The
Shiite Power Struggle: Hardly Good News For The US In Iraq
By Ramzy Baroud
08 September, 2007
Countercurrents.org
The
decision made by Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr to halt his Mahdi Army’s
attacks on occupation forces and Iraqi security is likely to be considered
the single most promising breakthrough for the US military in Iraq.
Although the move comes ahead of several reports to be presented to
the US Congress later this month, the decision was ultimately an outcome
of a long-brewing intersectarian conflict between Shiite Iraqis, which
will further complicate the devastating American failure in Iraq.
Al-Sadr’s decision
followed the widespread clashes at Karbala on August 26, during one
of the holiest Shiite festivals. Despite various accusations of outside
involvement, the clashes were apparently Shiite through and through,
involving militant members of the Badr Brigade of the Islamic Supreme
Council (lead by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, a duel ally of the US and Iran)
and al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army.
Both of these groups are
Shiite, but they differ significantly in terms of their loyalty to Iran:
al-Sadr, although backed by Iran, often invokes an Iraqi national sentiment,
while the Badr Brigade of the Supreme Council is unabashedly pro-Iran.
While the latter has been heavily involved both in the sectarian killings
and the massacres of (mostly Sunni) civilians, it coordinates most of
its work with the US military, and is in fact heavily represented in
the Iraqi army, police and intelligence. Yet, it is the armed wing of
the Islamic Supreme Council that is affiliated with the Shiite high
authority Ali al-Sistani, and both hold unquestionable allegiance to
Iran. The US also claims to fight Iran’s agents in Iraq (who are
blamed for the development of most destructive types of guerrilla warfare
tactics) and yet Iran plays an uncontested role in determining the overall
policies of the ruling Shiite parties in Iraq - who are willing collaborators
with the US military.
Al-Sadr’s recent decision
was, predictably, welcomed by the Americans, who are likely to take
any opportunity to prove the successes of their most recent operations.
Top official Gen. David Petraeus has already boasted about the troop
surge leading to a reduction in sectarian fighting. Statistics, however,
directly contradict such claims. Figures from the Associated Press show
that the month of August registered the second highest civilian death
toll in Iraq - 1,809 civilians - since the US invasion of March 2003.
The sharp rise is largely attributed to the quadruple suicide bombings
on August 14, near the Syrian border, which killed 520 people.
The significance of that
incident - aside from its devastating death toll - is of less consequence
than the inner Shiite fighting, considering that the targeted group
is a small minority that played next to no part in the raging conflict.
However, it will most likely be underlined further by the US to detract
from the fact that their once reliable allies in Iraq are now engaged
in a perplexing fight over control of the southern part of the country,
where most of the oil wealth is concentrated. Southern Iraq is also
important to groups vying for power because the city of Basra directly
borders Iran, the main ally for Iraqi Shiites and their major source
of political validation, and Najaf and Karbala, two of the holiest cities
for Shiites around the world are located in the south (the recent clashes
in Karbala were about controlling these shrines). With the British vacating
their positions in Basra, Shiite groups, who had hitherto displayed
a degree of unity in their fight against Sunnis, are now increasingly
likely to lock horns; those who control the south seem set to emerge
as the future power brokers of the country.
Although capable of inflicting
widespread damage, al-Sadr’s chances of becoming this power broker
are slim. For one, his Shiite rivals receive greater backing from Iran,
which has displayed a largely Machiavellian attitude towards the situation
in Iraq, choosing never to bid on the underdog. The advent of the Americans
has also worsened the position of the Sadrists as they became largely
excluded from all government institutions. The new Iraqi hierarchy favored
the followers of al-Hakim, who apparently represented a more dominant
and perhaps more trustworthy (from an American point of view) branch
of Shiites.
However, despite his seemingly
erroneous strategies and media depictions as a ‘radical’,
al-Sadr has actually adopted a very careful balancing act. He has continued
to appeal to his Shiite followers in a way that sets him apart from
al-Sistani, while simultaneously maintaining good relations with al-Sistani
and Iran. He has even occasionally appeared sympathetic to the plight
of the Sunnis.
Yet his relative political
shrewdness could hardly bridge the gap between the various Shiite groups,
which remains essentially ideological and an extension of the theological
contention between the Hawza followers of al-Sistani and the followers
of Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr, Muqtada’s father. The divide between
the two religious Shiite schools is as real as ever and the new economic
woes and power struggles are likely to bring back to the fore –
and further fuel - these differences. With Badr Brigade claiming 70,000
strong militiaman and al-Mahdi counting over 50,000, both groups are
overwhelmed with fear and mistrust; under these circumstances, the prospect
of co-existence seems bleak.
We know very little of why
al-Sadr decided to send the al-Mahdi army into hibernation. He claims
that his militias are being infiltrated by Iran, but this is unconvincing
given that al-Sadr uses Iran as a personal escape whenever his safety
is threatened at home. The US military continues to crack down on his
followers, and the Iraqi military, mostly controlled by his rivals,
are carrying mass arrests in al-Sadr city and elsewhere. A lenient al-Sadr
may well inspire revolt amongst his followers and send the inner Shiite
fight on an early and destructive path, or he might find himself compelled
to resume the fight on behalf of his own group. Both scenarios would
be bad news for the Americans, who would be forced to watch an escalating
Shiite power struggle in a country they supposedly control.
-Ramzy Baroud is a Palestinian-American
author and editor of PalestineChronicle.com. His work has been published
in numerous newspapers and journals worldwide. His latest book is The
Second Palestinian Intifada: A Chronicle of a People's Struggle (Pluto
Press, London). Read more about Baroud at his website ramzybaroud.net
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