Guerrillas
Hold Ace In Post-War Iraq
By
Paul Buchanan
New Zealand
Herald
28 June, 2003
Observing post-conquest Iraq, we should remember Mao's maxim that the
population is the sea in which the guerrilla fish swim. Drained of sustenance,
this sea becomes inhospitable to the schools of irregular combatants
whose grievances, personal and political, unite them in violent cause.
Without popular support,
a militarily weak actor cannot defeat a stronger one. The odds change
when insurgents have more sympathy among the population than their adversary.
Unconventional fighters blend
with those not committed to arms, blurring the target for troops sent
to quell rebellion. This invites sucker ploys whereby occupation forces
are provoked into using lethal force against a population already disposed
to resent them.
The disappearance of Saddam
Hussein's most loyal followers in front of the American assault seems
less to do with cowardice, bribery or resignation, and more likely a
tactical retreat into guerrilla warfare.
Looting of national wealth
after the fall of Baghdad was initially well-organized. Those who knew
the score prepared accordingly, others followed, and the diversion allowed
armed cadres to escape.
The strategy also gave them
post-conquest leverage. Using "gray" networks between security
agencies in the region, the organized thieves can cash in on the black
market to fund the insurgent campaign, or hold stolen cultural treasure
for political ransom once the occupier has withdrawn.
Coalition planners anticipated
a military retreat but reckoned it would be towards strongholds where
last-ditch stands would be made. Instead, Saddam's fedayeen and Special
Republican Guards dispersed and regrouped while American forces were
preoccupied with looting and other post-war peacekeeping preambles,
and are now beginning a protracted struggle that is marshaled into three
stages.
The first phase is the strategic
defensive. It is a situation of cover and retrenchment, developing guerrilla
cadres and stockpiling arms while engaging in sporadic, seemingly uncoordinated
hit-and-run attacks on the opponent's conventional forces, command centers
and infrastructure.
In the case of Saddam's loyalists,
they not only had ample time to prepare for such a war but may have
the deposed leader and some of his close advisers to lead the campaign,
plus Arab solidarity fighters to bolster their ranks.
Strategic defensive approaches
exploit military "asymmetry" to the advantage of the weaker
actor by capitalizing on lack of popular support for occupation. Even
if liberated from tyranny, people may resent cultural differences, disrespect,
ignorance, or arrogance on the part of those who ostensibly freed them.
They may want to return to
the daily routine but find their movements impeded by foreign troops.
Unlike the deposed tyrant, these oppressors are close, strange-looking
and odd-sounding, even to those who do not attempt to usurp their authority.
In such an environment, guerrillas
find sustenance even as the lesser of evils, especially if they are
on home soil, share ethnic or kindred ties, are prepared to fight, and
are patient.
The best way to counter this
is to fight unconventionally as well, using inducements for co-operation
more than coercion. Special forces like the SAS are trained to that
end. American and British special forces are specifically tasked with
working with local sympathizers to win the hearts and minds of the population
(or at least that of their leaders).
They were used to good effect
against the Taleban, and were helpful in softening the loyalties of
some Ba'ath Party and military commanders before the assault on Baghdad.
But they have a secondary role in occupied Iraq.
The United States response
to the emerging insurgency mixes armored presence with reactive deployment
of infantry, airborne and air cavalry complements. This is reasonable
on the face of it, since only large numbers of troops on the ground
can effectively maintain an occupation. But in size there is a target-rich
environment, to which can be added the burdens of relatively inflexible
response to small-group tactics in a blurred context of popular hostility.
Thus, although formidable,
these assets are ill-suited for the type of low-intensity conflict proposed
by the fedayeen.
Intelligence gathering is
a crucial part of the guerrillas' game, since local knowledge proves
decisive in the timing and targeting of irregular strikes, avoidance
of capture or destruction. US forces are at a disadvantage despite their
technological superiority in eavesdropping, since they have few Arab
linguists and specialized intelligence agents working on the ground
without detection.
Real-time intelligence reporting
is skewed in favor of the Iraqi guerrillas, since coercive interrogation
results and volunteered information from the citizenry may not be reliable.
Counter-insurgency operations are often conducted partly blind to the
context, which increases the possibility of loss or counter-productive
results.
Fighting unconventional forces
with conventional force is a losing proposition unless decisive at the
onset, because time is on the side of the former. The thrust of guerrilla
strategy is to not stand up and fight. Instead, it confuses civilian
grievance with armed demands about the future disposition of political
control, making any status quo short of foreign domination more acceptable
to the local population.
Without a viable exit strategy
to counter that, the specter of mission-creep from liberation to occupation
to counter-insurgency spells career-threatening trouble for US commanders,
especially those who did participate in "shock and awe".
For US political authorities,
the evolution of the mission away from large-scale offensive operations
poses career hazards as well, at the ballot box.
The irregular conflict in
Iraq displays hybrid characteristics. Because of the lack of physical
cover, it combines elements of rural insurgency (dispersal, fluidity
of movement) with those of urban insurgency (close-quarter attacks in
villages and towns as well as Baghdad neighborhoods). It responds to
a larger plan of strategic centralization and tactical decentralization,
where guerrilla cadres, already briefed on the second phase of the war
and operating from cached havens, engage in autonomous, independent
raids responding to local conditions and opportunities.
This two-pronged approach
is designed to keep US forces on the defensive, on guard and trigger-happy.
It prevents the US from concentrating troops in a specific area, which
spreads them thin and forces their constant redeployment to counter
threats.
The guerrillas are thereby
able to pin down a far larger number of opposing forces, increasing
the logistical problems of the latter. It also prevents the process
of reconstruction from moving forward at pace because infrastructure
can be damaged in those areas where coalition forces are otherwise occupied.
Political control then becomes contested.
With success in the first
phase, guerrilla wars have two subsequent stages - the strategic stalemate
and strategic (counter) offensive. The strategic stalemate combines
irregular tactics with conventional assaults designed to seize occupied
territory. The strategic (counter) offensive expands to large-scale
conventional offence to secure political control.
The vulnerabilities in this
plan are in the transition between phases. If that they ratchet up military
maneuver and change tactics, guerrillas expose themselves, so operational
doctrine cautions patience and certainty. The preferred option is to
see the occupying force withdraw for political reasons as a result of
the first two stages, thereby easing the way for the final assault.
The fall of Saigon followed this pattern.
Without decisive victory
in the months ahead, confronted by other domestic and international
problems, the Bush Administration enters an election year hung with
an albatross of a war that was started under dubious pretences and which
shows signs of grim familiarity for those who remember the debacles
of Indo-China.
It may not be the same, but
it certainly seems Déjà vu.
Paul Buchanan lectures on
international affairs at Auckland University.
©Copyright 2003, New
Zealand Herald