Book
Review: Hamas –
A History From Within
By Jim Miles
09 September, 2007
Countercurrents.org
Book Review: Hamas –
A History From Within. Azzam Tamimi. Olive Branch Press, Northampton,
Massachusetts. 2007.
Most
of the world knows the superficial history of Hamas as presented by
western media, the stories of the suicide bombers, the election results
that were argued to be a vote against the PLO/Fatah but not for Hamas,
the resulting denial of that democratic vote by all western governments,
and most recently, the Hamas takeover of the dysfunctional governance
of the Gaza Strip. Azzam Tamimi’s book, Hamas – A History
From Within, presents a much broader and much more accurate perspective
on a group that has had much more significance for the Palestinian people
than simply being a militant suicidal terrorist group.
Consistent with the title,
Tamimi presents a history that shows Hamas’ development from its
roots within the Muslim Brotherhood, from its aspects of international
cooperation and denial, and from ‘within’ – the development
of the ideas, policies, and implementation of ideas that is rarely seen
in western media sources. It is not a fawning sycophantic review, as
it also reveals the internal struggles within Hamas between the various
people and political institutions involved in its history and development,
and further reveals the precarious hold it had on survival, a survival
that became ensured only with the advent of more serious Israeli atrocities
during the first Intifada.
Arguments have been made
that Hamas was assisted in its set-up by Israel in order to counter
the power of the PLO/Fatah organization. Tamimi is much more nuanced
in his discussion of this, arguing more that Israeli ignorance of what
Hamas embodied and what it meant to the mostly poorer and refugee Palestinians
allowed it to survive without direct complicity. Beginning with Sheikh
Yassin in Gaza, and as a reaction to the defeat of pan-Arabic Nasirism
after the 1967 war, the Islamic Brotherhood centred their concerns not
on militancy, but “primarily on instilling Islamic values and
ethics in the hearts and minds of the young.” At that time, Israel
did not support the Islamic Brotherhood (Ikhwan) but the “occupation
authorities did not object to this seemingly benign religious activity.”
Tamimi argues, “At
this time, the Palestinian Ikhwan…were concerned principally with
the education and training of their members and supporters so as to
shield them from what they deemed to be alien and hostile ideologies
and sociopolitical trends …[rescuing] the individual, the family,
and the community as a whole from the onslaught of Western ideas, whether
liberal or Marxist.” An Islamic education and revival of Islamic
society, and not militant terrorism, were the initial forces behind
Ikhwan activities.
Following from that, and
with full evidence over the years, the Ikhwan, focussed mainly on students
and young people, focussed on providing social, recreational, and educational
services. Again, “The Israelis did not see this association [the
Islamic Society] as any kind of threat, and granted the Ikhwan a license
for its establishment.” The activities of the society “included
sports, recreational trips, scouting activities, and public lectures
on religious and social issues.”
There is certainly room to
spin these developments into that of Israeli subterfuge against the
PLO, and more than likely within the broad spectrum of opinion that
is usual in all possible political motivations that view could arise
within some individuals, but Tamimi’s overall historical development
indicates, as above, that Israel simply saw it as no threat to themselves
at that time. Likewise, within the Ikhwan, would be individuals that
were more militantly oriented than others, but the fundamental appears
solid and well argued, that education and social services were the primary
goal of the original Ikhwan set-up.
This led to the development
of mosques, schools, kindergartens, universities, day-care, medical
clinics, hospitals, and other social organizations. These organizations
obviously greatly benefited the poor and the refugees within the West
Bank and Gaza; in contrast, the PLO/Fatah, as evidenced in this work
and other recent histories, became more concerned about supporting their
own internal structures and maintaining their power and predominance
politically and economically over the Palestinian territories.
As history from ‘within’
Tamimi concentrates most of his presentation on the personalities and
politicians that influenced the development of the Ikhwan into what
became known as Hamas. Sheikh Ahmad Yassin was the foremost among them,
a spiritual and moral leader who oversaw the major developments of the
group, and who served as spiritual leader in absentia during his many
years in Israeli prisons. Other less familiar names play major roles
in the many developments both for and against Hamas, Khalid Mishal,
Abu Marzuq, Samih al-Battikhi, Ibrahim Ghosheh, Isma’il Haniyah,
Jordan’s King Abdullah, and many others illustrate the political
turmoil that Hamas experienced over the years.
The international role played
‘within’ Hamas is also reviewed, with its on and off relationship
with what I could only label as the conspiratorial monarchy of Jordan
significantly displayed. Hamas’ relationships with other Arab
states, many of which appeared self-serving for the Arab states, is
well outlined, with the ultimate support coming with the release of
Sheikh Yassin in 1997 after the disastrous (for the Jordanians) botched
Mishal assassination attempt. Yassin’s Arabic tour the next year
demonstrated high level political support from his Arab neighbours (except
those overly influenced by his political rival Arafat) as well as the
continuing strong support from the Arab populations. This support came
from “the movement’s steadfastness in recent years in the
face of an American-led global campaign against it. In the face of would-be
crushing blows, Hamas had refused to modify its stance in the slightest
towards compliance.”
In Palestine, Hamas leaders
were noted for “ascetism, altruism, dedication, and honesty,”
for living with and among the people as they always had, as “no
one joins Hamas to make money or has become rich by virtue of their
position within it….Finally, donors were aware that only a small
fraction of the money raised by Hamas would be used for military purposes.”
This stands in contrast to
the PLO/Fatah activities. The internal relationship of Hamas with the
PLO/Fatah becomes more intense as events progress, the comparison between
the two also drawing significant support towards Hamas. Tamimi, as with
other recent Palestinian histories [1] is quite direct in his criticism
of the PLO/Fatah who dominated the Palestinian Authority whose “officials
were seen to be paid unreasonably high sums” as well as being
employed “in the expanding security services, whose task was to
control the occupied Palestinians on behalf of Israel.” This “vast
bureaucracy…secured the loyalty of its employees….and served
to increase the disparity of economic means between Palestinians.”
Fatah suffered from “a plague of rampant corruption” and
was “wracked by corrosive rivalries that sickened many Palestinians.”
The transition from being
a section of the Islamic Brotherhood, the Ikhwan, into Hamas began before
the start of the first Intifada. Internal discussion had taken place
about armed resistance, with the Ikhwan maintaining that building the
Islamic individual and community were paramount. From these discussions
developed the movement towards protest actions, and a more militant
viewpoint that found expression with the Intifada, dated as of December
8, 1987. The Intifada “was a gift from heaven” for Hamas,
with the PLO and Israel being caught off guard. The Israelis misjudged
it in two aspects: that it was “Merely an expression of anger
that would abate in a day or two;” and they “were not sure
who was orchestrating the unrest.”
The results of the Intifada
were counterproductive for Israel as they “were oblivious to the
fact the whenever they hit Hamas, and no matter how hard they hit it,
they only earned it further popular sympathy and support.” With
the PLO leaders at this time still encamped in Tunis, it was these actions
that Tamimi credits “to the emergence of Hamas as a credible alternative
to the PLO.” Through all this the Hamas military wing developed,
the al-Qassam Brigades, “a product of the intifada itself.”
With their organization involving an ‘inside’ and ‘outside’
leadership, and the recognition that Israel would try to decapitate
that leadership, “Hamas…seemed to make gains out of its
losses.”
From that time, Hamas history
became public, with the western media emphasizing the Islamic militancy
of the al-Qassam Brigade above the overall Hamas political set-up. From
that, as is well known, Hamas has been declared a terrorist organization
by many countries even though it is much more similar to all other insurgencies
worldwide against foreign occupation. [2] Eventually, through all the
intervening activities, Tamimi summarizes, “From Israel’s
unconditional and unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon to its unconditional
and unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, it was Hamas that reaped the benefits
and emerged victorious despite the losses. The failure of peace negotiations,
whether the Oslo Accords, the road map, or Sharon’s disengagement
policy, seemed in the eyes of many Palestinians to vindicate Hamas’s
approach.”
History then takes the story
in a new direction as Hamas buys into the political process. This part
of the story is much better known to the west, albeit similarly biased
in its presentation of Hamas as a terrorist group. Although winning
a clear majority of the Palestinian legislative seats, an accomplishment
that Tamimi sees not as a vote against the PLO as “in reality,
only a fraction of the votes cast was made up of protest votes,”
the election was universally disallowed and has resulted in ongoing
internal division within the Palestinian territories, with now PLO leader
Abbas being the current Israeli/American “man of peace”
while being derided alternately as another PLO pawn in their hands.
The PLO, Israel, America and the west in general have done as much as
possible to discredit and destroy the Hamas political success.
While discussing these recent
events, Tamimi also discusses more of the philosophical underpinnings
of the Hamas movement and the discussion that takes place within Hamas
itself concerning its goals and means. The Hamas charter “reads
more like an internal circular” and there is ongoing discussion
about writing a new charter. In Appendix II, Tamimi presents a memo
prepared by the Hamas Political Bureau in 2000 that is a much more nuanced
document, and it still calls for – naturally - the liberation
of Palestine, and supports its right to military resistance (as a right
determined under international law as well).
In the chapter “The
Liberation Ideology of Hamas” Tamimi develops these internal discussion
as well as adding more definition to other ideas presented in passing
in western media. The idea of ‘hudna’ or truce receives
strong coverage (including previous statements that only Hamas had ever
initiated and maintained a unilateral truce during the various conflicts),
as well as ‘tahdi’ah’ or calming, a temporary ‘hudna’.
The result of these truces however was that “Israel’s refusal
to reciprocate led many Palestinians to lose confidence in the usefulness
of declaring a unilateral truce.” The concept of suicide and suicide
bombing within the Islamic context as well as within western perception
is discussed, along with the related Islamic discussions of jihad and
its subordinate positions of ‘qital’ and martyrdom.
For those in the west who
truly want to understand Hamas, Hamas – A History From Within
should be required reading (along with those mentioned in the footnotes).
It is clearly written, presents well structured arguments and while
it is a history, it is much more than dates, names, and events, but
a running discussion of the changes in ideas and organizational structures
within Hamas. Although the Israelis and Americans use their own “terrorist
theology” to denounce Hamas the reality as seen by the Palestinians
is one of colonial occupation and subjugation with the intent, ultimately,
of Israeli hegemony over the Palestinian territories as well as the
greater Middle East, supported in full by American commercial/military
interests. Azzam Tamimi has presented a highly informative work, one
that provides a significant new perspective for the west on what is
occurring in Palestine and the Middle East.
[1] see in particular Between
the Lines, by Honig-Parnass and Haddad, Haymarket Books, 2007, and The
Palestinian Hamas by Mishal and Sela, Columbia University Press, 2006.
While they all direct criticism at the PLO/Fatah, they also recognize
the contributions made towards recognition of the Palestinian situation
internationally and the powerful unifying symbolism of Arafat, particularly
when he defied Israel at the end of his time in Ramallah.
[2] Nor did Hamas originate suicide bombings of civilians. Yes, that
is terror, but it is also an ‘asymmetrical’ response to
massive oppression endured under occupation and the terror that devolves
from Israeli and American military actions against Palestinian civilians.
For a reasoned discussion on suicide bombing, see Dying To Win, by Robert
Pape, Random House, 2005.
Jim Miles
is a Canadian educator and a regular contributor/columnist of opinion
pieces and book reviews to Palestine Chronicles. His interest in this
topic stems originally from an environmental perspective, which encompasses
the militarization and economic subjugation of the global community
and its commodification by corporate governance and by the American
government.
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