The
Phoney War
By Andrew
Grice and Ben Russell
The Independent,
UK
08 July 2003
1. Iraq's weapons
Serious doubts were raised
yesterday about whether Saddam Hussein possessed the weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) on which Tony Blair and George Bush rested their case
for war in Iraq.
In a damaging finding for
Mr Blair, an inquiry by the Foreign Affairs Select Committee concluded
that "the jury is still out" on the accuracy of the Government's
dossier on Iraq's weapons, issued last September.
The MPs warned: "Continuing
disquiet and unease about the claims made in the September dossier are
unlikely to be dispelled unless more evidence of Iraq's WMD programmes
comes to light."
The committee challenged
the Government, which must respond in detail to the report in two months,
to say whether it still believed the document was accurate "in
the light of subsequent events" - the failure yet to find WMD.
Although Mr Blair believes
evidence that Saddam possessed WMD will be found, senior MPs warned
that time was running out. Sir John Stanley, a Tory member of the committee,
said: "The longer the period during which no WMD are found on the
scale indicated in that September dossier, the longer the period when
there is also no evidence that such weapons have been destroyed, the
greater is going to be the concern - not only in this committee and
in Parliament but also among the British people."
Writing in The Independent
today, Robin Cook, the former foreign secretary, says the Government's
alarmist claims in the run-up to the war now appear in conflict with
post-war reality. He says: "We have not found any of the chemical
weapons factories which we were assured were rebuilt. We have not traced
the nuclear weapons programme which we were assured had been restarted.
And we have not uncovered any weapons of mass destruction, never mind
any within a 45-minute drive of the artillery units."
Mr Cook warns the Government
not to make the security services the "fall guys" for the
failure to find WMD by blaming poor intelligence. He says: "It
was not the intelligence agencies who took the decision to go to war.
The decision was that of the Prime Minister and it was he who used intelligence
to justify the case for war."
Yesterday, a Ministry of
Defence report on the early lessons from the Iraq conflict admitted
that Saddam's regime was "a very difficult intelligence target
with few sources of information".
The MPs' committee also raised
doubts about the quality of intelligence material, saying: "It
appears likely that there was only limited access to reliable human
intelligence in Iraq, and ... the UK may have been heavily reliant on
US intelligence, on defectors and on exiles with an agenda of their
own."
Q: How long can we wait
for evidence that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction? And
if none is found, will the Government admit the basis for war was flawed?
2. Alastair Campbell and
the BBC
Many Labour MPs believe that
the war of words between the Government and the BBC diverted the Foreign
Affairs Select Committee's inquiry - and the media coverage of it -
away from the "real issue" of whether Iraq possessed WMD.
By persuading Tony Blair
to allow him to give evidence to the MPs, Alastair Campbell, the director
of strategy and communications, pictured, became the focus of the inquiry,
and the dispute became the most serious between the BBC and a government.
Without the row, yesterday's report by the MPs would have been seen
as critical of the Government.
Graham Allen, a Labour MP,
said: "Alastair Campbell brilliantly diverted MPs and the media
by throwing the media pack the bone of the BBC. Now everyone must try
to get back to the real agenda and pursue the big questions - why did
the UK go to war?"
The committee said too much
prominence was given to the warning in the Government's dossier issued
in September that Iraq could deploy chemical and biological weapons
within 45 minutes. But it cleared Mr Campbell of the allegation made
by Andrew Gilligan, above right, the BBC's defence correspondent, that
he "sexed up" the dossier. It found Mr Campbell "did
not play any role in the inclusion of the 45-minutes claim" and
"did not exert or seek to exert improper influence" on the
September dossier.
That allowed Mr Campbell
to claim victory, but it was not total. The MPs were split on party
lines, with three Tories, one Liberal Democrat and one Labour MP saying
the committee should not reach a verdict on the BBC dispute.
Although Downing Street sought
to lower the temperature last night, the BBC rejected Mr Campbell's
demand for it to say its original claim was wrong. The MPs' criticism
of the "45-minute" claim justified the story, it said. The
MPs also challenged the Government to say if it still believed the claim
was justified.
The report failed to break
the deadlock between the two sides. Although the Government will be
relieved at the findings, the dispute has left a bitter taste for some.
John Grogan, Labour MP for Selby and chairman of the all-party parliamentary
BBC group, has called on the Government to stop pursuing the issue.
"This row is now doing far more harm to the Government than it
is to the BBC," he said.
Q: What was the basis
for the claim that Saddam could deploy weapons "within 45 minutes"?
And did Alastair Campbell pick a fight with the BBC as a diversionary
tactic?
3. Niger and the 'sale
of uranium'
Tony Blair was under increasing
pressure last night to justify the Government's controversial claim
that Saddam Hussein had tried to obtain uranium from the African state
of Niger.
The Foreign Affairs Select
Committee said that it was "puzzled" by the Government's insistence
that it stood by the claims, even though the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) dismissed the allegations as based on crude forgeries.
Previously undisclosed documents from the Foreign Office, handed to
the Commons inquiry, acknowledged that some of the documents passed
to the IAEA were forgeries but said that they had not originated in
Britain.
Questioned about the claim
in the Commons a month ago, Mr Blair replied: "Until we investigate
properly, we are simply not in a position to say whether that is so."
Yesterday the Government
stuck to its line that its September dossier was accurate, with the
Foreign Office insisting that its information came from more than one
source, and was received after the visit of a former United States diplomat
to Niger to investigate the claims.
But Joseph Wilson, who was
asked by the CIA to investigate sales of uranium from Niger to Iraq,
said on Sunday it was almost certain that British and American leaders
knew they were circulating false reports.
"That information was
erroneous and they knew about it well ahead both of the publication
of the White Paper and the President's State of the Union address,"
Mr Wilson told NBC television.
Yesterday the committee of
MPs said it was "very odd indeed" that ministers were still
reviewing the evidence about Saddam's alleged dealings with Niger despite
the Government's insistence that it did not base its claims on documents
now known to be false.
The MPs challenged the Government
to explain the evidence for its allegations, and declare whether it
still believed the claims to be accurate.
Q: As the Government still
maintains that Saddam was seeking uranium from Niger, when will it produce
the evidence to support the allegations?
4. The dossier
Iain Duncan Smith increased
the pressure on Tony Blair last night to apologise for misleading Parliament
over the provenance of the "dodgy dossier".
The Conservative leader called
on Mr Blair to make an urgent statement to correct his claim to MPs
that the February dossier represented "further intelligence".
The Foreign Affairs Select
Committee heavily criticised Mr Blair, saying he "misrepresented"
the dossier, which was largely plagiarised from academic articles on
the internet. Alastair Campbell was attacked for not asking vital questions
on the origins of the document.
It was revealed during their
inquiry that 90 per cent of the document had been lifted from published
papers, a mistake condemned as "wholly unacceptable".
Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary,
has acknowledged the affair was a "complete Horlicks", while
Downing Street and Mr Campbell have admitted that mistakes were made.
Mr Duncan Smith told Mr Blair in a letter: "The select committee
report is clear and explicit in stating that when referring to the dossier
you 'misrepresented its status'. Consequently, you gave an inaccurate
impression of the dossier to both Parliament and the British people."
He called for an independent
inquiry into the affair. He added: "It is in your interest to clear
up the confusion and immediately take the appropriate action against
those persons responsible for you committing the serious mistake of
misinterpreting intelligence in Parliament."
Charles Kennedy, the Liberal
Democrat leader, also called for Mr Blair to apologise for "unwittingly"
misleading Parliament.
Q: Will Tony Blair now
apologise for the "dodgy" dossier? And, as this was the first
time Britain has gone to war on the basis of intelligence, will there
now be a judicial inquiry?
5. The legal basis for
war
Tony Blair, senior ministers
and loyal backbenchers have deployed a host of reasons to justify the
war alongside the prime case for disarming Saddam Hussein.
Mr Blair used the failing
authority of the United Nations as a key argument for taking action
to prevent Saddam's defiance of weapons inspectors.
However, he was left a severe
political and legal problem when he failed to obtain a second resolution
finally and unequivocally authorising force.
The Attorney General provided
the ultimate legal basis for British involvement in the war in advice
to the Cabinet in March. His advice was crucial after the threatened
French veto ended hopes of gaining full international backing for war.
Lord Goldsmith based his
advice to the Cabinet on the force of successive UN Security Council
resolutions, based on the terms of the ceasefire after the 1991 Gulf
War.
His one-page legal opinion
argued that Saddam was in material breach of Security Council resolution
1441 because he failed to co-operate with weapons inspectors. That,
he said, triggered the justification for the use of force passed in
Security Council resolution 687 after the 1991 Gulf War.
Despite widespread suspicions
that regime change was the ultimate aim of the growing confrontation
with Iraq, Mr Blair consistently shied away from advocating the toppling
of Saddam as a major war aim, except if it was necessary to secure disarmament.
The distinction was crucial, because while acting in self-defence to
neutralise a threat or imposing the will of the UN could be declared
legal, simply intervening to topple a foreign leader could not.
Mr Blair insisted that he
was acting through the UN to preserve the unity of the international
community. However, Clare Short, the former secretary of state for international
development, challenged that claim, accusing the Prime Minister of agreeing
a secret pact with George Bush to go to war by the spring.
But Mr Blair linked Saddam
with the threat of terrorism and suggested links with al-Qa'ida before
the war. Mr Blair told Labour's Welsh conference in February: "I
tell you it is fear, not the fear that Saddam is about to launch a strike
on a British town or city ... but the fear that one day these new threats
of weapons of mass destruction, rogue states and international terrorism
combine to deliver a catastrophe."
In March he told MPs: "Do
not be in any doubt at all - Iraq has been supporting terrorist groups.
For example, Iraq is offering money to the families of suicide bombers
whose purpose is to wreck any chance of progress in the Middle East."
Before and after the war,
ministers stressed the human rights abuses and tyrannical nature of
the regime. The Government's publication of a dossier on Saddam's human
rights abuses was widely condemned as opportunistic. But the Government
encouraged the work of the Labour backbencher Ann Clwyd, who has been
a staunch campaigner against human rights abuses in Iraq. She was instrumental
in briefing Labour MPs before the vote on war in March.
Last week Jack Straw, the
Foreign Secretary, pointed to the removal of Saddam and his regime's
support for Palestinian terrorism as a significant encouragement to
the Middle East peace protest.
A group of 16 senior Labour
backbenchers also justified backing war by declaring that "removing
Saddam Hussein was not only morally justified, it has also provided
an opportunity to resolve some of the most intractable problems of the
Middle East."
Q: Was Mr Blair's primary
aim regime change? Did he use WMD 'evidence' as an 'honourable deception'
as Clare Short says? So was this war illegal? If so, will Tony Blair
resign?