Exporting
The Islamic
RevolutionTo Iraq
By Michael Jansen
The
Jordan Times
05 December, 2003
George W. Bush may be on the way to transforming
Iraq into an Islamic state modelled on the Iranian system of valayet-e-faqih,
rule of the jurisprudence. This became clear on Nov. 29 when Iraqi Shiite
Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani issued a fatwa, or religious
ruling, which opposes the step-by-step plan for the hand over to Iraqi
governance, put forward by the US occupation administrator L. Paul Bremer
III on Nov. 15. This plan envisages the adoption of a basic law
and the convening of local caucuses to choose representatives to a national
assembly which would select a provisional government. This would rule
until a new constitution can be drafted and elections for a democratic
government held.
In a two-part fatwa,
the septuagenarian Sistani said that the basic law should be presented
to the [elected] representatives of the Iraqi people for their approval
and called for elections to the proposed assembly with voters presenting
ration cards for identification. Sistani had previously said the basic
law should reflect Iraq's Islamic identity and stipulated that legislation
should not contradict Islam. Since he is the only figure in a position
to make such determinations, the fatwa amounted to a declaration of
intent to not only remain involved but also to expand his role in the
political process.
In July, Sistani
issued his first postwar fatwa, demanding that members of a constitutional
commission be elected. Bremer ignored the fatwa for several months,
but eventually had to scrap his original strategy which involved the
appointment of a commission to draft a constitution, the holding of
a referendum on the text, elections and the transfer of sovereignty
to an Iraqi government.
Iran-born Sistani
has emerged as the most powerful political figure in the country because
he commands the loyalty and respect of the majority of the Shiites,
60 per cent of the populace. Although he has refused to endorse the
war and occupation and to meet US officials, he has called upon Shiites
to give the US time to deliver democracy and reconstruct the country.
If the ayatollah called for popular Shiite resistance, the US and its
allies would find their occupation untenable.
Sistani, a devout
and learned man belonging to the quietist school of Shiite
thought which holds that clerics should not engage in politics, has
been thrust into a key role by the uncertain postwar situation. He must
also prevent Shiites from turning to his rival, Muqtada Sadr, a rabble-rousing
preacher who calls for the prompt end to the occupation and withdrawal
of US forces, a policy which could precipitate all-out war between occupiers
and occupied. Sadr's followers are accused of murdering a pro-Western
cleric and attempting to kill a grand ayatollah. They have also fought
pro-Sistani elements in the streets of the holy city of Najaf for control
of mosques and funds.
Sistani opposes,
in principle, the installation in Iraq of the valayet-e-faqih.
On this issue he differs from Sadr, Abdel Aziz Hakim, head of the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and several other Shiite
leaders. Under this system, a clerical superstructure, holding the levers
of power and vetting all decisions and laws, has been imposed on Iran's
elected president and parliament. This system has not been a success
in Iran. It has given the conservative clerics ultimate authority and
put them at odds with the Iranian people and their elected representatives
who have, over the past six years, tried and failed to liberalise the
social system and adopt the rule of law and democratic institutions.
As a result, Iran has suffered from a struggle for power between conservatives
and reformists, which has prevented the country from moving forward
on the social, political and economic fronts and has given rise to popular
frustration with the entire clerical caste and the polity created by
Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979.
Nevertheless, in
practice, Sistani had to accept the assumption of power by an informal
valayet-e-faqih as the only way to proceed in the current
political vacuum. Therefore, Sistani has, unofficially, taken over the
role of Supreme Guide which is formally held in Iran by Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei. If this trend continues, the Iraqi Shiite Hawza, the theological
institution based in Najaf, could come to exercise the responsibilities
performed in Iran by the Council of Guardians and the Expediency Council.
Sistani's latest
fatwa forced Bremer to see what is happening. By indirectly consulting
the ayatollah on policy, Bremer had given him both a veto and the right
of approval. Having recognised where Iraq is headed, Bremer has attempted
to back away from his previous practice of listening to what Sistani
has to say on key policy issues. But having lent an ear in the first
place, Bremer is finding it difficult to ignore the grand ayatollah.
Some members of Iraq's appointed Governing Council, which had followed
Bremer's lead, also recognised the danger that Sistani could marginalise
the council and deprive it of the limited powers it possesses.
Although Shiite
members belonging to parties with a religious background are inclined
to accept Sistani's authority, the majority is not. However, division
on this issue could weaken the council, strengthening Sistani.
Fifteen years after
the end of the eight-year war which halted Iran's attempt to export
its Islamic revolution to Iraq by subverting that country's Shiite majority,
Bush could very well be in the process of installing in Iraq the very
Iran-style valayet-e-faqih Khomeini had in mind. If Sistani
becomes the key power-broker in Iraq, this means the million soldiers
and civilians who lost their lives on both sides in the Iraq-Iran conflict
may have died in vain and the tens of billions of dollars spent by Iraq,
Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to halt the export of the Iranian revolution
were wasted.
It also means that
Washington, sooner rather than later, had better reconcile and seek
rapprochement with Tehran, the regional Shiite power. Bush had also
better stop characterising Iran as part of his axis of evil.
Even if Bremer and the Iraqi Governing Council manage to contain Sistani
and prevent the planting of a valayet-e-faqih, the grand
ayatollah and the Hawza will remain key players on the Iraqi political
scene. Therefore, it would be wise if Bush and the anti-Tehran neoconservatives
in his administration dropped the feud with Tehran which began when
Ayatollah Khomeini overthrew the Shah in 1979.