The
European Union Dilemma: Israel, Palestine And The Geneva Initiative
By Am Johal
13 March, 2006
Countercurrents.org
From November 2004 until March
2006, Israelis and Palestinans will have seen the following happen in
only seventeen months: the death of Yasser Arafat, the election of Mahmoud
Abbas as President of the Palestinian Authority, the first withdrawal
from Gaza and four West Bank settlements since 1967, a centrist breakaway
from the ruling Likud Party in Israel and a new leader of Kadima and
the Labor Party, a debilitating stroke which has incapacitated former
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, the election of Hamas in Palestinian
legislative elections and the upcoming Israeli elections in March.
Only in Israel is it a normal
week when the Acting Prime Minister openly threatens to kill the Prime
Minister of the Palestinian Authority if there are acts of violence.
The EU and the US were once again hopelessly silent not wanting to interfere
in what is now deemed to be the normal political culture of Israel.
The normalcy of this type of rhetoric in the public sphere only legitimizes
a deformed political environment which has led to continued dysfunction
in dealing with the conflict. The Israeli mainstream is living in a
bubble – it is like an ostrich that buries its head in the sand.
After all, under this narrative acting tough is strong leadership, promoting
peace is a sign of weakness.
Ehud Olmert has also openly
called for a unilateral drawing of the boundaries in the West Bank.
Israel has also continued its assassination policy which has included
the recent killing of innocent civilians in the Gaza Strip.
The Israeli left is also
energized with the election of Amir Peretz to lead the Labor Party.
Though Labor may not win the upcoming election, they may be in a position
to set the agenda in the coming years. They have shown much more willingness
to work with Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Authority to work on
a negotiated solution to the conflict.
Olmert has now announced
that he intends to set new borders for Israel by 2010. The new lines,
he said, would include large settlement blocs - Ariel, Ma'aleh Adumim
and Gush Etzion - and the Old City and adjacent neighborhoods in East
Jerusalem. According to Haaretz, the border would be marked by the separation
fence, which would be moved at certain points, and Israel would maintain
security control over the Jordan Valley. The settlements outside the
fence would be evacuated. The settlement blocs would be strengthened,
and Israel would build up the disputed E-1 zone between East Jerusalem
and the settlement of Ma'aleh Adumim.
The Palestinian Authority
under Mahmoud Abbas or Hamas would have no political credibility if
they supported such a one-sided plan. A leading Hamas figure recently
said that this action is akin to an open declaration of war. The European
Union responded by once again threatening to cut off aid to the Palestinian
Authority. The EU is quickly losing credibility as an honest broker
in the region. In the mid-term, the Geneva Initiative may provide the
most realistic option for an interim final status agreement in the region
for a two-state solution in Israel and Palestine. In any event, the
conditions for a third intifada erupting are still preventable but the
momentum is going the other way.
In the contemporary context,
the European Union’s engagement in the region is an important
foundation from which to approach emerging challenges in the region.
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnerships signed as part of the Barcelona
Process in 1995, were designed from the outset to be long-term in their
structure and scope. The Association Agreements which were eventually
signed were distinguished from earlier partnerships in that the focus
was more on economic and trade agreements than on development assistance.
There was, however, important language built in to the agreements related
to social and human rights issues.
The main objectives of the
Euro-Mediterranean partnership as set out were:
1) the creation of a zone of peace and stability on the principles of
human rights and democracy;
2) the construction of a zone of shared prosperity by the gradual setting
up of an area of free trade between the European Union and its Mediterranean
partners and between these same partners, accompanied by large financial
support from the Community to facilitate economic transition and help
partners deal with the socio-economic challenges caused by this transition;
3) the improvement of mutual understanding between the peoples of the
region and the promotion of free and flourishing civil society, thanks
to the organization of cultural exchanges, the development of human
resources and support for civil societies and social development. 1
By attempting to create a
permanent dialogue between the nation-states in the Mediterranean, there
have been numerous processes, roundtables, civil society forums and
funding opportunities for civil society development. By moving beyond
decision makers and technocrats, the European Union and its Mediterranean
partners have also sought to institutionalize multi-level engagement
which has brought together other artistic, social and cultural opportunities
for involvement. The institutionalization of dialogue through multiple
channels and the development of civil society networks has been one
of the legacies of the European Union in its engagement in the Mediterranean
region. Malta and Cyprus have also joined the European Union. 2
In the journal Confluence,
Agnes Chevalier wrote:
The Euro-Mediterranean
Agreements are substantially different from previous development assistance
agreements. They are based on the principle of adherence to disciplinary
rules and a series of values. In the traditional fields of economic
aid, particularly commercial preferences, and financial assistance,
the approach has been radically changed. Commercial preferences will
from now on be reciprocol for there will be a two-way exchange of trade
in industrial products, while European grants will be linked to conditionalities.
It is an important change. With commercial reciprocity, the Euro-Mediterranean
relationship will no longer be one of assistance, it will become the
partnership that has been invoked for so many years (to the point that
the EU could seem, in the short term, as the main beneficiary of regional
free trade). The prospect is much more demanding for the Mediterranean
economies which must open up to competition […] It is now known
that it is only by opening up internationally that the developing economies
can hope to improve their standard of living… 3
Many critics have argued
that the many new structures created for the European Union to engage
with the Mashreq and Maghreb countries such as the Euromed Civil Forum
serve to legitimize the political economy underlying these very agreements.
Just as setting up many of these forums was designed for the purposes
of moving beyond direct foreign diplomacy and the meta-narratives of
international relations, but to create direct linkages between important
areas of society where decentralized cooperation can occur between “those
responsible for political and civil affairs, the cultural and religious
world, universities, researchers, media, associations, trade unions
and private and public enterprises […] To do this, action that
supports democratic institutions and the reinforcement of the rule of
law and civil society will be supported.” 4
Liberalization of economies
and developing democratic institutions in the Arab world remains a policy
imperative of the European Union and the United States. The US in particular
would like to frame agreements in a similar way to the Helsinki Accords
which were signed in the 1970’s with the Soviet Union and the
Eastern bloc as a structure to promote liberalization.
The Euro-Mediterranean Agreement
was signed in 1995 and entered into force on June 1, 2000. The Euro-Mediterranean
Committee on the Barcelona Process serves as the central planning group
for the various committees and subcommittees. According to an internal
evaluation by the European Commission:
Barcelona is the only
context for ministerial meetings in which Israel, Syria and Lebanon
participate. This is not without its importance during the last three
years when the Middle East peace process has been blocked. Since the
Barcelona Conference (1995), the foreign affairs ministers of the twenty-seven
partner countries have met periodically, in Malta (1997), Palermo (1998
– informal meeting), Stuttgart (1999) and Lisbon (2000 –
informal meeting). In addition, twelve ministerial sectoral meetings
have been organized during this period. 5
Yet another network in this
framework is a group of senior officials from these various nation-states
which are responsible for policy, security coordination, human rights
and peace building. EuroMesCo organizes training seminars in five fields
including: political dialogue and security among the partnership, interdepencies,
foreign policy and mutual security (the PESC programme), sub-regional
cooperation and governance issues. Euromed has also allocated funds
to the maintenance of social cohesion in partner countries where privatization
and other aspects of economic reform are occurring. The failure of the
Camp David Accords, the initiation of the Second Intifada and the events
of September 11th served to heighten the importance of this process
in the long term beyond the official diplomatic channels. 6
Although Europe has a greater
interest in Central and Eastern Europe economically, the Mediterranean
countries play a significant role in regards to European Union immigration
issues and in relation to the strategic significance of the Israeli/Palestinian
conflict and the broader Israel/Arab regional conflict.
European Union
In 1999, Israel received
close to 50% of foreign direct investment from the then 15 member states
of the European Union directed at Mediterranean countries followed by
Turkey. Between 1993 and 1999, the foreign capital formation of the
Mediterranean countries by the member states of the European Union fell
from 7% to 4% despite the signing of Association Agreements with the
European Union. 7
Currently the relationship
has become more developed and economic integration is continuing to
increase:
In 2004 the total volume
of bilateral trade (excluding diamonds) came to over €15 billion.
Thirty three per cent of Israel’s exports went to the EU and almost
40% of its imports came from the EU. In 2004, Israel’s exports
to the EU, excluding diamonds, were composed of electrical machinery
and equipment (39%), chemical products (17%), plastics and rubber (9%)
and optical measuring and medical instruments (8%). Its major imports
from the EU were electrical machinery and equipment (35%), chemicals
(13%) and base metals (6%).
Total EU (25 Member States) trade with Israel rose from €19.4 billion
in 2003 to 21.36 in 2004. EU exports to Israel reached €12.75 billion
in 2004, while imports from Israel were €8.6 billion. The trade
deficit with Israel was €4.15 billion in the EU’s favour
in 2004. 8
In the European Union, there were nearly 18 million ‘non-nationals’
before the expansion of ten new countries representing 5% of the population.
67% of these were in Germany, France and Great Britain. With lowering
birth rates and aging populations in the European Union, the need for
labor in low skill jobs in an economically expanding Europe coupled
with high unemployment rates in these Mediterranean countries. 9
Even though there is on the
surface a need for migration from these Mediterranean countries, there
has been an expansion of the theme of ‘Fortress Europe.’
According to one writer:
The European security
services are undergoing a huge expansion, with the reinforcement of
the powers of customs and police officers, the creation of a European
judicial area, harmonization of the Schengen procedures, the weakening
of controls over expulsion, increasing difficulties in obtaining visas,
etc. 10
Europe is faced with the
dilemma of requiring immigrant labour, but not wanting an immigrant
society. The debate regarding Turkey’s accession to the European
Union is a salient one related both to Islamic and economic factors.
Added to this are increasing tensions with its own Muslim communities
since September 2001 amongst member states of the European Union. The
recent bombings in Spain, London and the controversy over the Danish
cartoon strip depicting Mohammed as a terrorist are recent examples.
Despite numerous opportunities for engagement, many view this issue
of labour as a strategic issue to be viewed from social, economic, cultural
and security perspectives. 11
The European Union is a secondary
player to the United States in the region. The European Union is also
one of the four partners that form the Quartet as the negotiating parties
to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict which includes Russia, the United
States and the United Nations. The European Union has actively attempted
to facilitate relationships between the Arab states of the Mediterranean
and Israel on trade related matters. They have also created forums to
establish economic, diplomatic, academic and non-governmental organizational
contacts. 12
The push for liberalization
of the developing Mediterranean nations has the willing support of the
European Union and international institutions as a sign of progress
that these modernization initiatives will bring about democracy. Some
critics of this process have claimed:
With this model, the
authoritarianism of governments is tolerated, on the sole condition
that they comply with the injunction to open their markets. Thus we
have a totally original situation, political authoritarianism coupled
with an economic liberalism that enjoys the support of the ‘democratic’
Western states. 13
.
NGO’s and civil society
have increased substantially since the beginning of the Barcelona Process
actively supported by the European Union and various member states.
In the official words of
the European Union:
The objective of the
European Neighbourhood Policy is to share with neighbouring countries
the benefits of the EU’s enlargement to 25 Member States in 2004
through strengthening stability, security and well-being for all concerned.
It is designed to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between
the enlarged EU and its neighbours and to offer them greater political,
security, economic and cultural co-operation. 14
In December of 2004, the
Presidency of the European Union in a report related to the EU-Israel
workplan as part of the Association Agreement wrote:
The European Council
considers that Israel, on account of its high level of economic development,
should enjoy special status in its relations with the EU on the basis
of reciprocity and common interest. 15
The European Union’s
support of the Middle East Peace Process has been buttressed by their
relationship with Israel through the Association Agreement and related
documents which have been ratified. This work is centered around:
1) Political dialogue and
cooperation
2) Industry, trade, services and internal market
3) Justice and legal matters including migration and organized crime
4) Research and innovation in education, science, technology and culture
5) Transport and Energy cooperation between Israel and Palestine
6) Customs and taxation 16
The European Union’s
role in the peace process has developed since the signing of the Oslo
Accords in 1993. Since the convening of the Barcelona Process in 1995,
the failure of the Camp David Accords in 2000 and the outbreak of the
Second Intifada, the European Union joined with the United States, Russia
and the United Nations to form the Quartet as part of the Roadmap to
Peace. The European Commission Delegation to Israel is responsible for
official relations between Israel and the European Commission. 17
Article 2 of the Association
Agreement includes clauses on human rights. The European Union has yet
to build in effective enforcement mechanisms related to these commitments.
Since April 2005, the EU
and Israel have:
discussed the Middle
East Peace Process, anti-Semitism, human rights and minority issues
in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories, Israeli accession
to international organizations, counter-terrorism, the Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership, trade and services liberalisation, facilitation of Palestinian
trade, regional cumulation of rules of origin, and a number of specific
trade points. 18
EU – Occupied
Palestinian Territories
The European Union included
the Palestinian Territories as part of the European Neighbourhood Process
in 2004 and originally signed an interim Association Agreement in 1996.
In 2004, the European Union wrote a Country Report on the Palestinian
Territories and in 2005 adopted a European Neighbourhood Policy Action
Plan. On October 5, 2005, the European Union adopted a Communication
entitled EU-Palestinian cooperation beyond disengagement – towards
a two state solution. Its primary focus is on:
Achieving political viability
requires reinforcing legitimacy and accountability of administrative
structures, strengthening rule of law, human rights and fundamental
freedoms as well as improving security, engaging civil society, and
making public administration more efficient. Protecting the status of
the Arab population of Jerusalem, and addressing the refugee issue beyond
immediate humanitarian needs will also be important.
Economic viability will
be achieved through: developing bilateral and trade relations, building
up a customs administration, reconstructing and rehabilitating West
Bank and Gaza Strip, creating the enabling environment for private sector
investment, improving the management of public finances, developing
a knowledge based economy, and addressing the social dimension. 19
The European Union has tied development assistance funds to conditions
which require institutional reform including improved accountability
mechanisms and enhanced transparency of systems. With the recent election
of Hamas in legislative elections, this area of conditions will be under
heavy scrutiny from both sides. As well, the European Union has heavily
contributed to democratic transition in the Palestinian Territories
including sending observer missions to the Palestinian Presidential
elections in 2004 and the legislative elections in 2006. The European
Commission Technical Assistance Office to the West Bank and Gaza Strip
performs a similar function in the Palestinian Territories. 20
The European Parliament is
involved in determining and monitoring “the foreign policy position
with regard to the allocation of major technical and financial support
programmes for third countries.” The European Commission has regularly
developed statements and positions on policy in support of both the
Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority acting to fulfill their
international obligations. 21
The Second Intifada
After the First Intifada
which lasted from 1987 to 1993, Israel and PLO signed on to the Oslo
Accords in the spirit of peace built around the idea of mutual recognition
and support for a negotiated two-state solution. This process was prematurely
derailed by the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin
in 1995 by a right wing Jewish extremist.
After the collapse of the
Camp David Accords in 2000 under the leadership of US President Bill
Clinton, the conditions for peace were once again altered. The Israeli
side presented the collapse as “Barak’s Generous Offer”
while the Palestinian side portrayed it as “Barak’s Big
Lie.” Yasser Arafat left the negotiating table in July of 2000
and began planning for a Second Intifada. 22
US Ambassador and negotiator
Dennis Ross later wrote:
There is little prospect
of mediating any conflict if one does not understand the historical
narratives of each side. I say this not because it is important to perpetuate
the historical debate or because one side can convince the other that
it is wrong, but rather because both sides in any conflict must see
that a third party understands why it feels the way it does, why it
values what it values, why its symbols say so much about its identity.
Peacemaking in the last
decade emerged from a historical context of deep-seated grievances and
desire for justice on both sides. Arabs and Israelis each have a narrative
that tells their story and interprets their reality, and these narratives
were lurking in every discussion. To understand these narratives, one
needs to know what shaped them; how they evolved; and how particular
historical developments affected attitudes and beliefs. Only then can
one appreciate what we had to contend with in trying to promote peacemaking.
23
On September 28, 2000, Israeli
opposition leader Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount with 1,500 security
personnel which was widely interpreted as provocative. The Palestinians
responded by throwing stones and the ensuing military crackdown left
dozens killed in the weeks and months that followed. In the five years
that followed, over 4,000 people died in Israel and the Palestinian
Territories combined in the period known as the Second Intifada. 24
In December of 2000, in a
last ditch effort US President Bill Clinton met with Israeli and Palestinian
envoys and made what was reported to be a final offer of 97% of the
West Bank, with a capital in East Jerusalem, a return of refugees to
Palestinian Territories but not Israel and a $30 billion compensation
fund for refugees. Many have disputed the details of this offer and
about the seriousness of the actual proposal. The current Geneva Initiative,
an extraparliamentary process with civil society involvement, bears
some similarities to this final status agreement and is widely circulated
as the consensus amongst moderate Israelis and Palestinians who support
the two-state solution. The proponents of the Geneva Initiative claim
they have majority support of Israelis and Palestinians for the agreement.
It was completed in December 2003 and fits within the framework of historical
agreements which have been signed between Israel and the Palestinian
Authority during various stages of the peace process including the Oslo
Accords and the Roadmap to Peace. The language within the Geneva Accords
includes the following:
Confirming that this
Agreement is concluded within the framework of the Middle East peace
process initiated in Madrid in October 1991, the Declaration of Principles
of September 13, 1993, the subsequent agreements including the Interim
Agreement of September 1995, the Wye River Memorandum of October 1998
and the Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum of September 4, 1999, and the permanent
status negotiations including the Camp David Summit of July 2000, the
Clinton Ideas of December 2000, and the Taba Negotiations of January
2001;
Reiterating their commitment to United Nations Security Council Resolutions
242, 338 and 1397 and confirming their understanding that this Agreement
is based on, will lead to, and –by its fulfillment-- will constitute
the full implementation of these resolutions and to the settlement of
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in all its aspects;
Declaring that this Agreement constitutes the realization of the permanent
status peace component envisaged in President Bush's speech of June
24, 2002 and in the Quartet Roadmap process.
Declaring that this Agreement marks the historic reconciliation between
the Palestinians and Israelis, and paves the way to reconciliation between
the Arab World and Israel and the establishment of normal, peaceful
relations between the Arab states and Israel in accordance with the
relevant clauses of the Beirut Arab League Resolution of March 28, 2002;
and
Resolved to pursue the goal of attaining a comprehensive regional peace,
thus contributing to stability, security, development and prosperity
throughout the region; 25
In 2001, Ariel Sharon and his Likud Party won the election against Ehud
Barak and the Labor Party when the Israeli public wanted a tougher stand
against the Palestinians and as a result of the Arab/Israeli minority
actively boycotting the election. Sharon refused to negotiate with Arafat
and unilaterally moved to consolidate areas around Jerusalem and continued
to expand settlements in the West Bank. It was largely under his leadership
that the Separation Wall was constructed. In the summer of 2005, Sharon
unilaterally led the Gaza withdrawal; the first disengagement since
Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza in 1967.
The major issues which continued
to have a daily effect on Israeli and Palestinians included home demolitions,
settlement expansion, construction of the Separation Wall, movement
restrictions, administrative detention, suicide bombings, rocket attacks,
targeted assassinations, inequality before the law, unfair share of
state resources and military incursions. 26
Hamas
Hamas was formed in 1987
as a branch of the Islamic Brotherhood in the Palestinian Territories.
Its political base was set up in the Gaza Strip where they also utilized
foreign donations to set up charitable ventures including the provision
of social services, education and religious activities. It remained
a resistance movement that had the destruction of Israel as part of
its charter. It had heavy involvement with the First Intifada in the
years 1987 to 1993. With the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, the
ruling Fatah Party led by Yasser Arafat supported a two-state solution
contrasting sharply with the more militant Hamas. As Fatah faced corruption
allegations and an inability to end the occupation, Hamas gained popularity
in the West Bank as well. After formally being involved in violent attacks,
Hamas is still listed as a terrorist organization by the United States,
the European Union and Canada. Co-founders Sheik Ahmed Yassin and Abd
al Aziz Rantisi were killed in targeted strikes by Israel in 2004.
Hamas receives funding from
Iran, other Arab and Muslim states including Saudi Arabia and from Palestinian
expatriates who view the organization as a resistance movement. It carries
out some propaganda activity in Western Europe and North America. 27
Hamas, as well as other militant
organizations such as Islamic Jihad and the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
have been involved in over 150 suicide bombings since 1993.
Since the beginning of the
Second Intifada, over 3,000 Palestinians have been killed largely by
Israeli military responses in Gaza and the West Bank. Just under 1,000
Israelis have been killed. Numerous sieges in places like Jenin, Nablus,
Hebron, Rafah and the Gaza Strip have killed hundreds. As well, dozens
of Arab Israelis have also been killed by Israeli security forces. According
to the BBC:
The five years of the Palestinian
intifada have cost more than 4,000 lives. Btselem, an Israeli human
rights group, has been tracking casualty figures on both sides. Most
of the statistics cover the period from 29 September 2000 to 15 September
2005.
PALESTINIANS KILLED BY ISRAELIS*
3,218 killed by Israeli security forces in the West Bank and Gaza including
657 aged under 18
187 killed in extrajudicial executions and 296 (including at least 29
aged under 18) killed in the course of assassination operations. 56
killed by security forces in Israel including one aged under 18
41 killed by Israeli citizens in the West Bank and Gaza including at
least three aged under 18
* There are no figures to show the proportion of Palestinians who were
combatants and those who were civilians.
ISRAELIS KILLED BY PALESTINIANS
444 civilians killed in Israel including 80 aged under 18
223 civilians killed in the West Bank and Gaza Strip including 37 aged
under 18
221 Israeli security forces killed in West Bank and Gaza
84 Israeli security forces killed in Israel
PALESTINIANS KILLED BY PALESTINIANS
112 killed by Palestinian civilians on suspicion of collaborating
50 killed by Palestinians in other circumstances
FOREIGN CITIZENS
32 foreign citizens (including at least two aged under 18) were killed
by Palestinians in Israel
10 foreign citizens were killed by Israeli security forces in the West
Bank and Gaza
15 foreign citizens were killed by Palestinians in the West Bank and
Gaza Killings by foreign citizens
3 Israeli civilians were killed by foreign citizens (for September 2000
to September 2004)
PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL (for September 2000 to September 2004)
13 Palestinian citizens of Israel were killed in Israel by the Israeli
police and border police.
4 Palestinian citizens of Israel were killed by Israeli security forces
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
Killings by Palestinian citizens of Israel (for September 2000 to September
2004)
3 Israeli citizens were killed in Israel by Palestinian citizens of
Israel
1 member of the Israeli security forces was killed in Israel by a Palestinian
citizen of Israel
* The above figures do not include:
Palestinians who died after medical treatment was delayed due to restrictions
of movement
Palestinians killed by an explosive device that they set or was on their
person
12 Palestinian citizens of Israel killed within Israel by the Israeli
police in October 2000
One Jewish Israeli citizen killed within Israel by a Palestinian Israeli
citizen in October 2000
Two Jewish Israeli citizens and one member of the Israeli security forces,
killed by a Palestinian citizen of Israel in Nahariya in September 2001
Four Palestinian citizens of Israel killed by Israeli Defence Forces
(IDF) gunfire in the West Bank and Gaza
One Palestinian citizen of Israel killed by Border Police gunfire within
Israel in July 2003
Five Palestinian citizens of Israel killed by an absconded IDF soldier
on a bus in Shfaram, within Israel, in August 2005 and the shooting
soldier, beaten to death by Palestinian citizens of Israel
ECONOMIC COSTS
The World Bank reported in 2004 that after almost four years of conflict
and Israeli restrictions on movement that disrupt business activity,
average Palestinian incomes had dropped by more than one third, and
a quarter of the workforce was unemployed.
Nearly one-half of all Palestinians live below the poverty line. More
than 600,000 people (16% of the population) cannot afford even the basic
necessities for subsistence. 29
Palestinian moderates have argued that both Israeli government policies
and corruption by the Fatah Party in the Palestinian Authority created
the conditions for Hamas to build beyond its traditional base. According
to Ali Abunimah, one of the founders of Electronic Initifada:
In 2003, Israel completed
a wall entirely surrounding the city of Qalqilya, which is in the north
of the West Bank…They are imprisoned now in a giant Israeli-controlled
ghetto. Prior to the wall being completed, Fatah controlled all of the
seats in the Qalqilya city council. After the wall was built, in the
municipal elections which were held, Hamas won every seat. To me, that's
a signal that that vote for Hamas is a sign of people's resistance.
It's a sign that they're not willing to submit to Israel's efforts to
crush them and imprison them. And that, I think, was reproduced throughout
the Occupied Territories. 30
Abunimah remains skeptical
of what he calls the “peace process industry” which in his
view takes the attention away from Israeli occupation of the West Bank
and Gaza since 1967:
It's easier for the Canadian government, and the European Union
and the United States to say, 'we need Palestinian reform, and we need
capacity building, and we need state building, and we need to send consultants
to help the Palestinians learn this and that, and look how busy we are
holding seminars on a free press and democracy…It's a lot easier
for Western politicians to do that, than it is to take Israel to the
United Nations and impose sanctions on it…The legislative council
which was elected has no power. Israel governs the Occupied Territories,
not the PA…I don't think that Palestinians in general want to
live in an Islamic state…[People support Hamas] because it is
the Islamist groups who have expressed the desire for resistance…I'm
not in favour of religious politics in general, whether Muslim, Christian
or Jewish, but Hamas has not expressed any intention to do away with
the democratic process… They've agreed to abide by the rules of
the game, and they should be held to that. 31
After the death of Yasser
Arafat in 2004, Mahmoud Abbas was elected President in January of 2005.
Despite negotiating a ceasefire with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
and attempting to rein in militants, it was only partially successful.
In the summer of 2005, Ariel Sharon followed through on his commitment
to proceed with a withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.
According Ari Sharit, a writer
for the Israeli liberal daily Haaretz, in an interview with the The
New Yorker:
This man has affected
the lives of all Israelis and Palestinians, in many episodes over several
decades, but I think that, at the end of the day, what was most important
was the settlements. In this sense, Arik the Settler is the one who,
unfortunately, had more influence than all the others. He changed the
reality on the ground in a fundamental way. Ironically, toward the end
of his life, he began undoing some of what he did during most of the
previous quarter of a century, while still trying to save other parts.
The drama of creating the settlements—which I think was a pitiful
project and absurd in many ways—and the drama of the undoing are
what will remain with us in the years following the Sharon era. This
is not history; it is still history in the making, and it will shape
our future here in the next decade. 32
The Geneva Initiative
Since the peace process stalled
and the Israeli government moved to a course of unilateralism, the architects
of the Geneva Initiative worked outside of traditional diplomatic structures
but brought some of the same expertise to the table to come up with
a proposed final status agreement. Many of the individuals who helped
frame the Geneva Initiative were involved in multi-party talks between
1999-2001 and were intimately involved in high level negotiations. 33
What sets the Geneva Initiative
apart from the other proposals which have been suggested is that there
is more joint Israeli/Palestinian support for the initiative amongst
moderates. Many people now concede that public education is one of the
most important components of achieving consensus in both Israel and
the Palestinian Territories. A 2005 poll showed the model agreement
to have 64 percent support among Israelis and 54 percent among Palestinians.
34
The West Bank and East Jerusalem
are far more complicated when it relates to future withdrawals. The
West Bank, also known as Judea and Samaria, has religious significance
to some in the Jewish faith. The Gaza withdrawal involved less than
10,000 people. The West Bank settlements have over 240,000 people settled
there at present. Daniel Levy, the Policy and International Director
of the Geneva Initiative and a former peace negotiator for the Israeli
government observes that:
Having proven that withdrawal
is possible, further evacuation in the West Bank may be almost inevitable.
The other school would point to parallel entrenchment in the West Bank,
settlement expansion, construction of the separation barrier, and the
financial costs of Gaza relocation and societal trauma it generated,
to argue that Gaza first may well be Gaza last. Under this scenario,
the viable two-state solution is at best indefinitely postponed, and
at worst fatally undermined. 35
Under the Geneva Initiative,
75 percent of Israelis beyond the Green line would be incorporated into
Israel’s new borders in a land swap with the Palestinians. This
would ensure less disruption and have less impact on a fuller withdrawal.
There would also be a need for a multi-national force to enforce a final
status deal and the European Union may be best positioned to coordinate
this effort. 36
Both the Israelis and Palestinians
would not be well served by a diplomatic vacuum or a period of polarization
in the next few years. The Quartet within the Roadmap to Peace and the
European Union unilaterally through its own roundtables and processes
can adopt many of the measures sought in the Geneva Initiative as well
as pushing both parties to meet international obligations. The economic
arrangement provides the best leverage in this regard and tying development
funding with reforms has proven to be largely effective in bringing
about policy changes over the long term. 37
Levy cites two significant
challenges in the short-term:
1) While the world waits
for the next pronouncements of Israel’s cabinet, new, often devastating,
realities are being shaped by bulldozers, builders, and bureaucrats.
The construction of the separation barrier, deep inside Palestinian
territory in some places, creates a physical as well as mental obstacle
for those who believe in and advocate a realistic two-state solution…these
facts raise the possibility of a cumulative undermining of the viable
two-state solution through settlement expansion that on some day passes
the point of no return…either the magic formula for finally freezing
settlement construction must be discovered, or the focus needs to be
undone for a peaceful solution to prevail.
2) The greatest threat to the two state solution may in fact be the
tenuous position of the Palestinian center and its prospective replacement
by a leadership that abandons the two-state paradigm (eg. Hamas)…Abbas
and his group symbolize reform, democratization, and non-violence, all
wrapped up in the most evocative image in the Muslim world today –
the Palestinian cause. If this trend loses out to the forces of violence
and extremism in Palestine, then the regional and global spill-over
effect could be catastrophic. 38
With the election of Hamas
in January of 2006 and the upcoming Israeli elections, there may be
a brief interregnum in which to re-establish the existing peace processes.
Many argue that if the different parties cannot be brought together
in constructive engagement, the likelihood of a Third Intifada in the
coming months is very possible. 39
The United States, the European
Union and Israel have all called on Hamas to recognize Israel’s
right to exist before further funding would be given to the Palestinian
Authority. This may lead to enhanced funding arrangements with neighbouring
Arab countries including Iran which would complicate the situation vis-à-vis
geo-strategic politics. As well, Hamas would have to reorganize themselves
to move from a resistance movement, which utilizes violent tactics and
is viewed widely as a terrorist organization, to an organization which
can lead a mass non-violent resistance movement in support of a final
status agreement for a two-state solution.
As it is presently constituted,
Hamas calls for the destruction of Israel in its founding charter. In
some respects, Hamas has similarities to Yasser Arafat’s Palestine
Liberation Organization prior to the signing of the Oslo Accords.
The Geneva Initiative as
the basis of a final status agreement, according to Levy, will require
three characteristics to succeed:
1) First, the Israeli public
resolves to pursue the permanent status negotiation approach, or the
composition of the Israeli government changes and new leaders adopt
this position.
2) Second, the Palestinians strategically drive the agenda with big
gesture politics, declaring what they are willing to accept in an endgame
negotiation (such as an adoption of the Geneva Initiative) and thus
dramatically influencing Israeli public opinion.
3) Third, the Quartet puts a detailed permanent status vision on the
agenda, thereby cushioning the political climate for Palestinian moderates
and discouraging the creation of harmful new facts on the ground. 40
Conclusion
The late Edward Said, a Columbia
literature professor and Palestinian supporter, made this observation
soon after Oslo Accords were signed:
Arafat and his Palestinian
Authority have become a sort of Vichy government for Palestinians. Those
of us who fought for Palestine before Oslo fought for a cause that we
believed would spur the emergence of a just order. Never has this ideal
been further from realization than today. Arafat is corrupt. Hamas and
Islamic Jihad are no alternative. And most Palestinian intellectuals
have been too anxious to bolster their own case, following Arafat and
his lieutenants in the abandonment of their principles and history just
to be recognized by the West, to be invited to the Brookings Institution,
and to appear on US television…The Israelis have clung to their
power and their old policies, the Arabs have capitulated and fawned
on their victors without a truce of guts or decency. 41
The Israeli/Palestinian conflict is one of the longest running disputes
in contemporary international relations. The eruption of the Second
Intifada further inflamed the situation leading to thousands of deaths.
The results on the ground showed little cessation of violence, the erection
of a Separation Wall and the expansion of settlements in the West Bank
despite the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Since the failure of the
Camp David Accords, the Roadmap to Peace has been largely unable to
move the parties closer together largely due to the polarization of
politics during the Second Intifada. With the death of Yasser Arafat,
the exit of Ariel Sharon from Israeli politics and the election of Hamas,
the international community will be challenged to avert more violence
in the short and mid-term.
The European Union, as well
as other parties, will need to utilize their economic arrangements with
Israel and the Palestinian Authority to meet the stated obligations
both nations have committed themselves to under the Roadmap to Peace
process and earlier agreements. Beyond the development of civil society
in the region, the European Union may need to be involved in the establishment
of a multi-national force in the region to help enforce a future final
status agreement. Moving this conflict away from the traditional narrative
of ethnic, religious and biblical foundations to one based on the modern
narratives of the nation-state and international law will be important
if a pragmatic final status two-state solution can be negotiated and
implemented in a just way.
Notes
1 European Union web page:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/israel/intro/
2 Amin, Samir. Europe and the Arab World. (New York: Zed Books, 2005),
pg. 83.
3 Amin, Samir. Europe and the Arab World. (New York: Zed Books, 2005),
pg. 86.
4 European Union web page: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/israel/intro/
5 Amin, Samir. Europe and the Arab World. (New York: Zed Books, 2005),
pg. 91.
6 European Union web page: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/israel/intro/
7 Amin, Samir. Europe and the Arab World. (New York: Zed Books, 2005),
pg. 113.
8 European Union web page: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/israel/intro/
9 Amin, Samir. Europe and the Arab World. (New York: Zed Books, 2005),
pg. 117.
10 Amin, Samir. Europe and the Arab World. (New York: Zed Books, 2005),
pg. 119.
11 Amin, Samir. Europe and the Arab World. (New York: Zed Books, 2005),
pg. 118.
12 European Union web page: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/israel/intro/
13 Amin, Samir. Europe and the Arab World. (New York: Zed Books, 2005),
pg. 123.
14 European Union web page:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/israel/intro/
15 European Union web page:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/israel/intro/
16 European Union web page:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/israel/intro/
17 European Union web page:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/israel/intro/
18 European Union web page:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/israel/intro/
19 European Union web page:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/israel/intro/
20 European Union web page:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/israel/intro/
21 European Union web page:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/israel/intro/
22 Mossawa Center Status and Implications Report - www.mossawacenter.org
23 http://www.policyreview.org/dec04/hanson.html - excerpt by Dennis
Ross
24 www.miftah.org
25 http://www.geneva-accord.org/HomePage.aspx?FolderID=11&lang=en
26 http://www.btselem.org/English/index.asp
27 Council on Foreign Relations - http://www.cfr.org/publication/8968/#1
29 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3677206.stm
30 http://www.rabble.ca/
31 http://www.rabble.ca/
32 http://www.newyorker.com/online/content/articles/060123on_onlineonly02
33 http://www.geneva-accord.org/HomePage.aspx?FolderID=11&lang=en
34 Levy, Daniel. From Geneva to Gaza. Harvard International Review,
Fall 2005, pg. 25.
35 Levy, Daniel. From Geneva to Gaza. Harvard International Review.
Fall 2005. pg. 24- 26.
36 Levy, Daniel. From Geneva to Gaza. Harvard International Review.
Fall 2005. pg, 25.
37 Levy, Daniel. From Geneva to Gaza. Harvard International Review.
Fall 2005, pg. 26.
38 Levy, Daniel. From Geneva to Gaza. Harvard International Review.
Fall 2005, pg. 27.
39 Levy, Daniel. From Geneva to Gaza. Harvard International Review.
Fall 2005, pg. 25.
40 Levy, Daniel. From Geneva to Gaza. Harvard International Review.
Fall 2005, pg. 27.
41 Bayoumi, Moustafa. The Edward Said Reader. (New York: Vintage, 2000),
pg. 392.