Strategic Crossroads: Beijing’s Calculated Moves and New Delhi’s Strategic Rebalancing

Introduction: China’s Strategic Pivot in South Asia

The evolution of China’s role in South Asia, particularly within the context of the India-Pakistan rivalry, reflects a deliberate and sustained effort to reshape the region’s balance of power. From an early position of disengagement, shaped by domestic preoccupations, to its current orchestration of strategic alignments, China (中国 Zhōngguó) has steadily adapted its approach to safeguard and expand its national interests. Central to this shift has been the rise of India — a growing power whose political assertiveness, economic development, and strategic outreach have increasingly complicated Beijing’s ambitions. As India strengthened its global and regional standing under successive governments, it emerged as both a counterweight and a challenge to Chinese influence. Meanwhile, Pakistan remained a willing partner in China’s long-term vision. Together, these dynamics have driven China to recalibrate its strategy from opportunistic partnerships to structural investments — economic, military, and political. Tracing this transformation illuminates how China and India have come to define competing trajectories of power in South Asia, and how their interactions now shape the region’s evolving strategic architecture.

The Early Years (1947–1962): From Revolutionary Isolation to Tentative Engagement

In the immediate aftermath of India’s and Pakistan’s independence in 1947, China’s role in the subcontinent was marginal. Internally, Mao Zedong (毛泽东 Máo Zédōng) and the Chinese Communist Party (中国共产党 Zhōngguó Gòngchǎndǎng) were engaged in a brutal civil war, culminating in the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国 Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó) in 1949. Mao’s priority was consolidating internal control rather than extending influence abroad. Meanwhile, India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, advocated for a neutral, non-aligned foreign policy and sought close ties with China, emphasizing shared anti-colonial values.

The brief flowering of Sino-Indian relations under Mao and Nehru, exemplified by the Panchsheel Agreement of 1954, masked deeper tensions. Pakistan, under its first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan and later military leaders like General Ayub Khan, initially leaned heavily toward the West. China, embroiled in the Korean War and facing American encirclement, viewed South Asia as a secondary theater. It engaged cautiously, prioritizing stability on its southern borders but making few investments in influencing the India-Pakistan dynamic.

India’s response to China’s increasing engagement with Pakistan was one of cautious optimism initially, as Nehru sought to maintain peaceful relations with China while simultaneously consolidating India’s position in the subcontinent. However, as China began building ties with Pakistan, India grew concerned about the implications for its strategic position. This led India to enhance its defense capabilities, with a particular focus on bolstering its military in the northern borders.

The Break and the Bond (1962–1971): Sino-Indian Conflict and the Birth of the China-Pakistan Alliance

The 1962 Sino-Indian War, fought under Mao Zedong and Indian Prime Minister Nehru, marked a definitive rupture in China’s South Asian policy. Nehru’s decision to grant asylum to the Dalai Lama (达赖喇嘛 Dálài Lǎma) after the 1959 Tibetan uprising fueled Chinese suspicions of Indian intentions. The war exposed not only military vulnerabilities but a fundamental misreading of each other’s strategic goals.

In Pakistan, General Ayub Khan, seeking new patrons beyond a hesitant United States, moved closer to China. For Beijing, a strategic window opened. The 1963 Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement, signed under Mao and Ayub Khan, was more than a technical adjustment; it cemented a strategic bond aimed squarely at India. Both sides saw clear incentives: for China, Pakistan was a lever to pressure India; for Pakistan, China offered both diplomatic support and a long-term strategic hedge.

By 1971, the subcontinent was once again in turmoil. India’s Prime Minister Indira Gandhi decisively intervened in East Pakistan, leading to the creation of Bangladesh. China, led by the aging Mao, sympathized with Pakistan’s position but, constrained by international alignments and internal Cultural Revolution (文化大革命 Wénhuà Dà Gémìng) chaos, offered only rhetorical support. Nonetheless, the 1971 war reaffirmed the strategic utility of the Sino-Pakistan partnership for Beijing’s long-term designs against Indian primacy.

India, in turn, responded to China’s growing closeness with Pakistan by shifting towards a more robust defense posture. The 1962 defeat was still fresh in India’s memory, and the Indian military began reevaluating its strategy, prioritizing modernization and strengthening its northern defenses. India’s concern about Chinese involvement in the region accelerated its quest for international alliances, particularly with the Soviet Union, which provided crucial military and economic support in the coming decades.

Cold War Calculations (1971–1990s): Nuclear Balancing and Strategic Support

The post-1971 period saw China, now under the pragmatic leadership of Deng Xiaoping (邓小平 Dèng Xiǎopíng) following Mao’s death in 1976, recalibrate its South Asia strategy with greater sophistication. Recognizing the limits of conventional military balancing, Beijing turned to more asymmetrical means to contain India.

Pakistan, under Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and later military ruler General Zia-ul-Haq, aggressively pursued a nuclear deterrent in the wake of India’s 1974 Pokhran nuclear test under Indira Gandhi. China, while officially adhering to non-proliferation norms, covertly aided Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions, calculating that nuclear parity would entrench strategic instability favorable to Beijing’s interests.

India’s response was swift and decisive. After the 1974 Pokhran test, India began a sustained push to enhance its nuclear program, which culminated in the nuclear weapons program being officially declared as a national goal. India also sought to establish closer ties with the United States, not only to counter China’s growing influence over Pakistan but also to ensure a balance of power in the region. In this period, India also sought to bolster its regional alliances and strengthen its defense posture, emphasizing deterrence through its nuclear capabilities.

New Millennium, Old Strategies (2000–Present): Economic Entanglement and Military Posturing

The dawn of the 21st century brought new dynamics. China, rising under the leadership of Jiang Zemin (江泽民 Jiāng Zémín) and later Hu Jintao (胡锦涛 Hú Jǐntāo), recognized that economic engagement could coexist with strategic rivalry. India, led by reformers like Atal Bihari Vajpayee and later Manmohan Singh, liberalized its economy and deepened ties with the United States, culminating in the 2008 US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement.

Yet China’s essential calculus remained intact. Under Hu Jintao and then Xi Jinping (习近平 Xí Jìnpíng), Beijing doubled down on its Pakistan strategy, most notably through the launch of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (中巴经济走廊 Zhōng-Bā Jīngjì Zǒuláng) in 2015. Partnering with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif‘s government, China embedded itself into Pakistan’s economic and security structures, creating stakes too large for Islamabad to abandon.

India’s response to China’s growing footprint in Pakistan, particularly through initiatives like CPEC, was one of skepticism and concern. India viewed CPEC as a direct threat to its sovereignty, especially because the corridor passes through Gilgit-Baltistan, a region that India claims as part of its territory. As a result, India increasingly vocalized its opposition to Chinese projects in Pakistan, seeking diplomatic channels to counterbalance the influence of China.

Meanwhile, Narendra Modi’s rise in India in 2014 brought a more assertive Indian nationalism to the fore. Modi’s outreach to the West and Japan, his infrastructure push in border areas, and his refusal to back down during crises like Doklam (2017) and Galwan (2020) marked a clear break with earlier cautious Indian strategies. In response, Xi Jinping’s China displayed growing military assertiveness, signaling that economic ties would not prevent Beijing from directly challenging India where strategic interests clashed.

India’s response to China’s military assertiveness was an accelerated modernization of its own defense capabilities. India ramped up infrastructure development along its northern borders, increased its military presence in disputed territories, and strengthened its security ties with countries like the United States, Japan, and Australia, particularly through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). India also increased defense spending and undertook significant reforms in its military strategy to counteract China’s growing influence.

Religion as Strategy: Managing Contradictions at Home and Abroad

China’s approach to religion — and Islam in particular — reveals striking strategic pragmatism. Internally, Xi Jinping has overseen unprecedented repression in Xinjiang (新疆 Xīnjiāng), subjecting Uighur Muslims (维吾尔族 Wéiwú’ěr zú) to mass surveillance, re-education camps, and cultural erasure.

Yet externally, China has maintained warm ties with Islamic nations, none more so than Pakistan. Leaders like Imran Khan have studiously avoided criticizing Chinese actions, prioritizing CPEC investments and military support over ideological solidarity with Uighur Muslims. China, for its part, compartmentalizes: at home, Islam is treated as a security threat; abroad, Islamic solidarity is instrumentalized to cement alliances.

India’s position on the treatment of Uighur Muslims in China is characterized by both silence and strategic reticence. While India has generally refrained from publicly criticizing China’s human rights abuses in Xinjiang, it has expressed concerns about China’s approach to minority rights in international forums. However, given the complex geopolitical realities and India’s focus on its regional rivalry with China, the issue has remained more of a background concern than a front-line issue in India’s foreign policy.

Domestic Politics and South Asian Policy: From Mao to Xi

From Mao’s revolutionary fervor, through Deng’s pragmatic reforms, to Xi’s assertive nationalism, China’s domestic political evolution has profoundly shaped its South Asian posture. Mao’s ideological confrontation with imperialism made South Asia a secondary concern unless directly implicated, as with Tibet and the 1962 war. Deng’s “hide your strength, bide your time” (韬光养晦 Tāoguāng yǎnghuì) philosophy led to cautious, indirect regional engagements, focusing on economic modernization at home and hedging against India via Pakistan.

Today, Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” (中国梦 Zhōngguó Mèng) doctrine elevates national rejuvenation and territorial integrity to central political missions. Under Xi, South Asia has moved from a peripheral concern to a core arena where China must assert its influence, defend its Belt and Road (一带一路 Yídài Yílù) investments, and contain rivals like India. Leaders in Pakistan, from Nawaz Sharif to Imran Khan to the current military establishment, have positioned their country as a willing partner in this broader Chinese vision. India, under Narendra Modi, increasingly sees itself locked in a zero-sum competition with China for regional and global standing.

India’s response to China’s growing assertiveness under Xi has been to adopt a more proactive and often confrontational approach. India has sought to leverage its growing international standing, strengthen its defense alliances, and build its military capabilities, while also engaging in strategic dialogues with other powers, particularly the United States, to counterbalance China’s rise.

Defense Narratives: From Peaceful Coexistence to Strategic Assertiveness

China’s defense rhetoric has evolved in lockstep with its capabilities and ambitions. In the 1950s, under Mao Zedong and Jawaharlal Nehru, talk of “peaceful coexistence” (和平共处 Hépíng Gòngchǔ) served as a diplomatic fig leaf while border tensions simmered. After the 1962 war, China adopted a defensive crouch, emphasizing sovereignty and non-interference to justify military buildups.

In the 21st century, particularly under Xi Jinping, China’s defense posture has become unapologetically assertive. The modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (中国人民解放军 Zhōngguó Rénmín Jiěfàngjūn), aggressive fortification of the Himalayan frontiers, and increasingly sophisticated military exercises with Pakistan demonstrate a new strategic language: not only is China willing to defend its interests, but it will actively shape the strategic environment to its advantage. Pakistan, receiving Chinese arms, training, and diplomatic backing, remains a critical instrument in this effort.

India’s response to China’s growing military assertiveness has been to enhance its military readiness and engage in strategic dialogues with regional and global powers to secure its position in South Asia. India has increasingly conducted joint military exercises with the United States, Japan, and other countries, and has pushed for stronger defense ties within the framework of regional security arrangements like the Quad.

Conclusion: A Chessboard of Calculated Engagement – But at What Cost?

China’s evolution from a passive observer to an active regional architect in South Asia is a striking example of strategic mastery. From Mao’s ideological fervor to Xi Jinping’s aggressive nationalism, Beijing has continuously recalibrated its approach to leverage the shifting geopolitical landscape, primarily by aligning itself with Pakistan and countering India’s regional ambitions. However, this seemingly calculated strategy is not without its long-term consequences. China’s support for Pakistan, particularly through initiatives like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), represents not just economic engagement, but also a dangerous entanglement in a volatile bilateral relationship that could ignite broader regional instability. Moreover, China’s military assertiveness in the region, particularly along its borders with India, exacerbates existing tensions, further deepening the region’s militarization and increasing the likelihood of conflict.

India’s responses, while resolute, reflect a nation caught in a delicate balancing act. On one hand, India has pushed back against China’s growing influence through increased military modernization, defense alliances, and diplomatic channels. On the other hand, India’s own approach to China remains marked by contradictions — striving for economic engagement while simultaneously acknowledging the existential threat posed by China’s strategic rise. The question that lingers, however, is whether India’s actions are sufficient to counterbalance China’s increasingly formidable presence in South Asia, or if India is merely reacting to a set of moves it tried to anticipate.

Moreover, the broader implications of this regional rivalry cannot be overlooked. As China continues to deepen its relationship with Pakistan, it risks destabilizing the entire region, particularly as both nuclear powers — India and Pakistan — engage in an arms race fueled by Chinese support. Meanwhile, India’s own relationship with the United States, Japan, and Australia in the framework of the Quad could inadvertently lead to a further polarizing of South Asia, pushing both India and China into adversarial postures that hinder potential diplomatic solutions.

Ultimately, the South Asian chessboard, shaped by China’s long game and India’s countermeasures, reveals the limits of both countries’ strategies. While China’s pursuit of regional influence through strategic partnerships and economic dominance is formidable, it comes at a significant cost to regional stability. Similarly, India’s response — though marked by strategic ambition — remains reactive and at times fragmented. As both countries continue to manoeuvre within this complex geopolitical space, the question remains: will South Asia see a sustainable balance emerge, or will it become the site of a protracted standoff, where strategic miscalculations could lead to unpredictable consequences for the region and beyond?

In the end, the ongoing strategic contest between India and China in South Asia is not just a reflection of regional aspirations, but also a cautionary tale of how unchecked ambitions, even when cloaked in the rhetoric of cooperation, can escalate into dangerous rivalries with global repercussions.

—Ashish Singh has finished his Ph.D. coursework in political science from the NRU-HSE, Moscow, Russia. He has previously studied at Oslo Metropolitan University, Norway; and TISS, Mumbai.