezeshkian and Vladimir Putin signed the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between Iran and Russia. The treaty covers areas of cooperation ranging from defense, intelligence, energy (both nuclear and gas), trade, technology, etc. Post ratification, the treaty will be valid for twenty years with an added provision for automatic renewal for subsequent five-year periods.
Are Moscow and Tehran simply reinstating the comprehensive strategic partnership that the two states had forged in 2001 or are there other factors necessitating the need for such an agreement between them? Both Russia and Iran find themselves in a spot of bother due to the developments that have taken place in the recent past. While Russia has suffered due to the Western-states imposed economic sanctions and the effects of a long war with Ukraine, Israel’s systematic targeting of Hamas and Hezbollah leadership and the swift fall of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad’s regime has weakened Iran’s position. The re-election of Donald Trump as the president of the United States, against whom Iran allegedly orchestrated an assassination plot, is likely to increase tensions for Tehran. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has vowed to do everything possible to stop Tehran from becoming a nuclear power. The treaty with Russia can be construed as Iran’s attempt at obtaining a degree of assurance for its security and ensure the survival of the regime. It also suggests Russia’s interest in safeguarding one of the few friendly regimes it counts as a close partner in the Middle East. This article delves into the motivations and rationale for Iran and Russia to conclude such a treaty at this juncture.
Continuities and Departures from the 2001 Agreement
The 2025 agreement largely borrows from the provisions of the 2001 Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Moscow and Tehran but has expanded the scope of cooperation comprehensively. While the 2001 treaty consisted only 21 articles, the 2025 agreement has 47 articles. There are some continuities and a few divergences between the two treaties. For instance, the 2025 agreement’s article 3 (3) reiterates the article 3 of 2001 treaty that “In the event that either Contracting Party is subject to aggression, the other Contracting Party shall not provide any military or other assistance to the aggressor which would contribute to the continued aggression”. To foster closer defense cooperation between Moscow and Tehran, the article 5 (4) of the 2025 agreement obligates the parties to “consult and cooperate in countering common military and security threats of a bilateral and regional nature.” In addition, the agreement also calls upon the parties to develop bilateral military-technical cooperation mechanism, along with holding joint military exercises and cooperation in intelligence sharing. Whereas, in a noteworthy departure from the 2001 treaty’s article 16 which called upon Iran and Russia to “cooperate in promoting the process of disarmament and the reduction and eventual elimination of all forms of weapons of mass destruction”, the 2025 agreement’s article 10 only suggests that the parties should “cooperate closely on arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation, and international security issues…” Does this imply Russia’s tacit acceptance of Iran’s nuclear ambitions? A lot will depend upon how the US and Israel view this.
Why Iran needs Russian security
With Trump re-taking the charge as the president, Iran’s worries are likely to increase. During his inauguration speech after winning the election, Trump hinted at the possibility of military action stating that “the US armed forces would be free to focus on their sole purpose – defeating America’s enemies.” There are reports suggesting that Israel’s Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer believes, Trump will either authorize a US military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities or support an Israeli military operation to accomplish the same. Israel has already demonstrated that it can undertake an air strike against Iran when on October 26, 2024 it bombed Iran’s missile production sites, in retaliation for Iran’s ballistic missile attack on Israel on 1st October of the same year.
In the past year, Iran has been dealt several blows. First, the untimely death of the then Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in May 2024 and the subsequent internal tussle for the appointment of next president as well as the post-Khamenei succession plan speculation brought to the fore the divisions within Iranian polity. Second, the simultaneous elimination of top leadership of both Hamas and Hezbollah has ostensibly affected Iran’s influence and standing in the region. Both the terror groups are extremely important for Iran to further its influence in the Middle East and especially to maintain a leverage with Israel. Third, Israel’s direct attack on Iran in October 2024 with no collateral damage shows the relative weakness of Iranian defenses. Fourth, the loss of Assad and Syria as an ally would isolate Iran further in the regional politics. In fact, with help from China, Iran has been trying to improve bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to emerge out of isolation.
Since September 2024, Netanyahu has adopted the strategy of directly addressing the Iranian population. In his second address in October 2024 address, with Persian subtitles, he stated that “when Iran is finally free – and that moment will come a lot sooner than people think – everything will be different.” He reiterated the same message to the Iranian public in December that “…you suffer under the rule of a regime that subjugates you and threatens us, you know what this regime is truly terrified of? It’s terrified of you, the people of Iran. And one day, I know that, one day this will change. One day Iran will be free.” Is Netanyahu hinting at a possible attempt at toppling Iran’s ruling regime? This is most disconcerting for Iran as the regime’s survival is the top priority for the leaders and Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRGC).
When it comes to Iran’s military strength, the Iran Air Force still largely operates a few of the old and obsolete F-4, F-5 fighter jets that the United States had supplied to Iran when the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was ruling it. Since then, except the Soviet supplied Mig-29s in early 1990s, Iran has not been able to make any noteworthy acquisition to boosts its offensive capabilities. In the past-decade Russia has become the sole supplier of conventional arms to Tehran. Moscow has supplied Iran with the S-300 air defense system, but Tehran is keen on also acquiring the S-400 and the Sukhoi-35 fighters for deterrence against air attack. In the economic arena too, Russia has tried to help Tehran by facilitating its inclusion in the BRICS grouping that has given Iran a stage to improve its stagnating economy.
Russian Interest in Iran’s Survival
With the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, just like Iran, Russia also lost one of the few allies it had in the region. The years of civil war within Syria had weakened the Syrian Army and the state to such an extent that they could no longer effectively counter the rebels. In addition, Russia’s three years long war with Ukraine meant that it could no longer focus on the region or spare resources to rebuild Syrian forces. Worryingly for both Moscow and Tehran, the HTS-led government in Syria may not be friendly towards them.
Having lost an important ally, Russia is keen on ensuring the survival of Iran’s regime. With the offensive and defensive capabilities of IRGC and the Iranian Armed forces in doubt, the defense pact with Russia is being seen as the best security guarantee that Iran can currently have. Although with Russia’s own ongoing military campaign, how effective this pact would be in deterring the US and Israel is anybody’s guess. While the agreement mandates the parties not to provide any military or other aid to the aggressor that “would facilitate the continuation of the aggression,” it does not include any mutual defense clause. This is in contrast to the accords that Moscow has signed with other allies such as Pyongyang in June 2024. Article 4 of the DPRK-Russia Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership states that North Korea and Russia “shall immediately provide military and other assistance” to the other party if it “falls into a state of war due to armed invasion from an individual or multiple states.” One possible reason for this maybe the skepticism among Iranian decision makers regarding reliability of Moscow as an ally. This was reflected in Iran’s ambassador to Russia, Kazem Jalil’s statement to the press post agreement signing that Iran is “not interested in joining any bloc” as the priority of the Islamic Republic is the state’s independence, security and self-reliance. Moscow is also not keen on having formal obligations for militarily defending Iran as it would affect Russia’s own relations with the friendly Arab partners such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Despite certain reservations, Iran-Russia military cooperation has become more pronounced in the recent years. The Ukraine-Russia conflict has given additional impetus to the defense cooperation between the two, with Iran supplying close-range ballistic missiles Fath-360 and Kamikaze drone Shahed 136 to Russia. The cooperation has also transcended into the space sector where Russian rocket launcher deployed Iranian satellite into the orbit.
Conclusion
Arguably, Iran has weakened considerably due to the decimation of its invaluable assets Hamas and Hezbollah at the hands of Israel, the sudden fall of its long-time ally Assad and the economic struggles due to the weight of international sanctions. The domestic turmoil triggered by the death of Mahsa Amini and the widespread protests in its aftermath have undermined the legitimacy of the regime. However, one should not draw the conclusion that Iran is incapable of defending itself. Iran’s own defenses have not been probed fully yet, and it retains the capability of causing problems for the US and Israel through its non-state allies and missile-drone attacks.
For Iran, the treaty with Russia is intended more as an assurance of its security. For the ruling regime in Tehran, its survival is its supreme consideration. Tehran is also looking at boosting its conventional military strength and inject growth in its stagnating economy. Towards that end, its ties with both Moscow and Beijing are important. The geopolitical alignment of China, Russia and Iran against the US and Israel is clearly visible in the interactions that are taking place between the three. Russia is keen on retaining a foothold in the Middle East, for which Iran is indispensable to it. This goes to show that the relationship between the two is likely to grow further in the near future.
Hemshikha Mishra is Research Assistant at School of Internal Security, Defence and Strategic Studies, Rashtriya Raksha University (RRU), with a keen interest in Iranian affairs.
Ankit Kumar is Assistant Professor at School of Internal Security, Defence and Strategic Studies, Rashtriya Raksha University (RRU).
