Political Perspectives
On Iran
By Ardeshir Mehrdad
and Mehdi Kia
17 August , 2005
Znet
In the recent presidential elections in
Iran, Mahmood Ahmadinejad, an unknown conservative military commander,
won. His victory was surprising as many had predicted Hashemi Rafsanjani
would become Irans next president. Rafsanjani, perhaps the second
most powerful man in the Islamic Republic, was supported by a broad
coalition of reformists and pragmatist elites. The shock of this surprise
victory may partly explain the crude nature of some of the analyses
that followed. Even more striking is the failure to address the deeper
causes and background to this event, and to analyse its consequences.
This article is an effort to address these issues. At the onset a few
observations may be helpful:
Background
In the Islamic Republic,
elections, including presidential ones, are fundamentally undemocratic,
tightly controlled processes. The law deprives many citizens such as
women, religious minorities (including non-Shiite Muslims) and
political opponents of the religious state, etc from standing for president.
This is enforced in practice by the unlimited power of the Council of
Guardians [1]. This Council has consistently rejected anyone it considers
unsuitable for the ruling circles. Therefore, in practice, elections
in the Islamic Republic are nothing more than a beiat [expression
of allegiance] with one of the few, and often the only, person the Council
of Guardians has let through its net [2]. In such conditions non-participation
in elections, rather than reflecting voter apathy, is one form of expressing
dissent, a means of protesting against the regime and questioning
its legitimacy [3].
Those sections of
the state that are up for periodic elections, including the presidency,
are in general of secondary importance in the power structure. The system
revolves round an unelected central core, headed by a Supreme Leader,
vali-e- faqih, with truly unlimited powers. It is here that all major
decisions are made, especially so after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini
and his replacement with Ayatollah Khamenei. The presidency and
the administration have ultimately an executive responsibility
or as the outgoing President Mohammad Khatami puts it they play
the role of a footman. Yet because of the faction-ridden nature
of the ruling elites, the individual in charge of the executive becomes
important since this appointment could effect the distribution of public
resources and to some extend the ability of the entire state structure
to function. Hence control of elected organs, and the presidency in
particular, are also hotly contested, and subject to intense bargaining,
among the various factions.
The most important
function of elections in the Islamic Republic rests precisely here:
namely the redistribution of power among the various ruling factions.
This contest is particularly acute at times when the internal crisis
of the regime is intensified and when the normal bargaining processes
are unable to reach a consensus. Elections in
such conditions become a mechanism for the re-allocation of power, where
factions test their respective power against electoral legitimacy. Until
the latest election, the normal practice in the Islamic Republic was
for all the factions to observe the rules of an in-house democratic
game. After the initial weeding process by the Council of Guardians,
the power centres did not intervene in favour of one or other candidate
outside the legal framework, or more accurately, did not
undermine too explicitly legal appearances [4].
What at first glance
distinguishes the latest election in the Islamic Republic from all its
predecessors is that for the first time the rules of the democratic
game among the regimes various factions have been openly flouted.
Cheating, in the shape of manufacturing votes has always been a common
practice, whether through stuffing ballot boxes, or miscounting this
or that voting booth in favour of a candidate. The Council of Guardians
has frequently declared null and void votes cast for some candidates.
Finally the overall number of votes cast in elections is always massaged.
This is, after all, a way to claim greater legitimacy among the voting
public for the entire system. This fraud, however, always took place
by common consent among the factions, supposedly without damaging the
electoral prospects of one or other candidate.
What is totally
unprecedented is what took place in June. The world witnessed structural,
nation-wide and highly organised deception, led from the apex of the
pyramid of power in favour of one candidate that took not just the world,
but a large section of the ruling elite of Iran by surprise. The shape
and scope of this scheme was such that it would not be an exaggeration
to state that Ahmadinejad, a commander in the Revolutionary Guards Corps,
took over the presidential palace through a blood-less coup or as revolutionary
guard commander Zolqadr said afterwards in a complex way
and [through] multi-layered planning [5].
These elections
were also held at a time of unprecedented developments in the region.
As far as the Middle East is concerned, Iran is in a very strong position,
mainly thanks to the military interventions of its long term foes,
the United States and Britain. To the East, the Taliban regime (with
whom it nearly went to war in the late 1990s) is defeated, and many
of Irans allies are back in power as regional warlords, such as
the governor of Herat province in western Afghanistan under the pro-Iran
warlord Haji Ismail Khan. However Irans main international success
has been achieved in Iraq. Without firing a single shot, they have seen
not only the removal of Saddams secular Bathist regime
a neighbour they hated more than Israel and the US but the coming
to power of their protégés, the Shia parties and
militias of Islamic Daawa (the Iraqi occupation Prime Ministers
party) and other major parties in the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance such
as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), sharing
power with the Kurdish PUK and KDP. All are organisations well known
for getting military, financial and political support from Iran since
the 1980s. This, together with chaos created by military occupation
in Iraq is part of the reason why the Islamic regime in Iran felt confident
enough to take unprecedented risks in these elections.
As a result of this
election, for the first time in the life of the Islamic Republic, virtually
every organ and institution of power, electable or otherwise, has been
handed over to the complete control of the conservatives. It would appear
on the surface that political power is now homogeneous and concentrated
at the apex of the regime, in the hands of its Supreme Leader, Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei. However, there is evidence that the coup détat
that was carried out behind the curtains of elections was not just directed
against reformists, or the leading candidate Hashemi Rafsanjani, but
against the majority of the existing groupings in the ruling oligarchy
[6].
There is no doubt
that, Ahmadinejad and his supporters belong to the conservative wing
of the ruling bloc. However, among the various conservative circles,
Ahmadinejad , in particular belongs to groups that have been named radical
new-conservatives. He was one of the founders of the groups called Alliance
of Builders of Islamic Iran (abadegaran) and Devotees (isar-garan).
Over the last few years, encouraged and supported by the Supreme Leader,
these groups have been taking root, predominantly in the security-police
and military organs. They espouse populist-Islamist and value-based
slogans that distinguishes them from the other conservatives. It is
also clear that in the pre-election bargaining of the various ultra-conservative
factions, Ahmadinejad was not acceptable to all and the conservatives
went into the elections with four candidates.
As a result of the
June election for the first time in a quarter of a century a military
man, rather than a mullah, takes over as head of the executive. This
almost completes the trend of military-security control of the main
organs of state, which began at the end of the Iran-Iraq War, and gained
momentum over the past 8 years. This trend began in the municipal council
elections when the abadgaran took control of many towns and cities two
years ago and was consolidated when they went on to control the Majles
(parliament). The point cannot be overemphasised that this is an entirely
new and qualitative change, one that could have a decisive influence
on the relation between barracks and mosque in a theocracy.
The open interference
by the supreme leadership apparatus [Khameneis entourage] in the
elections, the key role of the military and para-military
apparatus in shaping and organising the vote, and ultimately the coming
to power of the populist new-conservatives was an act which was contrary
to the norms in the present political culture. Not surprisingly it gave
rise to an unprecedented wave of protest from among the ruling elites.
Such behaviour can undoubtedly upset the line-ups within the regime
and place the leadership apparatus, and specifically further isolate
Ali Khamenei. It can weaken his position among the clerical oligarchy,
which for nearly three decades has held real power in its hands. It
is not beyond the bounds of imagination that the Assembly of Experts
[7], despite being controlled by conservatives, will question his suitability
to continue as leader. Rafsanjanis recent proposal to replace
the Supreme Leader (Khamenei) with a Council of Leadership could well
be taken up seriously with the support of other influential clerics.
So, why take such a risk? How can one explain this political purge that
took place under the guise of elections? What are its possible consequences?
Why the coup?
The 9th presidential
election was a stage where the crisis engulfing the regime and the solutions
that could harness these crises were simultaneously played out in the
shape of an aggressive struggle for power. It took place at a time when
the existence of the regime was seriously threatened from three directions:
At home the regime is fast approaching a crisis of control, increasingly
isolated and assaulted by a general wave of disaffection and protest.
Meanwhile the regional and global noose is tightening in pursuit of
Bushs project of regime change. Finally within the
regime the factional splits and quarrels have made it impossible for
the ruling elites to take decisive decisions and act in a united way.
These crises, of
course, have structural causes [8] wedded in the contradictory nature
of power in the Islamic Republic. They were born with the regime, and
have steadily worsened over the last two decades, in particular after
the adoption of neo-liberal policies and the application of the structural
adjustment programmes. They have been deepened, more recently by Bushs
post September 11 policies, to the extent that today the regime finds
itself faced with real dangers.
Over these years,
and in response to the regimes crises, the rulers gradually lined up,
gelled into two different politico-ideological camps. Self-styled reformists
faced conservatives. The former believe that without reforms
the system cannot survive, although they hold different views as to
what reform entails. Some limit it to policies and ultimately
the conduct of the state in relation to the people, in particular in
the social and political arena. Others go as far as institutional reforms
in the power-structure. For instance they want a change in the constitution
to increase the relative power of elected organs in relation to those
that are appointed [9]. They also want to normalise and reduce
tension in foreign relations, and abide by international norms.
This, they believe will guarantee the survival of the system and hence
their hold on power.
During 1999-2001
the reformists attracted the support of a large section
of the population and clocked substantial victories in a chain of elections,
occupying almost every institution up for election. Yet at the very
moment of victory their dream turned to nightmare. It became obvious
to all but the most blind that this repressive and reactionary regime
is not only immutable, but the institutional power structure is intertwined
with the interests of the ruling groups such as to make any reforms
impossible. In addition the appalling consequences of the economic policies
of the reformists on the daily life of the millions, had not only created
major disappointment, but made inevitable the prospect of growing protests.
The international
scene fared no better, and September 11 put an abrupt end to Irans
efforts to normalise foreign relations. Khatamis dialogue
of civilisations foundered when Bush placed Iran among rogue states
and officially declared a policy of regime change. It then became obvious
that, contrary to the hopes raised by Khatamis inauguration 8
years before, in a changing world political environment his discourse
and foreign policies cannot provide the regime with any protection against
outside threats. The effect of these setbacks was, on one hand, to weaken
the position of the reformist faction within the overall ruling structures,
subjecting them to greater pressure from the conservatives. And, on
the other hand, destroyed the internal cohesion of the various groupings
that made up the reformist alliance. The result was repeated
schisms and splits.
The conservative
bloc has a different strategy to deal with the burgeoning crises: Concentrate
power more and more at the top and use naked repression and terror through
the military and police apparatus. All the cliques within this bloc
oppose any change in the institutional structure of power, especialy
if that means reducing the authority of the leadership apparatus [10],
which to them assures the Islamic foundation of the entire
system. They are convinced that any flexibility in principles
and values will lead to oblivion, and should be ruthlessly resisted.
Indeed, they aim to simplify the muddled and contradictory aspects of
the regime by doing away with the semi-elected republic in favour of
a self-appointed caliphate, with a highly centralised structure [11].
Conservatives also viewed any openness in the political atmosphere or
the formation of any form of independent social or political associations
as a dangerous threat to their total control of society. Faced with
the erosion of politically mobilised social support for the Islamic
Republic, they turned to hired military and mercenary forces as their
sole instrument of control.
On the international
level the conservatives prefer to play the card of Islamic movements,
terrorist activities and politico-religious conflicts. They also try
to open up whatever breathing space they can by manoeuvring in the gaps
and on the competing interests among great powers, in particular looking
towards China, Russia and Japan. To achieve this their main weapon is
commercial and economic concessions. Notwithstanding such policies,
however, they have not flinched from making behind the scene deals and
concessions, if it served to consolidate their power, nor to use the
nuclear weapons card.
The conservative
bloc, particularly since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, had occupied
all the key positions of power. These included all the organs that came
under the command of the Supreme Leader the armed forces, the
police intelligence apparatus and the judiciary. Moreover control over
the Council of Guardians, by drawing red lines that cannot be crossed,
permits control over every branch of state, including the state bureaucracy
and the executive.
Yet the despotic
and intensely reactionary nature of the various cliques within the ultra-conservative
bloc severely limits their ability to deal with the emerging crises.
Indeed within a few years after the revolution of 1979 they themselves
became the main cause of political and social crises, pushing the latter
to bursting point. This may be a reason why throughout its entire life
this bloc could never extend its support base beyond the military and
quasi-military networks and the people under the direct umbrella of
the charities run by them. Their track record in dealing with the crisis
of legitimacy and the ever-escalating isolation of the regime has been
dismal. This can be seen in the proportion of votes for their candidates
never exceeding 25% of the votes cast. They only became electable
when the rest had boycotted elections [12]. This fact was one reason
why, at least for the last 10 years, they were content to tolerate the
rival blocs control over the executive machinery and the legislative
Majles, while keeping a tight grip on the protective shield of the security
forces.
With the failure
of the reformists to keep their support base, their inability to act
as a safety valve for the entire regime, the failure of their foreign
policy to provide to provide a partial shield against US threats, the
conservatives faced a new quandary and starkly precarious conditions
[13]. They had only two choices: compromise and abandon the ruling political
system in a step by step prossess of isolation, or face a deadly confrontation
and put up with the consequences. Faced with this Hobsons choice
the conservatives split into various factions: The Alliance of Builders
of Islamic Iran (abadgaran), Principled Reformist (usul-garane eslah
talab) etc.
These new groupings,
which could be called Islamist new-conservatives, carved their place
in the political spectrum of the country by being critical of and rejecting
all other factions: the reformists (supporters of Mohammad Khatami),
pragmatists (supporters of Rafsanjani) [14] and traditional conservatives.
In their view all three, had failed in practice, and indeed exacerbated
the crisis such that the very existence of the regime was threatened.
For the new-conservatives, recourse to an immediate, bold and radical
solution seemed unavoidable. And this is what they did a slow
consolidation of power followed by a silent coup.
Over the last few
years the new-conservatives had managed to quietly infiltrate many organs,
outwitting their rivals to end up controlling many town councils, the
Majles and now the presidency.
The new-conservative
groups, emerging predominantly from within the armed forces and working
under the umbrella of the leadership apparatus, aim for a new equilibrium.
This is an equilibrium that will reduce the internal and external crises
and ensure the survival of the system. The aim is to create a powerful,
centralised, principled state, cleansed of corruption, one that can
count on renewed support from the lower sections of society, the military
and semi-military forces, armed with nuclear weapons, all funded by
petro-dollars. With these tools they believe they can confront both
internal and external challenges without resorting to any structural
changes, while maintaining the ideological-authoritarian nature of the
regime.
The difference between
the new-conservatives and the more traditional conservatives lies in:
First, prioritising destitute masses to win back their support for the
regime. Second, on their definition of the state. Theirs will be an
interventionist state, a state that will control all the main lifelines
of the country, quite unlike the privatised variety of the
traditional conservatives. Third, on focusing their slogans and discourse
on social justice and the welfare of poor rather than on Islamic values
and the question of haq va baatel [right and wrong in religious matters].
This grouping, however, is still in the process of development, and
their exact policies are somewhat ill defined, indeed in the making.
The broad outlines can, however, be deduced from statements and utterances
of its spokespersons. There are two central solutions.
a. To centralise
power at the apex and embark on a political, organisational and financial
purge of the executive body of the state. What they hope to do is to
harness internal tensions and to block any effort by opponents to use
internal splits to further their aims. These are reflected in such slogans
as the fight against bureaucratic corruption, the state aristocracy,
and the rentiers.
b. The attempt to
form a new political movement in order to rekindle the social base of
the regime, in particular among the urban and rural poor something
that had gradually eroded over the last 15 years. In fact they are trying
to ride the popular discontent of the victims of the economic policies
of the regime. Here they hope to cultivate the right material to help
them rebuild the crumbling fortifications of the regime. Moreover, they
might well be in need of cannon fodder were the conflict with the US
and Israel to escalate. The role of such slogans as social justice,
the fight against inequality, the anti-poverty drive, the taking
the oil money back to the peoples table, the solution to
the housing problem, employment and marriage of youth and such like
is precisely to serve this purpose.
Some supporters
of Ahmadinejad have referred to this as the third revolution
one that instead of clergy or students has its leadership in the military
[15]. This revolution is being born in the barracks rather than mosque
or university. Others see this is a rebirth of the idealism of the early
revolutionary years and a re-emergence of Islamic populism [16].
It was along such
a trajectory that the unannounced alliance between a number of new-conservative
groupings under the leadership of Khameneis circle were able to
lead the recent elections, through a carefully planned and executed
plan with headlights off until the eve of the second ballot,
to go on and occupy the last bastion of the reformists and pragmatists
[17]. The ground is now ploughed for the absolute rule of the velayate
faqih something the late Ayatollah Khomeini had called for but
failed to implement successfully - foiled by the deep contradiction
of his regime [18].
Does this scheme
rest on real capabilities, real ground and real potentialities? If successful
can it save the regime from the quagmire it is sinking in? Or is this
just a moribund attempt with no other outcome but further weakening
of the regime, its greater isolation and a speeding up of its implosion
and collapse?
Can the new-cons
do the impossible?
To answer these
questions we will consider the real conditions, potentials and limitations
faced by the Islamic Republic today. However it is important to first
clarify a few issues:
1. The crisis of
the Islamic Republic has structural roots. They are above all the expression
of the incompatibility of a religio-ideological ultra-reactionary regime
with its material surroundings and historic setting. It is no surprise
that the Islamic government has been in continuous crisis since birth,
repeatedly surfacing under various guises and at numerous levels. The
constant need for political and structural changes has been an inevitable
necessity. At best these efforts, which surfaced as political U-turns,
have merely shifted the epi-centres of such crises from one area to
another - avoiding an explosion without removing the underlying causes.
Every time the question was the same: What are the regimes capacities,
where are the U-turns heading and what would be the passing effects
of any change in policy? For the mullahs ruling Iran, such crises were
the norm. We have therefore witnessed a move from principles
to expediency, from elitism to populism, from decentralisation
to the reverse and back again always in search of stability!
[19].
2. In the current
domestic and international conditions the Islamic Republic cannot find
a solution to survive without totally negating its very existence. The
stark choice it faces is either to submit totally to colonial conditions
(either keeping the religious appearance or under a secular mask) as
have some its neighbours, and to dissolve in Bushs plan for a
larger Middle East, or surrender to a progressive participatory
and radical democracy. Despite all the outcries and widespread claims
to the contrary, there is no third road. No matter how daring the manoeuvres,
or how unexpected the changes and shifts in power and policies, this
regime will face a fresh deadlock sooner rather than later making its
collapse inevitable.
3. The Islamic Republic
has come out of the latest election weaker than ever, and will embark
on yet another political U-turn, creating an even greater level of instability.
There are two main reasons for this. Firstly in order to make to entice
the population to participate in the electoral process, it has had to
retreat from what was always considered its fundamental principles and
values. The rulers were forced to recognise, and even consider some
of the political, economic and cultural demands of the people. We saw
them apologising for the dismal record of the last 3 decades. Even more
astonishing was how all candidates avoided issues relating to Islam
and revolution and directly or indirectly criticise the
authoritarian and oppressive nature of their own regime [20].
Moreover, in this
election, candidates on both sides of the political spectrum encouraged
negative voting. People were asked to vote to reject, rather than to
support a particular candidate or slogan. Reformists and pragmatists
encouraged people to vote against reaction, despotism and to guard against
the danger of fascism (meaning Ahmadinejad). Conservatives asked people
to vote against corruption, inequality, poverty, and the plunder of
public resources (meaning Rafsanjani) [21].
Yet despite all
the departures and all the tricks, and in spite of the usual threats
of dire consequences of voting abstention, official sources admit that
only 28 of the 48 million eligible were dragged to the polling booths
(this figure includes the rigged votes). In circumstances where most
of the opposition, the ones who call for an overthrow of the Islamic
regime, had asked for a boycott, the absence of 40% of the voters, rather
than a sign of disbelief or indifference, is a clear and unambiguous
sign of widespread opposition to the very existence of the system [22].
4. In its quest
for political homogeneity and unanimity in power, the regime was forced
to jettison the ruling alliance that had lasted nearly three decades,
an alliance that helped the system maintain stability. Now, for the
first time in its entire existence, the Islamic Republic has to be answerable
to its various challenges, both domestic and external, without the help
of reformists and pragmatists in key positions. At a time when it has
little room to manoeuvre, the regime has lost one of the main weapons
it has used successfully on so many occasions to sow indecision among
its domestic and foreign opponents [23]. From now on it has to face
its crises head on, and in doing so to rely on its last resource, the
military barracks, to keep its balance.
The country is increasingly
in military hands. Significantly, on the road to creating a military
state, the special position and stature occupied by the clergy has been
uniquely questioned. For the first time in 25 years a non-cleric is
president and a military man to boot. The logic for the central
role of velayate faqih - the embodiment of the monopoly of rule by the
clergy and the very basis of Khomeinis vision of Islamic
government has been abandoned.
5. Moreover, by
choosing Mahmood Ahmadinejad, an extremist counter-intelligence officer
in the Revolutionary Guards, with a history of involvement in terrorism
and murder [24], to head the executive, foreign relations, even attendance
at international gatherings will become more problematic than ever before.
In particular with the nuclear weapons issue the US and Israel are in
a better position to incite international public opinion against the
Islamic Republic. Now, any judge or attorney anywhere can try their
hand at prosecuting the second person in the Iranian government.
Not yet ready
to fall?
Is the regime, then,
ready to fall? Notwithstanding the fact that the Islamic Republic has
come out of this election weaker and more fragile than before, one cannot
necessarily conclude that it is on the threshold of immediate implosion
and collapse. It is likely to continue its existence for some time yet.
The future of the regime rests on a number of factors and the way they
interact. Some of these factors may allow the regime a breathing space
while others will do the opposite:
Will Irans
rulers be able to implement a series of rapid new-conservative reforms
to rekindle the support of a significant section of the destitute masses
[25]? Can an anti-popular, utterly reactionary, despotic and authoritarian
regime, which was once able to use support from the dishinherited
to maintain power do so again? Can a regime, which in pursuit of exporting
its revolution, sent these supporters to clear minefields for eight
years, dangling a plastic key to heaven round their neck,
be capable of regaining their trust? Will the people who had been betrayed
once consent to being betrayed again [26]?
There are two possible
answers to these questions:
Affirmative: If
it makes good use of the opportunities offered, especially those resulting
form the US occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan , the Islamic regime
can mobilise some of the poorest in its support and survive the current
crisis. These opportunities include the quagmire of Iraq (which could
help the Islamic Republic play its Shite card), the current buoyant
oil market and the way any new crisis in the Middle East might influence
oil prices, the significant foreign exchange reserves they have accumulated
and the surplus earnings due to the current high oil prices. These could
be channelled into immediate improvement in the living conditions for
targeted sections of the population and reduce discontent among them.
Then there is the
deep crisis among the ranks of the opposition forces whose potential
to fill the current political vacuum has shrunk. There is also the weakness
and disunity among radical and progressive forces that could have helped
activate the existing class divisions and use it to organise and mobilise
the independent organisations of workers and toilers. And finally if
they successfully use the basij a nationwide political-military
organisation [27] that it controls, and the wide network of mosques
and associated charities, as powerful means of communication between
the state and the deprived and marginalised masses.
Negative: If the
new political cliques in power cannot overcome some of their contradictions
the obstacles they face both within and outside the ruling apparatus.
These obstacles are:
Creating a new balance
between the economic interests of the mafia-like rentiers at the top
and the demands of the dispossessed masses [i.e., the core element of
the new-conservatives strategy]:[M3] Being able to redistribute
public resources (especially oil income) to reduce the burdens of life.
This will require cutting all or at least some of the tentacles of an
insatiable monster. An octopus with one end in the inner circles around
Khamenei and the numerous institutions under its tutelage, and
tentacles in the Revolutionary Guards, the security apparatus, the newly
built palaces of the top families, and the offices of their offspring
(popularly known as the aghazadeha = sons of clerics). In other word,
being able to keep the promise to have the oil money on the table
of the poor and to create hope.
Neutralising the
immediate and savage resistance of capital both domestic and
foreign - which will view the slightest deviation from its model of
neo-liberal economy and austerity as anathema: Being able to gain its
confidence and to sell them an economic policy full of contradictories
and ambiguities. And to prevent domestic and foreign capitalists using
their most effective weapon, flight to other places, thereby squeezing
the economy and increasing unemployment [28].
Repressing or overcoming
the demands of working people, key agents of socio-political change.
Given the radicalisation of such demands by the masses, the regime will
need to block efforts to organise at various levels; to entice working
people to blindly follow yet another saviour, it will have
to split the ranks of the labour force, and to isolate the more radical
sections of the labour movement [29].
Controlling the
political context within which the regime operates: That is to say,
first of all, to crush the popular movements for social equality, cultural
and political freedom, and self-governing. Being able to create an environment
of fear such that anti-despotic movements, and in particular women,
youth, intelligentsia, and non-Fars nations and ethnic groups are controlled.
Being capable of suppressiong the rising waves of cultural and civil
disobedience and political protest. In short, producing a schism between
the demand for bread and that for freedom.
Stabilising the
regimes relationship with the world most powerful states: In particular,
preventing the nuclear weapons issue from becoming explosive, and hence
being able to divert petro-dollars as before to the state coffers.
And finally, preventing
the crises outside from infecting the corridors of power and fracturing
the political and factional homogeneity achieved by the present coup:
That is to say, preventing the singularity of decision-making being
destroyed, giving way once again to factional squabbles, obstructions
and such like, this time between the existing military-economic mafias
in the conservative faction.
There is little
evidence that new-conservatives in Iran will raise once more the flag
of social justice in a third revolution. If the first
revolution was a real tragedy, the third revolution
will probably be nothing more than a nauseating comedy.
Yet the key to the
puzzle of Ahmadinejad is in the hands of the working class. Emergence
of a progressive, radical and mass working class movement is the only
development that could fill the current ideological and political vacuum
within which reactionary populism of Ahmadinejad is trying to act. A
class that is the only social force capable of preventing demagogic
populism [30].
The crucial issue
facing Iran, however, is not the fate of Ahmadinejad. It is the fate
of the country. It does not require much imagination to understand that
the Islamic Republic has a mortal disease. Ahmadinejads remedy
is only temporary. Inevitable death awaits this regime, so out of keeping
with its era . What Ahmadinejad and the regime are vainly trying to
save is already doomed.
But the fate of
the country is not inevitable. In the manifold crises facing Iran, will
the country face collapse and break-up, invasion or a real liberating
future? That choice, and that future, is being made today. And the answer
is clearly not preordained nor totally dependent on how, or at the hands
of whom, the Islamic regime falls.
This future is once
again in the hands of the organised working class of Iran. Will the
working class be able to tie its strategic potential to the energy and
creativity of the social movements? Would it be capable of giving birth
to a real agent for social change through combining organisation and
organisational ability? If the answers to these questions are positive,
then not only the swamp the Ahmadinejads of Iran want to use to create
another ultra-conservative and reactionary movement will dry up, but
the country will avoid the threat of collapse, break-up or invasion.
Otherwise there will be silence, and silence is our sin!
[31]
The experience of
the last eight years has proved that a heavy penalty awaits those that
are unable to use the opportunities facing them to create something
new and surrender to the idea of reconciliation with reality. With the
advent of the ultra-reactionary new-conservatism, those movements who
fail to take up the occasion provided today to move to a better life,
and to a different world, are without doubt going to face a more savage
penalty.
Ardeshir Mehrdad,
Mehdi Kia
July 2005
[email protected]
[email protected]
footnotes
1. An all-powerful 12-man committee appointed by the Supreme Leader
and given veto rights on elections and laws that in their view are incompatible
with Islam. In the latest election only 8 of over 2000 candidates
passed its veto and were allowed to go on the ballot paper and
even here the two reformist candidates, Mostafa Moin (Minister of Higher
Education in the outgoing government) and Mehralizadeh were only reinstated
after serious protest.
2. See Iran: Majles
election boycott. What next? iran bulletin - Middle East Forum series
II no 1 p 2
3. This is a fundamental
difference between elections in the Islamic Republic and normal parliamentary
democracies. The Iranian electors are highly politicised and have shown
their ability to use the ballot box very adroitly to play the political
field in highly undemocratic conditions pertaining to the country. See
for example Presidential elections: What if the magic fails. iran bulletin
1993 no 2 p6; Majles elections iran-bulletin nos 25-26; Iran: Majles
election boycott. What next? iran bulletin - Middle East Forum series
II no 1 p 2
4. What some western
analysts have called democracy Iranian-Islamic style
5. There is evidence
that a coup-like plan, kept carefully blacked-out until
24 hours before the second round of elections, was put into motion.
Ahmadinejad , who had been trailing in the first round of elections
until counting was well underway suddenly emerges as the challenger
to Hashemi Rafsanjani to the open protest of the other runner up, former
Speaker of Majles, Mehdi Karrubi. Ahmadinejad s campaign distributed
5 million copies of a CD, almost exclusively in the poorer districts
of the country, which showed Rafsanjani and his family living in luxury
while Ahmadinejad was portrayed living a simple life and giving away
most of his salary to the poor. Then in the second round the Basij (militia)
troops put into effect a headlights off plan in which each
of the 1.5 million strong Basij had to bring 10 persons to vote. See
Shargh news paper (Farsi) 14 July 2005. Chief of Revolutionary Guards
Corps, Zolqadr addressing in a large meeting of the Basij: in
the complex political situation when foreign powers and extremist currents
inside have for some time been determined, and planned, to change the
result of the elections in their favour and to prevent the emergence
of an efficient and principled government, we had to act in a complex
way and the principled forces, thanks be to Allah, through correct and
multi-layered planning, were able to get the support of the majority
of the people in a tight and real competition
Sharq, Teheran
July 2005 (in Farsi).
6. There were eight
candidates. Moin and to a lesser extent Mehralizadeh represented the
reformists. The pragmatist Rafsanjani was very much a compromise candidate
who came in at the last minute and was expected by all commentators
to win. Others were Karrubi who represented the Society of Militant
Clergy with some links to the reformists. The rest belonged to
various conservative factions. These were former police chief Gjalibaf,
Ali Larijani the Supreme Leaders representative on the National
Security Council and of course Ahmadinejad .
7. The Assembly
of Experts is elected by the voters every 8 years from among senior
clergy (defined as those with knowledge and wisdom). Among
their role is to elect the velayate faqih the supreme leader
to the Islamic Republic who in turn has absolute power over the entire
civil and political society.
8. See Ardeshir
Mehrdad. The road to a terminal decline: alternatives split society
at one end even as it is united in another. iran bulletin 1995, nos11-12
p6
9. The velayate
faqih appoints most influential posts. In additional to the Council
of Guardians, he appoints the heads of the arm forces, the judiciary,
and has representatives of the velayate faqih in virtually
every organ.
10. The present
vali faqih: Seyyed Ali Khamanei.
11. The dual structure
of the Islamic Republic rests of two pyramids. One the religious-political
pyramid at the apex of which sits the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
The other the executive presidency based on a parliament and presidency
elected through tightly regulated and controlled electoral procedures.
See Ardeshir Mehrdad. Will Iran political system absorb civil
society or be overcome by it. iran bulletin 1998 no 19-20 p10
12. As happened
in the last elections to the Majles and the municipal councils. See
iran bulletin-Middle East Forum Series II no 2 p
13. Key elements
in this quandary were the failure of the project to reform civil
society and the increasing poverty and failure of the economic
privation programme.
14. Known in Iran
as Kargozaran Sazandegi = agents of construction
15. Khomeini called
the occupation of the US embassy in 1981 the second revolution.
16. Kaveh Afrasiabi.
The Ayatollahs Reign, June28, 2005 www.atimes.com
17. See ibid footnote
5.
18. See Ardeshir
Mehrdad. Velayate Faqih a system on its deathbed. iran bulletin
1998 nos 17 p6
19. For example
when the clashes became paralysing Khomeini created a new organ to stand
above all other organs: the Assembly for Expediency. See Where does
the Assembly for Expediency fit. iran bulletin 1998 nos 17 p9
20. Unlike previous
occasions there was little effort to use religious orthodoxy as a powerful
weapon to get voters into the booths. Instead each candidate tried to
distance themselves as much as possible from the past and to absolve
themselves from any responsibility towards it. This was most obvious
with Ahmadinejad who, as a relatively unknown figure, made greater use
of this ruse with benefit. Moreover such influential bodies as the Society
of Teachers at the Qom Seminary, the Teheran Society of Militant Clergy,
the Assembly of Militant Clergy, the Islamic Coalition Party (Heyat-haa-ye
Motalefe), who had played such crucial roles in previous elections,
their support being critical for getting the vote, were sidelined and
few candidates were happy to be officially linked with any of them.
21. A negative vote
is not always a protest vote, or even a boycott. It can also be a vote
to prevent things worsening: a choice between bad and worse.
22. This is exactly
the opposite to what Ali Khamenei tried to imply, and some opposition
forces echoed. Presence in voting booths cannot be automatically put
to the account of the legitimacy of the regime. A negative vote to the
record of the regime is not necessarily a positive vote for its existence.
23. Right up to
the recent election many opposition forces had used the presence of
the reformists within the regime as a chance for a peaceful transition
to a post-Islamic Republic era. The same hopes had been used by, among
others, the EU.
24: See for example
Enghelabe Islami for details of Ahmadinejad s involvement in the
murder of Kurdistan Democratic Party leaders in Vienna (in Farsi). See
also for other references
25. The experience
of the Iran-Iraq war is useful here. Then it used this weapon to break
the siege of domestic opponents, while putting up an effective resistance
to foreign invasion. It now hopes to use the same weapon to reduce the
capacity of domestic opponents to manoeuvre and to prevent foreign powers,
and specifically the USA, to try a direct overthrow whether by
a velvet revolution, or a limited or unlimited invasion.
26. Can political
Islam, as a mass-populist movement, reconstruct itself in Iran after
suffering a serious defeat, especially in the framework of a system
that is the institutionalised expression of this defeat? It might be
better to answer this question in a separate article.
27. A barrack-based
party, as Mohammad-Reza Khatami put it in an interview with HOMA
TV, a Satelight channel.
28. A day after
the election of Ahmadinejad the Teheran Bourse lost 5% of its share
value. The decline has continued since and has not been reversed by
the end of July. Iranian State TV, Jaam-e jam, interview with head of
the Iranian Bourse. July 28, 2005.
29. There is no
doubt that the populist slogans of Ahmadinejad have found an echo in
some of the poorest sections of society. This has been pointed out by
the international media, and corroborated by independent sources. What
is forgotten, however, is that while most of the middle layers turned
out to vote for Rafsanjani, the majority of the 20 million who did not
vote belonged to these destitute strata. This signifies that Ahmadinejad
s influence among the layers he has specifically targeted remains
weak. This does not bode well for the central strategy of the new-conservatives.
30. In 2000 at least,
20-23% of the urban and rural households lived under the absolute poverty
line. See Nili et al, Barrasi-e tahavolaat-e faghr, tozie
daramad, va refaah-e ejtemaaei; Sazeman-e modiriyat va barnaameh-rizi-e
keshvar; 1379 (Teheran, in Farsi). The official rate of unemployment
in Iran is 16 percent (Central Bank) and unofficial estimates are about
30 %