The
Jericho Prison Raid
By Ramzy Baroud
22 March, 2006
Countercurrents.org
Could
it be possible that the Israeli army raid on a Jericho prison on March
14 was done without careful coordination between Israel, the United
States and Britain? Could it also be possible that the timing of the
onslaught was equally innocent, of no political consequence, and not
linked in any way to the Palestinians' ability to withstand Israeli
blackmail, US threats and European intimidation following the Hamas
election victory in January 2006?
Arab League Secretary General
Amr Musa - a man known for being particularly cautious with his choice
of words - told Al Jazeera on the day of the attack: "Clearly,
there (was) some sort of coordination". Many others concur. But
before examining the Israeli raid itself, one should quickly scrutinize
its surrounding political milieu, for without such comprehension, the
Israeli attack which resulted in the death of a prison guard, a prisoner
and the abduction of several leading political prisoners would seem
just like any other day of violence in the fractious occupied territories.
The Palestinian parliamentary
elections last January, which introduced Hamas as a power player, have
yielded a most unfavorable formula from the point of view of the US
and Britain. Both governments have invested in a carefully designed
and self-serving democracy program that would cement and justify their
costly meddling in the region and, of course, their lost war in Iraq.
Whether they wish to admit it or not, the advent of Hamas, which has
provided a moral boost to Islamic political movements everywhere, has
most likely signaled the end of the US-led quasi-democracy project.
Israel, on the other hand,
has arguably benefited from the Hamas victory since, surly, no one would
expect Israel to negotiate with a political force that calls for the
Jewish state's demise; now Israel can further twist its masterful rhetoric
of having a moral right and obligation to secure itself from theoretical
annihilation at the hands of Hamas through more unilateral action, or
so the incongruous logic goes.
Indeed, acting Israeli Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert could hardly conceal his enthusiasm and has embarked
on all kinds of unilateral plans, by walling off Palestinians completely
and, further, by drawing his country's own version of permanent borders
- of course at the expense of Palestinian land and amid near complete
American and European silence.
Europe, even after it agreed
to pass some funds on to the Palestinian Authority, is yet to grow weary
of warning Palestinians of dire consequences if certain conditions are
not met (conditions that are of course applicable to Palestinians only).
The United States government
unabashedly demanded some meager funds it delivered to the Palestinian
Authority prior to the vote back. Palestinians complied. The Congress,
on the other hand, has forged and is quickly processing various laws
to further punish and alienate Palestinians for making their democratic
choice.
Even Israel's initial sense
of vindication has turned sour, as Hamas - despite its lack of experience
in international politics - has managed to win the trust of various
governments outside of the Western hemisphere, and is proving equally
savvy in making its conditions for a final settlement with Israel appear
plausible.
In other words, despite the
intense blackmail and arm-twisting to cripple one of a few truly democratic
Middle East experiences, Palestinians have successfully managed to impress
their political will as an irrevocable part of the region's political
reality; a very disturbing realization indeed in the eyes of the US
and Israel who have diligently worked for decades to undermine the Palestinian
people's aspirations.
But even more dangerous is
the fact that Palestinians were quietly reworking their political and
ideological divergence in intense meetings in Gaza, with the hope that
a national unity government would replace the less favored option of
a Hamas-only government.
Of course it's not the workings
of Palestinian politics that Israel and the US administration (and less
significantly Britain) found troubling. What's troublesome is the fact
that a national unity government that includes the defeated pro-US Fatah
movement would deny the Bush administration and Israel the chance to
scrutinize, undermine and eventually topple a lone Hamas government.
Thus, the US response to
the unity talks in Gaza between Hamas and Fatah representatives was
uncompromisingly clear. "Diplomatic sources said strict US restrictions
on contacts and assistance to Hamas would apply to Fatah and other parties
if they joined a government under the militant group," Reuters
reported on March 13, a day before the Israeli raid on the Jericho prison.
One should try to approach the analysis of the Israeli raid on the West
Bank prison' against this backdrop.
The prison has been under
the watchful eye of American and European monitors for over four years.
Their mission was to satisfy Israel's demand to keep Ahmed Saadat, the
leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP),
locked in, without trial, due process or conviction. Saadat is arbitrarily
connected by Israel to the killing of an Israeli minister, Rehavam Zeevi,
five years ago. His imprisonment by the Palestinian Authority, under
foreign monitoring, was for long a source of embarrassment for the PA
and its formerly leading Fatah party.
Abruptly, on March 14, Americans
and British monitors reportedly abandoned their posts, a move that was
followed minutes later by a well-calculated and well-executed Israeli
attack that resulted in a bloody episode and the abduction of Saadat
and a few other political prisoners. A military penetration of such
a magnitude would've surely consumed days, if not weeks in the making.
For the US administration and the British government to claim that they
didn't coordinate their decision to withdraw their monitors with Israel
is utter nonsense.
What followed was most predictable:
violence, chaos, threats of vengeance and the kidnapping of a few foreigners,
a most suitable conclusion to an event that was meant to spur just that:
to shatter the relative peace, to harden Hamas' mission in forming a
government, to provoke Palestinians into breaking their one-sided ceasefire,
thus their rank. But ultimately, with its brutal show of force, Israel
meant to remind the Palestinian leadership, democratically elected or
not, that those with the bigger guns will always have the final say.
-Ramzy Baroud
is the author of "The Second Palestinian Intifada: A Chronicle
of a People's Struggle" (Pluto Press, London) and also editor-in-chief
of PalestineChronicle.com.
He can be contacted at: [email protected]