Harish S. Wankhede is Assistant Professor at the Centre for Political Studies (CPS), Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. He was visiting scholar at the Centre for South Asia, Stanford University, California, USA. He was awarded PhD from the CPS, JNU in the year 2015.
Wankhede has published research articles on the topics of Caste, Dalit movement, Hindutva and social justice in major national and international journals. He is also a keen cinema enthusiast and writes regular columns in national dailies on Indian politics, pop literature, Bollywood and media culture. His first book on the Dalit Representation in Hindi Cinema is ready to publish from a reputed international publisher. In this interview with ABHISH K. BOSE he discusses the Narendra Modi government.
Excerpts from the interview
Abhish K. Bose: There is a large segment of the Indian middle-class who believes that Narendra Modi can change India in the model of US, China or other powerful countries. While these segments believe so on the basis of the events organised by Modi both inside and outside the country and the projects like ‘ Vande Bharath’, the apparent asymmetry among the rich and the poor aggravates unlike earlier. This is when the annual meeting of the world economic forum held in 2017 points out that among the fifty eight percent of the Indian wealth is concentrated at the disposal of the very one percent of the rich class. While the public relations and event management programmes are presenting an unrealistic picture where is the Modi dispensation carrying India into, is there any solid base in the conviction of the Indian middle-class that Modi can lead India to a glorious era or are they misled by the pomp and glory of the Modi dispensation ?
Harish S. Wankhede: The possibility that the rich-poor dialect would bring political change is an old rhetoric. Since the inception of India’s democracy, the statistics of precarious poverty, malnutrition, hunger deaths, unavailability of health and education facilities for the marginalized social groups, etc. have dominated the discussion in academic spaces and middle-class corridors, however such discussions have never produced any substantive political change on the behalf of the poor and the vulnerable groups. While making grand promises to end poverty in every political manifesto can be witnessed, the actual functioning of the politics remained dominated by the rich, social elites and periodically by the dominant regional castes. When it comes to the question of class-based inequalities, poverty and marginalization, the Narendra Modi realm is different from the earlier regimes because it has created a visible divide between the poor and the rest. The current dispensation overtly serves the class interests and political concerns of the elites and the middle class and neglects the issues and problems of the poor and other vulnerable communities.
It is visible that in the last one decade, any sincere deliberation on poverty (even on academic platforms) is relegated. We lack substantive statistics and other survey reports that may bring India’s precarious social and economic actualities to the people’s notice. The concerns and claims of the urban middle-class around economic development, Foreign Direct Investment, the growth in share market, good roads and infrastructure facilities, education in the US and European universities, growing numbers of NRI in developed countries, Unicorn Start-ups, etc. have bewitched the aspirational urban sections. The growing hope towards prosperity and development amongst the urban population has distanced them from the poor population. The BJP has examined the middle-class quests and promoted itself as the party that secures their economic interest and social status, often avoiding deliberation on the poor and vulnerable social groups. The extravagant events like international conclaves, Gujarat Sumeet, inauguration of mega infrastructure projects, NRI meetings, etc. build confidence amongst the aspirant middle class that the Modi government is determined for making India a competent economy against the US and China. They are not carried away by the propaganda, but a lot many actually believe that Modi will deliver on these grand promises.
The neo-liberal economic development has produced a significant middle class in the last three decades. This class is not only powerful in economic affairs but also dominates other sectors that are crucial for building political discourses and critical challenges against the political establishment. For example, the Media houses are overtly dominated by cast-class elites that find no problems with neo-liberal economic order and its dire impact on the farmers, poor working classes, Adivasis and the laborers in the informal sectors. In the mainstream media there is a visible absence of stories and news reports that reprimand the rich business groups, builder lobbies and powerful corporations for their neglect towards ecological concerns, constitutional modalities and other ethical practices meant for the safeguards of the poor. The mainstream media circulates and propagates the exclusive business and corporate events as the symbol of India’s economic development, neglecting the substantive issues of economic disparities, under development of cities and towns, growing unemployment and insecurities amongst youths and the crises within the agricultural sector. Ironically, the powerful middle class segments are comfortable with such showcasing and comfortable in neglecting the issues and problems of the worst-off social groups and working classes.
Abhish K. Bose : The uneven economic inequalities are reflected in the human development indexes too. As per the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2018 India is on 130th place among 189 countries. How does economic inequality manifest in the human development front?
Harish S. Wankhede: The human development index is published to judge the qualitative improvement in the people’s life on the indicators of education, health, food securities, clean environment, access to basic human freedoms, etc. In the Indian context, it is often acknowledged that the vast population in India is denied the basic human entitlements and they visibly survive as mere human bodies. People living in urban ghettos, jhuggis, homeless, poor migrants, daily wage earners, workers engaged in precarious jobs like sanitation and scavenging, etc. account a significant population that often remains outside the policy deliberation. Even in the rural spheres, landless people, agrarian poor labouring classes, Dalits, etc. face similar difficulties and exploitation. These worst-off sections face brutal social discrimination, conditions of lawlessness and perpetual insecurities. Though there are announcements of various policies and welfare schemes to empower these groups from their oppressive conditions, a majority amongst these groups remain at the worst-off conditions.
The current regime at the centre is extremely clever when it has to deal with the issues of economic disparities. It has promoted itself as a party that has reintroduced various welfare schemes, pro-poor policies and helped the vulnerable sections (like women) to escape the precarious economic conditions. The announcement of the grand welfare schemes, like free food to 80 crore families under the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Anna Yojana (PMGKAY), is also an acknowledgement by the government that a vast majority of the population needs state’s support to survive. Similar claims of building 2 crore houses for the poor under Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana (Urban) also highlights that the benefits of economic liberalization have not reached the poor classes and the worst-off social groups and therefore they require state’s intervention. However in such flagship programs, more than the discussion on the actual conditions of the poor, it is the celebration of PM Modi as the mascot of such policies that takes the central stage.
On the other hand, it is also visible that the state’s expenditure on key welfare schemes (like the SC/ST developmental budget) has not been according to the demands of the social groups. The state expenditure on education is constant at below 3 percent, whereas for the subsidies (Gas, fertilizer, loans, etc.) and welfare schemes (like MANREGA) the budgetary allocation is not substantive. Such neglect and absence of substantive policy framework for the welfare and empowerment of the poor and other vulnerable communities, allows the middle class and capitalist elites to exploit their skills, labour and talent without making them equal beholders of capitalist economic development. This gap is widening today, making the poor more dependent upon the mercies of the middle class and the government’s material doles for their precarious and undignified survival.
Abhish K. Bose: The Modi dispensation is pursuing the economic policies of the Congress governments led by Manmohan Singh favouring the corporate sector. So the BJP and the Congress are economically same whereas politically different. How did this similarity in economy and differences in political programmes distinguishes both parties?
Harish S. Wankhede: On many accounts there is a small difference between the BJP and the Congress over the prospect of India’s economic development. The Congress since late 1980s showed its open commitment towards liberalization, privatization and globalization of the Indian economy. The neo-liberal economic agenda was officially announced in1991, shifting the socialist priorities of the government towards expansion of the private economy by the global capital. The BJP has expanded the hopes of people from liberalization to new heights, almost making them believe that India is scaling the growth ladder faster and would soon topple the US and China on various parameters of development.
The small difference between the two can be measured on their distinct ideological values. The Congress was committed to promote big capitalist enterprises and privatisation of the public sector units, it has not created such a mega nationalist uproar around such initiatives, the way BJP is indulging into. Further, the Congress party often showcased the old socialist moorings and in the UPA II regime, announced extensive welfare schemes and economic packages for the betterment of the farmers, Adivasis and other marginalized communities (including policies like the MANREGA).
The BJP is aggressive in its commitment towards neo-liberal economic growth, has overtly distanced itself from the problems of the poor people and the working classes and provided a nationalist attire to the idea of growth. It manufactures a sentimental populism around India’s pitch for economic growth against China and other developed European countries (like the recent episode of promoting Lakshadweep against Maldives) and creates a nationalist zeal for higher economic growth. Such nationalist race disengages the people from questioning the government about the developmental projects and its linkage with poverty reduction, rural development and ecological protections. Under the BJP’s realm the idea of economic growth has been attached to the sentiment of nationalism mainly to curb and arrest any criticism of the government’s agenda of privatization of the Indian economy. The right-wing is more comfortable in associating itself with the big capitalist lobbies and business houses (like Adani) rather than building its image as the party that is committed to the welfare of the poor and marginalized social groups. Building such a hyper image brings the BJP closer to the middle class constituencies that often look at welfare schemes for the poor as wastage of state’s resources on undeserving people.
Abhish K. Bose: Ajay Gudavarthy in JNU argues that BJP under Modi is practising de-institutionalization, and personalized authority structures. That UPA and BJP are therefore different in their economic policy. Data and statistical analysis has also drastically gone down. How do you comment on his postulation?
Harish S. Wankhede: Absolutely! The new version of governance under the BJP, particularly the PM Modi-centric functionality of the state is antithetical to the values of deliberative and democratic form of governance. The iconic image that the ruling establishment wishes to create around Modi’s personality is aggressive and cannot be challenged by opposition’s arguments. The Modi-centric campaign even wishes to surpass the ideals of other great leaders of modern India like Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi on the scale of mass popularity, personal achievements and International stature. Importantly, his persona as the revivalist of the Hindu cultural nationalism adds an additional feature in his personality. Such ‘cult-like’ figures promise populist welfare initiatives for the poor or greater economic development, not as the responsible act of the government, but his personal philanthropic gesture or his ‘guarantee’ to the people (remember the campaign: Modi ki Guarantee!). Here the duties and official responsibilities of other ministries are bundled under the PM’s office and he will in his personal capacities deliver the welfare goods. Such euphoria and dream-like situations about the PM’s ability to deliver has consistently been constructed by the mass Media, film industry and other sources of communication.
Abhish K. Bose: The mass mobilisation on the eve of the PranPrathishta of Ram temple has mobilised people cutting across the country. Does the pan Indian mass mobilisation for the purpose of the temple consecration created an atmosphere for favouring BJP in the elections? Do you think whether this mass mobilisation consolidate in favour of BJP electorally? Isn’t there a rationale to think that this mobilisation on the eve of the elections are pre – planned and aimed at the imminent elections?
Harish S. Wankhede: The right-wing has always built a powerful connection between religion and the polity. After Mahatma Gandhi, the BJP is the only national party that utilized the Hindu cultural and religious symbols to mobilize the masses without much apprehension. This intimate association with Hindu religious symbols and cultural artefacts has made this party an impressive challenger to the ‘secular’ ruling elites of the Congress party in the past and has extended its influence over the common mass over the period. The creation of Hindutva’s cultural nationalism is on the basis of the allegation that in post-Independent India, the Hindus are persecuted, whereas the religious minorities (especially the Muslims) are protected and prioritised by the schemes and policies of governments. The criminal ‘othering’ of the Muslims as filthy, backward, patriarchal and anti-national is often manufactured through various channels, creating a public psychosis around the Muslim question.
To push the Muslim further into the margins of political discourse, the demolition of the Babri Masjid was celebrated as the marker of the Hindu awakening, as the end of the repressed emotions of the Hindus and as the arrival of the Hindu renaissance. BJP build this emotive connect successfully and mobilized the people, creating a fanatic section that sees no trouble to indulge in violence, riots and lynching of the Muslims.
With the Supreme Court’s verdict on the Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid issue, it is evident that the religious issues are no more private affairs of the people but can be utilized to propel mega political events. The BJP planned the consecration ceremony of the Ram Mandir as the biggest cultural event of recent times. It wanted to make it a memorable public event not for the cultural and religious value but as an event that has become possible because of the BJP’s authoritative presence in the national government.
The consecration ceremony is deliberately created as a political event, organized and monitored by the BJP. The major opposition parties and many key political influencers were excluded (like India’s president Draupadi Murmu and BJP’s ex-president Lal Krishna Advani), from the ceremony mainly to highlight the presence of PM Modi as the sole ‘star’ of the public function. The national media promoted this event as the symbol of India’s cultural heritage and BJP’s deep commitment to reassert India’s image as the country of Hindus. It attracted a grand response from the public and large section of people overtly showcased their involvement in celebrating this event. Hindu religious symbols (like the image of lord Ram) and its association with the BJP is a well-crafted political strategy that connects the common Hindus with the Hindutva party and build an organic force.
For the current opposition there are no alternative cultural strategies or mobilizational tactics that can challenge the BJP on the political ground. Especially no one in the opposition is thinking creatively to challenge the Hindutva’s juggernaut on the cultural front. The only possibility that has often been proposed is to forge a greater alliance (INDIA) of all the opposition parties and defeat the BJP in the elections. Even on this account the opposition is doing terrible, allowing the BJP to sway the general masses with new welfare promises, public events and new communal issues (like the Gyanwapi Masjid controversy)
Abhish K. Bose: The preparations for the consecration of the temple has begun few months before the scheduled event. The RSS activists gave the soil from Ayodhya to each of the hindu households in the country. Since in India the Hindus and Muslims are living inextricably interlinked, there is a chance of the susceptibility of the occurrence of communal polarisation among the population. Does this reignites the partially healed wounds?
Harish S. Wankhede: Without the Hindu-Muslim polarisation, right-wing political acts cannot be imagined. Its ideological base is crafted on the call of liberating India from the clutch of secularism that provide safeguards to the religious minorities. The second aspect of the same ideology is to convert the general Hindu mass as the aggressive proponents of Hindutva’s ideological version, accepting it as the synonym for Indian nationalism. The right-wing organizations sincerely indulge into Hindu religious and cultural events, that involves appropriation of the cultural symbols associated with the Dalit-Bahujan and Adivasi (DBA) groups. Most importantly, these symbols are further utilized to build a communal outlook against the Muslim minorities.
The contemporary right-wing project of Hindu revivalism is not overtly based on the conventional Brahmanical identities, cultural symbols or sacred values. Instead, the neo-Hindutva has shown flexibility and adopted various cultural strategies to influence the DBA groups to found a new meaning of Hindu revivalism. Such strategies include the possible appropriation of Ambedkar’s intellectual persona into the mainstream nationalist discourse. Ambedkar’s political views are ‘saffronise’ and he is often referred for his anti-Muslim rhetoric and as the critic of the Islamic social practices. Hindutva’s current version has developed a powerful craft to utilise the emotive and sentimental signifiers popular amongst the subaltern groups and integrate it into the communal Hindutva discourse. The DBA’s cultural symbols and narratives are now appreciated and appropriated as the integral part of the grand Hindu civilizational ethos and propel them to act on its behalf. The idea that soil for the Ram Temple shall be collected from various places (including places associated with the Dalit groups) is to connect a heterogenous section of people into the event.
Large sections of the Dalits are conventionally attached to the Hindu religious traditions and overwhelmingly engaged in various local rituals and folklore. The Hindutva ideologues understand the historic relationship of lower caste groups with the Hindu spiritual and religious conventions and have systematically intervened into this sphere to rebuild the bond. The local cultural artefacts and symbols are politicized to build an abstract relationship with the Brahmanical cultural heritage, and also to create challenges to the secular, progressive readings of these symbols and events. The BJP is Machiavellian in manipulating these local traditions as it not only identifies the DBA events as the signifier of ancient Hindu civilizational practices but also provides impetus to disturb the Hindu-Muslim social life that periodically ignites communal clashes. A critical study on communal riots in UP has demonstrated that the BJP has utilized various strategies to engage sections within the Dalits and mobilize them on communal agenda. The Babri Masjid in such discourse emerges as the powerful symbol of Muslim occupation and domination. Common people’s engagement with the consecration event, thus invites the religious site not only for spiritual bliss but as a political act, that challenges the presence of Muslims in India.
Abhish K. Bose: Given the depth and variety of Hindu religious faith and practice, how much lasting unity will result from the saturation coverage of the temple inauguration, and the promotional discourse along with it? Given the long-standing suspicions towards political power, and marginalization of the poor in general, how much credence can we give to the apparently unshakeable popularity of Modi?
Harish S. Wankhede: The common people’s religiosity and spiritual values are surely distinct from Hindutva’s cultural nationalism. Especially people belonging to the lower social strata, the Dalits, Bahujan and Adivasi (DBA) cultivate their independent social and cultural orientation to quench their spiritual thirst. The DBA’s political understanding, in principle, stands for social justice, fraternity, and substantive participation of these groups in the economic development of the nation. It appears that these caveats within the Hindus would challenge the Brahmanical promotion of Hindutva politics. However, it is also evident that the Hindutva’s call for nationalist integration of DBA’s has often communalize their social identities and religious symbols. Ironically, the opposition’s criticism that the BJP possess fascist tendencies and practice anti-Muslim politics has not emerge a substantive reason for the subalterns DBA groups to reject the right-wing appeal for cultural assimilation. Instead, DBA’s Hindu cultural past and civilizational roots brings them closer to Hindutva politics. In reverse, the right-wing acknowledges the heterogenous cultural claims raised by the subaltern groups and offers it a dignified space in its political calendar. Further, to show its growing intimacy the BJP promoted an alternative version of social justice and showed its readiness to provide them representation (though symbolic) in the political institutions.
The powerful image of Narendra Modi has been built upon the idea that Hindutva is an overarching political platform and has been offering respectable space to the DBA groups in political and cultural spheres.
For the traditional Hindutva ideologue, the Phule-Ambedkar ideological school is a bête-noir that shall be clamp down by coercive and violent means. Multiple cases of anti-Dalit atrocities, social discrimination and vandalization of Ambedkar’s statues demonstrate the hatred and neglect towards the Dalits’ claim for social justice. The social order is still contaminated by the Brahmanical religiosity, with continued domination of the social elites and deepening antagonisms between the Dalit-Bahujan castes. However, the socially marginalized groups are growingly joining the rightwing platforms, deserting the possibility of Dalit-Bahujan unity to destabilize the domination of social elites in political and social spheres. Instead, the young generation amongst these groups admires the BJP for offering a masochistic image to the nation, for its audacious claim of prosperity and development and for reigniting the Hindu cultural renaissance. Under such bewitchment, the DBA groups often refuse to acknowledge that the political resources, the privileges and power in public institutions and the benefits of economic development are overly exploited by the social elite minority. They also fail to accept that the Phule-Ambedkar ideological perspective has the capacity to liberate them from the hegemonic domination of the Brahmanical social elites and can make them independent agents of their cultural assertion and economic empowerment. Only if the DBA groups can raise their own cultural and political challenges against the domination of the social elites in powerful political positions and reprimand the Hindutva hegemony as the power for the Brahmanical cultural values, will the masses remain engulfed in right-wing propaganda.
Abhish K. Bose: Hinduism, like Christianity, was a world-denying religion, and held spiritual goals far above worldly pursuits. Gandhi exemplified these traits, refusing any position despite his leadership of the independence struggle. Christianity’s shift to a world-embracing stance happened over centuries, with religious reforms following the break-up of the Holy Roman Empire. Hinduism’s shift seems to have happened very quickly, over the past three decades or so, and it now aspires to make India like Israel, where religion is purely political and in fact represents the racial identity of Jews (only those whose mother was Jewish can claim citizenship in Israel eg). Can you comment?
Harish S. Wankhede: For more than a century (since the publication of Savarkar’s Hindutva), the creation of a disciplined, unified religious identity for the Hindus was an apostle goal of the Hindutva practitioners. The virtues of modernity, like secularism and social justice often created grand challenges against such aggressive design till the recent past. The right-wing has learnt from its fallouts and limitations and arranged innovative strategies and events to create a popular version of Hindutva, distinct from its ‘Brahmanical/upper caste laden’ version. The new Hindutva version is bold and smart as it is ready to indulge with the claims and demands of various socio-cultural groups within the Hindus and appropriate their distinct values. The new version of Hindutva is not necessarily based on erasing social and cultural differences between the Hindus (like the caste appendages), instead it allows the common people to celebrate it as a part of Hindu civilizational values, thus making them an integral part of Hindu cultural tradition. In such an arrangement, there is no space for spirituality, building a humanitarian common good or to treat each other as equal.
On the other hand, the new version of Hindutva is different from the ideals and values practiced by many other Hindu religious thinkers like Shankaracharya, Vivekananda and Gandhi. The great Gurus, peers and spiritual leaders have sermonized that the religious ideals shall promote spiritual awakening, build an ethical social order and educate the followers to work for the benefit of humanity. These teachings are based on the values of peace and love, tolerance and tranquillity, sacrifice and care to create a society of enlightened people. Within the political discourse of Hindutva these values are often treated as the symbol of powerlessness. The new version creates a deep interaction of religion with power, especially political power and denies much space to discuss the ideas of spirituality, transcendence or even humanity.
Instead, the Hindutva version of religion is connected not to the values of spirituality or humanity but with the political and militant version of cultural nationalism. This model is xenophobic (fear of the Muslims), highlights the superiority of the Hindus over the non-Hindus and promotes militant and violent action to showcase its power. This version is extremely dangerous as it mobilizes the majority sentiment against the vulnerable social groups, religious minorities and against those who are not comfortable with the current version of Hindutva (like the Left). On many events, such aggressive displays of power have entered into intolerant behaviour of the gathering, resulting in communal riots, violence and growth of communal antagonism against the Muslims.
Abhish K. Bose: For Nehru, dams were going to be the temples of modern India. Today temples are themselves the symbol, stimulus and goal of development, it sometimes seems. Can you comment on this seeming contradiction?
Harish S. Wankhede: The BJP has managed to play these contradictions well in the current times. The persona of Modi is celebrated not only for his significant role in the Ram Janmabhoomi movement that has now resulted in the opening of grand Ram Temple in Ayodhya but he is also promoted as the man that will take India into the ranks of most developed capitalist countries. Both the spheres: the Hindu culture awakening and India’s capitalist development in the global economy are crafted very well by the current dispensation.
Nehru has been remembered and celebrated in India for being a great modernist, secular nationalist, having deep affinities with the socialist ideological values for the development of India. Modi wishes to counter Nehru’s personality with alternative values and symbols. Modi is now projected as the heightened Hindu revivalist with close tie-ups with international finance capital that wish to develop India as a bold neo-liberal economy. Amongst the middle classes, the popularity of the renewed Hindu cultural sphere is as equal as its appreciation for the economic liberalization. The BJP promotes itself as a party that is capable of delivering on both the fronts of cultural nationalism and neo-liberal economic reforms.
The BJP’s fascination for Hindu cultural revivalism and neo-liberal capitalist growth surely takes it away from the problems and crises that the poor, working classes, farmers and the Adivasis face in their everyday life. This neglect of poor and socially marginalized poor is yet to become a concern within the political discourse today, however the crises and exploitative socio-economic conditions for these groups are real and frightening. The deep indulgence of the right-wing with the middle class economic issues and cultural interests of the social elites will soon be witnessed and examined by the other suffering groups. The grand political change will come when the poor classes, socially marginalized communities, farmers and Adivasis will take up the streets and will expose the fallacy of BJP’s cultural nationalism and the dire impact of neo-liberal economic growth.
A journalist with fifteen of years of experience Abhish K Bose was a staffer at The Times of India and The Deccan Chronicle – Asian Age. As a contributor, his interviews and articles have been published in Frontline magazine, The Wire, The Print, The Telegraph, The Federal, The News Minute, Scroll, The Kochi Post, Countercurrents.org, The Telegraph, Madhyamam Weekly and the Asian Lite international published out of Manchester.
