The
Bloody Price Of Occupation
By Tariq Ali
The Guardian
15 February, 2004
The
whole world knows that Bush and Blair lied to justify the war, but do
they know the price being paid on the ground in Iraq? First, the blood
price - paid by civilians and others this week as every week. More than
50 people died on Tuesday when a car bomb ripped through Iraqis queuing
to join the police force. The US military blamed al-Qaida loyalists
and foreign militants for this and other suicide bombings. But occupations
are usually ugly. How then can resistance be pretty?
Second, the price
of internal conflict. Religion is the politics of the unarmed opposition
to the occupation. What we are witnessing on the streets of Baghdad
and Basra is a struggle for power within the Shia community. What should
be the character of the new Iraqi state? And, as the UN continues to
dither over the timing of elections, when will this come about?
Third, and related
to this most pressing question of elections, is the price of confusion.
An intricate web of pacts and pay-offs is being constructed between
the American occupiers and their assorted interest groups, but how long
this will last is an open question.
As the events of
this last week have shown, the key issue now is the one of direct elections.
Kofi Annan is ready to go into action. The United Nations security council
has recognised the puppet government in Iraq. Two weeks ago a gathering
in Munich brought France and Germany back on board. The occupation of
an Arab country is now backed by most of the northern hemisphere. All
that is needed is an official UN umbrella to pretend that it isn't an
imperial occupation and try to effect a compromise with the Shia religious
leaders.
Their position is
awkward because the armed resistance has forced them to organise mass
mobilisations and put forward their own alternative to the occupation.
They have demanded immediate elections to a constituent assembly whose
members will frame a new constitution. So what might be the result of
such elections?
In the past secular
politics cut across sectarian and ethnic divisions. The Baath party
itself was founded in Basra and its pre-Saddam leadership consisted
of many people of Shia origin. It was the combination of Saddam's repression,
the post-1989 turn to religion in north and south and US opportunism
(in the shape of money and weapons to the anti-Saddam religious groups)
after the first Gulf war that led to the total dominance of the religious
leaders in the south.
The two principal
leaders of the unarmed opposition, Ali al-Sistani and Moqtada al-Sadr,
are vying for popular support. Al-Sadr is hostile both to the occupation
and plans to federate Iraq, which he sees as the first step towards
Balkanisation and western control of Iraqi oil.
Sistani, who represents
the interests of Teheran and is friendly with the Foreign Office in
London, has been collaborative but, fearing that he might lose support
to his rival, he has demanded an immediate general election. It is he
who wants to talk to Kofi Annan so that he is not seen as talking to
the despised occupiers.
I f Annan tells
him that elections should be delayed, he might be more willing to fall
into line. But if elections are held and result in a Shia majority,
might not Iraq go the way of Iran in the late-70s? In terms of religious
laws it undoubtedly will. Both Sistani and al-Sadr have demanded the
imposition of the sharia.
But it's not just
about politics and religion. Power leads to money and clientelism. There
are members of families and tribes linked to the main clerical groups
in the south and they are impatient. A great deal will depend on two
key issues: who controls Iraq's oil and how long US/UN troops should
remain in the country. As a result of the invasion and occupation of
Iraq, the clerical regime in Iran has become a key player. Once part
of the "axis of evil", its close ties with Sistani necessitate
a Washington-Teheran rapprochement.
And how better to
facilitate this than by dredging up the bogey of the Wahhabite al-Qaida?
The US may have sought to blame it for this week's car bomb attacks.
But this ignores the fact that "if you collaborate, then be prepared
to pay the price" has been the message of virtually every national
struggle over the last century.
In Vichy France
and occupied Yugoslavia and later in Vietnam, Algeria, Guinea and Angola,
collaborators were regularly targeted. Then, as in Iraq today, the resistance
was denounced by politicians and the tame press as "terrorists".
When the occupying armies withdrew and the violence ceased, many of
the "terrorists" became "statesmen".
Some of us who were
opposed to the war argued that while US military occupation of Iraq
would be easy they would face a resistance on different levels. And,
as becomes plainer every day, the achilles tendon of the occupation
is its incapacity to control a hostile population. Hence the need for
collaborators. Destroying states by overwhelming military power is one
thing. State building is a more complex operation and requires, at the
very least, a friendly if not a docile population.
Can US primacy be
maintained indefinitely in the face of overwhelming hostility? Obviously
not, but neither can the US, regardless of which party is in power,
afford a setback in Iraq. That would be a major blow against the "empire"
and weaken its ability to control other parts of the world. Add to this
a small irony: under Saddam, al-Qaida was not present in Iraq. If a
few of its members are there now it is because of the Anglo-American
occupation.
The occupation authorities
are trapped. The occupation is costing $3.9bn a month. Politically,
if they permit a democratic election they could get a government whose
legitimacy is unchallengeable and which wants them out of the country.
If they go for a rigged, Florida-style vote, it would be impossible
to contain Shia anger and an armed resistance would commence in the
south, raising the spectre of a civil war.
Militarily, the
capture of Saddam has not affected the US casualty rate, and the number
of nervous breakdowns and suicides in the US army occupying Iraq has
reached unprecedented levels. Sooner than anyone could have predicted
the occupation has become untenable. Regime changes in Washington and
London would be small punishment compared to what is being inflicted
on Iraq.
· Tariq Ali's
latest book, Bush in Babylon: The Recolonisation of Iraq, is published
by Verso
[email protected]